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Employment of a very large number of antennas is seen as the key technology to provide
future users with very high data rates. At the same time, the implementation complexity
will rise due to large memories required and sophisticated signal processing algorithms
employed. Continuous technology downscaling allows implementation of such complex
digital designs. At the same time, its inherent variability and vulnerability to physical
disturbances violate the assumption of perfectly reliable hardware operation.
This work considers Unique Word OFDM which represents the alternative to the stan-
dard Cyclic Prefix OFDM providing superior detection quality. The generalization of
Unique Word OFDM to a MIMO system is performed which allows interpretation as a
virtual massive MIMO system with only few physical antennas. Detection methods for
the introduced generalization are discussed and their performance is quantified. Because
of the large memory size required, linear detection represents the cost and performance
effective solution. The possible memory errors due to radiation effects or voltage scaling
are addressed and the nonlinear MMSE detection algorithm is proposed. This algorithm
keeps track of the memory errors and is able to significantly mitigate their effect on the
quality of the estimated data.
Apart of memory issues, reliability of the actual computational hardware which con-
stitutes the receiver is of concern in this work. An own implementation of the MMSE
Sorted Givens Rotations is subjected to transient fault injection. The impact of faults
in various parts of the implemented circuit on the detection performance is quantified.
Most vulnerable components of the implemented circuit in terms of reliability are iden-
tified.
Security is another major address of this work, since most current implementations
include cryptographic devices. Fault-based attacks on such systems are known to be
able to extract the secret key in feasible time. The remaining part of this work addresses
such fault injection-based malicious attacks. Countermeasures based on a combination
iii
of information and hardware redundancy are considered. Recently introduced robust
codes target such attacks by providing guaranteed detection capability. The performance
of these codes is assessed by application to actual cryptographic and general purpose
circuits. The work introduces metrics that help to identify fault locations in the circuit
which could escape detection with high probability. These locations are targeted by
transistor resizing that renders fault injection unfeasible.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Massive multiple-antenna (MIMO) systems have recently gained attention as potential
means to improve spectral efficiency, link quality and coverage compared to contempo-
rary small-scale MIMO [1]. This is achieved by employing hundreds of antennas. The
improvements come at the cost of the computational complexity increase at the receiver
[2].
Realization of such complex architectures should become possible thanks to the con-
tinuous shrinking of complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) devices during
recent years. However, continuous downscaling reached a point, where the expected
characteristics of the produced devices cannot be guaranteed [3]. For example, leakage
and drive currents vary from one produced die to the other. Sources of such variations
include fluctuations of geometric dimensions due to lithographic and etching techniques
and variable number of dopant atoms [4]. Furthermore, reducing transistor size makes
it susceptible to temperature variations, which accelerate the wear-out. Reducing scale
makes the CMOS devices more vulnerable to ionizing radiation, such as alpha particles
or high-energy neutrons from cosmic radiation. The latter do not damage the device
permanently, but may change the values of the processed or stored logic values, leading
to errors that could manifest themselves in wrongly computed variables of the algorithm
that is run on this device and compromise the algorithm’s correctness and/or perfor-
mance. It has to be concluded that the assumption of perfectly reliable hardware does
not hold anymore.
Whereas the above conclusions are drawn for hardware in general, their impact on imple-
mentations of prospect communication systems has not been largely addressed. Assum-
ing systems with hundreds of antennas, application of classical fault-tolerance measures
such as modular redundancy [5] is infeasible due to large number of components. Usage
of commercial off-the-shelf components renders radiation hardening not suitable either.
As massive MIMO systems require memories of large size, applying classical error de-
tecting code protection [5] will prove costly in terms of area and power consumption
increase. Fault tolerance requirement and the nature of operation of communications
systems are related, since the latter always process noisy data and therefore already
1
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possess some inherent resilience. Therefore, recent research trend is to modify the de-
tection algorithm, taking into account the variability of the underlying hardware, such
that the graceful performance degradation is achieved [6]. This controlled degradation
is then traded off for reduction of power consumption, allowing energy efficient design
[7]. However, these developments consider only generic signal processing subsystems or
small-scale MIMO receivers and no results on massive MIMO systems were available so
far. One objective of this thesis is to propose detection algorithms for large-scale MIMO
systems that take memory errors into account.
The reliability of computational components (apart from memory) that constitute the
sub-blocks of the detection algorithm(s) has not been largely addressed either. It is gen-
erally not clear, whether one part of the implemented computation is more vulnerable to
hardware imperfections than the other. This issue is addressed in this work by analyzing
the effect of transient faults in individual sub-components of the QR decomposition (one
of the receivers’ principal blocks) on the overall detection quality.
As by far most current systems (and communication systems are not an exception) in-
clude cryptographic components, security is another focus of this thesis. The reliability
and security are related issues in nanoscale electronics, susceptibility of circuits to dis-
turbances allows performing fault-based attacks. These malicious fault injections can
be used to perform cryptanalysis and gain access to sensitive information such as secret
keys. Among other countermeasures, a class of nonlinear error detecting codes referred
to as robust codes has been proposed [8]. Theoretically, robust codes guarantee detec-
tion of errors caused by malicious attacks. However, their construction and performance
characteristics are based on simplifying assumptions and do not take the structure of
actual circuits into account. This work assesses the performance of robust codes applied
to actual circuits and refines their theoretical characteristics.
1.2 Literature review
Recently the authors of [9] introduced new variant of orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) which is closely related to massive MIMO. It is denoted as unique
word (UW) OFDM. The difference lies in the encoding of sub-carriers, such that they
can be regarded as a virtual (massive) MIMO system, whereas in standard cyclic prefix
OFDM (CP-OFDM), the sub-carriers represent orthogonal channels. The size of the
resulting virtual channel matrix is governed by the number of sub-carriers employed.
The unique word signaling has been initially introduced for single-antenna systems
(SISO). The inherent coding across sub-carriers allows much better detection quality
compared to SISO CP-OFDM [10, 11]. This is achieved by inherent coding gain and
ability to apply MIMO detection algorithms such as linear minimum mean square er-
ror (LMMSE) or sphere decoding (SD), which are not applicable to single antenna
CP-OFDM. Application of sphere decoding to UW-OFDM has been published in [12].
However, the exponential complexity of SD restricted its use only to systems with low
number of sub-carriers [12, 13]. The relation to massive MIMO has not been yet elab-
orated and detection algorithms specifically developed for large scale systems have not
been considered.
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A fair comparison of SISO UW-OFDM to SISO CP-OFDM is impossible in general.
UW-OFDM clearly outperforms CP-OFDM in SISO case [10, 11], due to the fact that
it is essentially a (massive) MIMO system. However, current standards employ MIMO
with Mt transmit and Mr receive physical antennas. UW-OFDM should be extended to
support multiple physical transmit and receive antennas and its performance compared
to MIMO CP-OFDM.
Continuous shrinking of CMOS devices allowed implementation of complex and low
power designs both in general purpose computing and in application specific computing.
They are susceptible to process variations and soft errors that introduce computational
errors affecting the performance of higher layers [4]. Addressing this issue by up scaling
the power supply voltage contradicts with the low power requirement. Using traditional
hardware redundancy methods introduces additional area overhead and in turn increases
the power consumption.
The novel approaches to provide hardware variation resilient operation can be classi-
fied to circuit-architecture co-design approaches and algorithm-architecture code-design
approaches. The examples of circuit-architecture level techniques are RAZOR [14] and
CRISTA [15]. RAZOR uses dynamic detection and correction of circuit timing errors
by using a shadow latch. The key idea of RAZOR is to tune the supply voltage by mon-
itoring the error rate during circuit operation, thereby eliminating the need for voltage
margins and exploiting the data dependence of circuit delay [14]. CRISTA allows volt-
age overscaling (VOS) by prediction-based elastic clocking [15]. It isolates the critical
paths of the design and provides an extra clock cycle for these paths. These methods
are applicable to general purpose computing.
Algorithm-architecture co-design methods are advantageous when information from the
application can be used. For example, signal processing applications are working on
noisy data and do not require correction of all occurring errors. The resilience measures
take the application metrics such as signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or bit error ratio (BER)
into account. Based on these performance metrics some amount of computational errors
caused by variations of the underlying hardware can be potentially tolerated, leading to
energy-efficient design. These methods can be roughly classified into significance driven
approach (SDA) [16–18] and stochastic computing [19], however there is no strict dis-
tinction between these classes and the concrete algorithms may share common features.
The SDA uses the fact that not all computations of a particular algorithm are equally
important for the quality of the algorithm output. Significant parts of the algorithm
are constrained to be computed in a fraction of a cycle time. This approach has been
applied to video processing designs [16].
The idea of stochastic computing is to treat the computational errors caused by timing
errors or transient faults due to particle strikes as additional source of noise. The error
correction is then performed in statistical sense, such that some cost function defined
by the application is optimized. Stochastic computing features methods like algorithmic
noise tolerance (ANT) [20, 21] and soft N-modular redundancy (soft NMR) [22]. ANT
targets timing errors introduced by voltage overscaling. The architecture contains the
main device, which is allowed to produce wrong outputs due to VOS and an estimator
block which computes the same function as the main device, but produces a known
systematic error. With the knowledge of the statistics of the correct output of the main
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device and the systematic error introduced by the estimator block, the decision device
picks either one of them such that the overall error is minimized [23].
Soft NMR differs from the classical NMR in the voter algorithm [22]. The voter in soft
NMR treats the outputs of the N identical devices as multiple noisy measurements of
some parameter. It then uses estimation theory to design decision rule, which optimizes
some given cost function. It does not mask the error by majority voting but corrects
the errors in the statistical sense. For example, if the error is known to have Gaussian
distribution and the cost function is the minimum mean square error (MMSE), the
corrected output of the soft NMR voter is simply the average value of the N outputs.
In terms of MIMO receivers, an algorithm that uses stochastic computing or a sort of soft
NMR has been proposed in [24]. The outputs of Mr receive antennas are treated as out-
puts of N identical modules. Here, the compound noise term is formed that comprises
the errors introduced by hardware and the errors due to noise in the communication
channel. This compound noise is modeled by a mixture distribution, where the Gaus-
sian distribution of the channel noise is picked with probability 1 −  and an arbitrary
contaminant distribution is picked with probability . Next, robust statistics are used to
seek for outliers and robust LMMSE estimate of the transmit symbol vector is obtained.
Unfortunately, there are no details given on how to pick a particular contaminant dis-
tribution and how it relates to actual hardware induced errors. Also, no insights are
provided on how to identify the outliers and most importantly, the performance of the
method in terms of detection quality has not been assessed.
A related work has been performed by authors of [25]. Here, a model that combines
channel noise and memory errors due to VOS has been proposed. Based on this model,
they proposed modified detection algorithm that uses the combined model in deciding
on the transmitted symbol [6]. However, their work addresses solely small-scale MIMO
systems and therefore uses simplifying assumptions on memory error distribution. The
proposed model, with necessary refinements, will be the used in this work to modify
detection algorithms suitable for large-scale MIMO systems.
Other memory components of MIMO receiver have been addressed as well. It has been
shown in [26] that when the hardware errors occur in the input buffers of the channel
decoder it is still possible to recover even from high error rates by simply increasing the
number of decoding iterations. The hardware errors in the log-likelihood ratio (LLR)
buffer have been analyzed in [27]. These errors are not critical, as the LLR represents the
confidence in the decoded bit (positive for 0 and negative for 1). Thus, it is essentially
only necessary to protect the sign bit of the stored LLR value [28].
The channel preprocessing block turns out to be the most critical. It has been shown
in [29] that the errors in the input buffer to the channel preprocessing drastically spoil
the receivers’ performance even at low error rates, due to propagation to successor
blocks. In general, errors lead to mismatch between decomposed channel matrix and re-
ceived vector, rendering further detection and decoding useless. The QR decomposition
that implements channel preprocessing is a simple and stable algorithm when working
with fixed point arithmetic. Apart from that stability it does not posses any inher-
ent resilience. It is suggested in [28] to protect it by low level techniques. The actual
computational components of the receiver implementation have not been yet addressed.
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Cryptographic circuits and further security-related devices are vulnerable to malicious
attacks by fault injection [30, 31]. A circuit which processes protected data is run while
being subjected to physical disturbances, and the outcome of calculation, observed at the
circuit’s outputs, is analyzed. One such technique is differential fault analysis [32]: the
difference between fault-affected and fault-free executions is used to derive the secret
information stored in the device. A number of fault-injection techniques have been
suggested, ranging from rather imprecise voltage or clock-frequency manipulation [30]
to highly accurate pinpointed impact by laser pulses [33] or electromagnetic emissions
[34]. Successful attacks have been reported for a variety of well-known ciphers [35–37],
under different assumption of the attacker’s capability to inject faults. While a number
of techniques to advertently inject faults into a circuit are known [30], the most promising
method with high spatial and temporal resolution uses a laser beam to generate carriers
(electrons and holes) that induce parasitic currents and ultimately result in a bit flip.
The latest generation of fault-based attacks against state-of-the-art ciphers [35, 38–41]
requires only very few successful fault injections, but the exact time and location of each
performed fault injection must be controlled with a very high precision.
Countermeasures mainly consist of making the device physically inaccessible or em-
ploying fault detection [30]. The device is put into a tamper-proof case with intrusion
detection. Fault detection techniques included duplication / modular redundancy and
respective variations thereof with voting on the outputs. The drawback of these meth-
ods is the large imposed overhead. Another approach is to apply error detecting codes.
Usually linear codes are used, however more powerful nonlinear (robust) codes have been
recently proposed [8].
1.3 Contributions
This thesis aims at achieving fault-tolerant large-scale MIMO communication systems,
taking into account their specific properties. The individual chapters address different
aspects of this global goal. The key contributions of this thesis are summarized below:
• Generalization of UW-OFDM to a MIMO system is performed. The resulting sys-
tem is interpreted as a virtual massive MIMO system allowing application of quasi
maximum likelihood detection – likelihood ascent search (LAS). It is found that
encoding the individual data streams (relative to transmit antennas) by distinct
non-systematic UW generator matrices improves LAS BER performance. The
soft output LAS does not perform well in a MIMO UW-OFDM coded system.
Therefore, the LAS algorithm is modified to take into account the log likelihood
ratios provided by its initial solution. The resulting maximum a posteriori prob-
ability LAS and proposed soft output computation deliver better performance in
a coded system than the original LAS algorithm. Thorough simulations of MIMO
UW-OFDM and standard MIMO CP-OFDM are performed and their performance
compared.
• A novel memory error resilient nonlinear MMSE-based detection algorithm for
memory dominated massive MIMO system is proposed. The algorithm builds
up on the linear MMSE detection with moderate additional computational effort.
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The single-element single-bit flip assumption is relaxed, and the proposed solution
targets the multiple-element single flip scenario. The simulation results show that
even for high memory error rates, the proposed algorithm is able to significantly
reduce the impact of the memory errors on the overall receiver performance in
terms of BER.
• An architecture for MMSE sorted QR decomposition based on Givens rotations
implemented by conventional fixed point arithmetic is introduced. It is derived
directly from the classical systolic array implementation of conventional Givens
rotations. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first non-Gram-
Schmidt MMSE sorted QR decomposition implementation using conventional fixed
point arithmetic that meets the real-time constraints imposed by the long-term
evolution (LTE) standard.
• The first analysis of reliability of the implemented QR decomposition block by
actually injecting faults into the hardware, whereas actual works assume solely
memory errors. The computational sub-modules yielding the most performance
degradation are identified and the degradation is quantified in terms of the frame
error ratio (FER) floor.
• A cross-level protection solution, where a light-weight error-detecting code is com-
bined with hardening of insufficiently protected gates using transistor resizing is
proposed. Such gates are determined by FPGA-supported fault injection. A thor-
ough electrical analysis is performed in order to modify the electrical parameters
of these gates such that faults are highly unlikely. Area and power overhead
for a number of error-detecting codes are reported. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, this is the first work which co-optimizes fault handling by information
redundancy and by hardening individual circuit elements. In contrast to high-
level error models considered previously, faults within the combinational logic of
the circuit are considered and distinguished from errors, which are effects of faults
at the circuit’s outputs. The novel attack success rate (ASR) metric of a fault is
proposed that indicates the difficulty to inject a fault that is not detected.
• Robust error-detecting codes that specifically target malicious attacks and guaran-
tee minimal bounds on detection probability are systematically investigated. The
study is based on FPGA-supported fault injection campaigns on the circuit imple-
mentation of a recent lightweight block cipher and its sub-modules. The detection
capabilities of different robust and non-robust codes with respect to both random
faults and malicious attacks, as well as the required overheads are quantified. For
the first time, the performance of a novel punctured cubic code on actual crypto-
graphic circuitry is reported. Experimental results show that robust codes with
a certain number of redundant bits have better detection properties in security
context and higher predictability than their conventional linear counterparts.
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1.4 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides necessary background on wireless communication and details cyclic
prefix and unique word OFDM waveform design. Next, MIMO detection algorithms used
as a basis in this work are introduced. The classical fault tolerance measures along with
approaches specific for signal processing systems are shortly outlined. Finally, details
on fault based attacks and common countermeasures are provided.
Chapter 3 deals with generalization of UW-OFDM to a MIMO system. Simulation
results of detection algorithms specifically tailored for MIMO UW-OFDM are provided.
The results of this research are accepted for publication in [42]. Thereafter, nonlinear
MMSE-based detection algorithms are proposed and their performance is quantified by
simulation for both OFDM waveforms and different memory bit flip probabilities. Main
results of this work are submitted to [43].
Chapter 4 introduces own implementation of MMSE sorted Givens rotations and details
architecture and synthesis results. The implementation is published in [44]. Next, fault
injection experiments are performed that provide insights on most vulnerable computa-
tional components of the implementation. This work is published in [45].
Chapter 5 starts with background on robust codes. Then, fault-based metrics are in-
troduced together with the fault-injection framework. Results on cross-level protection
technique which combines robust codes with hardening of critical fault locations are pro-
vided. This research is published in [46]. Finally, application of robust codes to modern
low-power cipher PRINCE is investigated. This work is published in [47].
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. It puts its outcomes into perspectives, summarizes the
achievements and indicates future research directions.

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter starts with theoretical background on the problem of communication
through wireless multipath channels. The OFDM signaling which is deployed in cur-
rent standards is introduced together with its two versions addressed in this thesis,
namely cyclic prefix and unique word OFDM. Section 2.1.1 discusses the characteristics
of multipath channels and introduces channel classification based on the latter. Here,
the particular channel type that is used later in this thesis is isolated. Section 2.1.2
provides details on CP- and UW-OFDM signaling and highlights their differences. This
section also introduces main building blocks of the transceiver such as channel coding
and modulation. Next, in Sec. 2.2 MIMO CP-OFDM is introduced, followed by relevant
detection algorithms. Finally, Sec. 2.3 provides background on fault tolerance mech-
anisms for contemporary signal processing systems, fault-based attacks and respective
countermeasures.
2.1 Wireless communication
2.1.1 Multipath channels
Data transmission over wireless channels is obscured by physical phenomena of scatter-
ing, reflection and diffraction of radio waves. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. At
the receiver, the receive signal is the superposition of the transmit signal copies asso-
ciated with different propagation paths. The path depicted in solid is the line of sight
path (LOS). Remaining paths are due to distinct scatterers or the clusters of scatterers.
These paths are depicted by dashed lines, where the different dash patterns indicate dif-
ferent amount of delay with respect to the LOS path. In case the delays of the respective
paths are close, they can be combined to a single propagation path with the same delay.
The modulated or bandpass transmit signal can be expressed as [48]
x´(t) = <
{
x(t)ei(2pifct+φ0)
}
(2.1)
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Figure 2.1: Multipath propagation
where x(t) is the complex baseband equivalent [49], fc is the carrier frequency and φ0 is
the initial phase offset.
Assume φ0 = 0. The bandpass receive signal is obtained as the superposition of delayed
versions of x´(t), coming from L(t) propagation paths, which are characterized by their
complex amplitudes al(t) and delays τl(t), l = 0, . . . , L:
y´(t) = <


L(t)∑
l=0
al(t)x(t− τl(t))ei(2pi(fc+fdl )(t−τl(t)))


= <


L(t)∑
l=0
al(t)e
i(−2pi(fc+fdl )τl(t)+2pifdl t)x(t− τl(t))ei2pifct


= <



L(t)∑
l=0
al(t)e
−iφl(t)x(t− τl(t))

 ei2pifct


(2.2)
Looking at the bracketed term reveals that it can be regarded as the complex base-
band equivalent y(t) of the bandpass receive signal y´(t). It can be concluded that the
baseband representation of the receive signal is given as the superposition of scaled and
phase shifted copies of the baseband transmit signal. Using the equivalent baseband
representation allows removing the carrier frequency related term from the subsequent
analysis. The phase shift φl(t) may cause the versions of the transmit signal x(t) to
cancel each other out at the receiver, causing severe receive power drops which is known
as fading.
Finally, considering the above conclusions, the multipath channel is characterized by its
impulse response
h(t, τ) =
L(t)∑
l=0
al(t)e
−iφl(t)δ(τ − τl(t)) (2.3)
where δ(τ − τl(t)) is the Dirac delta function [50]. The phase shift φl(t) is formulated as
φl(t) = 2π(fc + fdl)τl(t)− 2πfdlt. (2.4)
The channel impulse response (CIR) in Eq. 2.3 is time-varying. The complex amplitude
al(t) depends on the characteristics of reflecting/scattering materials and changes slowly
Chapter 2. Background 11
transmitter receiver
(a) Channel at time t1
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(b) Channel at time t2
Figure 2.2: Time-varying multipath channel
over time relative to changes of the phase shift φl(t). This phase shift depends on the
time-varying delays τl(t), where each delay is associated with a distinct propagation
path l. The overall number L of propagation paths and the values of the respective
delays change over time as the receiver moves around in the multipath environment.
Consider an example in Fig. 2.2. At time t1, there are propagation paths defined by their
amplitudes al, delays τl and angles of arrival (AoA) θl(t). The l = 0 path corresponds
to the LOS. The AoA is measured with respect to the antenna broadside. That is, if
the transmitter and receiver are right in front (LOS path in Fig. 2.2a), AoA = 0o. In
the next time instance t2, the receiver has moved to another location and now there are
only two propagation paths. The path parameters α′i, τ
′
i , θ
′
i are marked with prime to
emphasize their time-varying nature.
The overall phase shift φl(t) also depends on the Doppler frequency fdl . The Doppler
effect manifests itself as the change of the perceived carrier frequency at the receiver due
to the relative movement of the transmitter, receiver and/or the multipath environment
[48, 50]. The Doppler frequency quantifies the amount of this change. Consider the
moving receiver depicted in Fig. 2.3 The receiver moves with speed v, and it requires
receiver
transmitter
A B
Figure 2.3: Doppler effect
the time ∆t to move from point A to point B. The difference in distance which the wave
has to travel is given by ∆d, measured in wavelengths. The introduced phase shift due
to ∆d is obtained as
∆φ =
2π∆d
λ
=
2π
λ
v∆t cos θ (2.5)
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where λ is the wavelength and θ is the AoA. The Doppler frequency is then obtained
from the given phase shift as
fd =
∆φ
2π∆t
=
v
λ
cos θ = fc
v
c
cos θ (2.6)
where fc is the carrier frequency and c is the speed of light. Therefore, the Doppler
frequency is the function of the carrier frequency, speed and AoA. It increases with
increasing the carrier frequency. Doppler shift is also directly proportional to the receiver
speed v. Given the carrier frequency and the receiver speed, the Doppler frequency is
maximal if θ = 0o:
fd,max = fc
v
c
(2.7)
The AoAs also change over time as the receiver moves around in the scattering environ-
ment as indicated in Fig. 2.2, thereby contributing to changing Doppler frequencies and
associated phase shifts.
Therefore, the multipath channel can be parametrized with respect to delay τ and time t.
The values of the parameters allow channel classification in terms of their frequency and
temporal variation. These parameters and the respective classification are introduced
next.
2.1.1.1 Delay spread
The time domain parameter related to τ is the delay spread Td, which is defined as the
difference between the arrival time of the transmit signal over the LOS propagation path
and the arrival time of the last delayed transmit signal copy [48]. The value of the delay
spread with respect to the symbol duration Ts indicates whether the channel is able to
introduce inter-symbol interference (ISI). In case Ts  Td, the delayed symbol versions
arrive far outside the duration of the symbol and would affect the subsequent symbols,
resulting in ISI. Conversely, if symbol duration is much longer than the delays spread,
Ts  Td, all echoes of the symbol still arrive within its duration and do not affect the
subsequent symbols. In this case the ISI is negligible.
As the CIR of the channel is a random process, the delay spread is a random variable.
It is obtained in terms of the auto-correlation function of the CIR. The CIR auto-
correlation function is defined as
R(τ1, τ2, t,∆t) = E {h∗(τ1, t)h(τ2, t+∆t)} (2.8)
In the general case, the auto-correlation function is computed for all possible combina-
tions of t and τ . The CIR random process is considered wide sense stationary (WSS),
meaning that its auto-correlation function does not depend on the time instant t at
which it is measured, but depends solely on the time shift ∆t [48]. Also the delays τ1
and τ2 of distinct multipath components are considered uncorrelated [48]. Therefore the
auto-correlation function is rewritten as
R(τ,∆t) = E {h∗(τ)h(τ,∆t)} (2.9)
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Figure 2.4: Power delay profile
The auto-correlation function defines the channel power with respect to the propagation
delay τ and the time shift ∆t. The power with respect to the propagation delay is
maximal when ∆t = 0. The CIR auto-correlation function in this case is referred to as
the power delay profile (PDP)
R(τ) = R(τ,∆t = 0) (2.10)
The PDP shows the distribution of power as a function of delay τ . The PDP provides
information on how much power is concentrated in each of the propagation paths that
are associated to the distinct values of τ . In case some paths are conveying very low
power their contribution to the ISI will be negligible. Therefore they can be excluded
from further processing. This way the complexity of reducing ISI is eased. The mean
delay τ¯ and the root mean square delay spread στ are obtained form PDP as
µTd =
∞∫
0
τR(τ)dτ
∞∫
0
R(τ)dτ
(2.11)
and
σTd =
√√√√√√√
∞∫
0
(τ − µTd)2R(τ)dτ
∞∫
0
R(τ)dτ
(2.12)
Consider an exponentially distributed PDP depicted in Fig. 2.4. The value of Td for
which R(τ) ≈ 0 for all τ > Td is referred to as the delay spread. In this case usually
the standard deviation of the PDP is chosen as the value of the delay spread Td. In
case of exponentially distributed PDP, the mean and standard deviation are the same,
therefore any one of the moments can be chosen to represent the delay spread.
2.1.1.2 Coherence bandwidth
In the frequency domain the parameter related to τ is the coherence bandwidth [48]. In
order to capture the time-varying channel in frequency domain, the Fourier transform
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Figure 2.5: Spaced-frequency correlation function
of its CIR is performed with respect to τ .
H(f, t) =
∞∫
−∞
h(τ, t)e−i2pifτdτ (2.13)
Its auto-correlation function is formulated as
R(f1, f2, t,∆t) = E {H∗(f1, t)H(f2, t+∆t)} (2.14)
Assuming wide-sense stationary and uncorrelated scattering, the auto-correlation func-
tion is simplified as
R(f1, f2,∆t) = E


∞∫
−∞
h∗(τ1, t)ei2pif1τ1dτ1
∞∫
−∞
h(τ2, t+∆t)e
−i2pif2τ2dτ2

 (2.15)
=
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
E {h∗(τ1, t)h(τ2, t+∆t)} ei2pif1τ1e−i2pif2τ2dτ1dτ2
=
∫ ∞
−∞
R(τ,∆t)e−i2pi(f2−f1)τdτ
= R(∆f,∆t)
where ∆f = f2 − f1. Therefore, the auto-correlation of the channel transfer function
H(f, t) in frequency depends only on the frequency difference ∆f . At ∆t = 0 this
function is referred to as the spaced-frequency correlation function and is defined as the
Fourier transform of the PDP.
R(∆f) =
∞∫
−∞
R(τ)e−i2pi∆fτdτ (2.16)
Consider the spaced-frequency correlation function depicted in Fig. 2.5. It is obtained
from the exponential PDP in Fig. 2.4. The frequency range Bc, where R(∆f) = 0 for any
∆f > Bc is referred to as the coherence bandwidth. In other words, coherence bandwidth
Bc is the range of frequencies for which the amount of fading can be considered identical.
As the coherence bandwidth is obtained from the PDP, it is proportional to the inverse
of the delay spread: Bc ≈ 1Td .
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The multipath channel can be classified with respect to the discussed parameters as
follows [48–50]:
• Frequency flat channel. With respect to the coherence bandwidth, the channel
is considered frequency flat if Bs  Bc. This means that the whole bandwidth
occupied by the signal undergoes the same amount of fading. Conversely, in time
domain this implies Ts  Td. This condition ensures that the amount of ISI
introduced by the channel is negligible. In particular, the symbol duration should
be at least an order of magnitude larger that the delay spread [48].
• Frequency selective channel. The channel is considered frequency selective if Bs 
Bc. Thereby, the different portions of the signal bandwidth undergo different
distortion introduced by the channel. Conversely, in time domain the frequency
selectivity implies Ts  Td. In particular, if the symbol duration is an order of
magnitude less than the delay spread, a frequency selective channel will introduce
significant ISI.
A communication system can be classified as narrow-band or wide-band only with re-
spect to coherence bandwidth or the delay spread of the channel. Given Td, increasing
the Ts with respect to it would result in decreasing the signal bandwidth Bs. Decreas-
ing Ts relative to Td increases the signal bandwidth Bs and introduces ISI. Therefore,
systems referred to as wide-band are considered to be affected by ISI. Consider a re-
alization of the channel transfer function illustrated in Fig. 2.6. The signal bandwidth
Bs1 spreads across two significant power drops (fades). This indicates that the signal
bandwidth most likely exceeds the channels coherence bandwidth. The signal bandwidth
Bs2 is on the contrary so narrow, that the channel transfer function is almost constant
across it. This indicates that Bs2 is very likely much narrower than Bc. In this case, for
the communication system with Bs2 the channel can be considered a flat fading channel,
whereas the same channel is considered frequency selective for the system with Bs1 .
OFDM communication systems considered in this thesis are classified as wide-band and
are therefore passing the data through a frequency selective channel that introduces ISI.
The ISI is handled by introduction of the cyclic prefix. This process will be explained
in subsequent sections. Along with the parameters related to τ , the parameters related
to the time evolution of the multipath channel are of interest.
2.1.1.3 Doppler power spectrum
The first parameter related to t is the Doppler power spectrum. Consider the scattering
function which is defined as the Fourier transform of the CIR auto-correlation function
with respect to ∆t
S(τ, fd) =
∞∫
−∞
R(τ,∆t)e−i2pifd∆td∆t (2.17)
The scattering function identifies the average power of the multipath channel with re-
spect to the delay τ and Doppler shift fd [48]. The Doppler power spectrum is obtained
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The auto-correlation function R(∆t) shows the variation of the channel with respect to
time t. The range of values of t for which R(∆t) is nonzero is denoted the coherence time
Tc. The value of coherence time gives the time frame in which the CIR is considered
constant. Obviously, the coherence time is approximately inversely proportional to the
Doppler spread of the channel: Tc ≈ 1Bd .
With respect to the introduced time-related channel parameters, the multipath channels
are classified as follows [48, 50]:
• Slow-fading channel. If the channel varies slower than the symbol duration, Ts 
Tc it is considered slow fading. As coherence time is inversely proportional to the
Doppler spread, slow fading implies that Bs  Bd. For example, in the 802.11n
channel model [51], the receiver and the transmitter are considered stationary
and people and/or objects are moving between them. The maximal speed of the
environment was picked v = 1.2 km/h in order to fit the Doppler power spectrum
measurement results [51]. The maximum Doppler frequency is therefore fd = 3
Hz at fc = 2.4 GHz. The channel coherence time is then equal to Tc =
1
2fd
= 0.17
s. The symbol duration in 802.11n is Ts = 0.061 µs which is much shorter than
the Tc. It can be concluded that the 802.11n channel is a slow fading channel.
• Fast-fading channel. In case the coherence time is less than the symbol duration,
Ts > Tc, or respectively Bs < Bd, the channel is considered fast varying or fast
fading channel.
2.1.1.5 Frequency selective channel model
It is convenient to model the frequency selective channel as the discrete-time tapped
delay line. It is derived as outlined next [49].
Consider sampling of the transmit signal according to the sampling theorem [52]:
x(t) =
∞∑
l=−∞
x (lT )
sin
(
pi(t−lT )
T
)
pi(t−lT )
T
(2.22)
where T is the sampling period. According to the sampling theorem, the sampling
frequency must be at least twice higher than the highest frequency present in the x(t).
The Fourier transform of the transmit signal is given as
X(f) =


T
∞∑
l=−∞
x(lT )e−i2piflT , |f | ≤ 12T
0 , otherwise
(2.23)
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Figure 2.7: Tapped delay line
Using Eq. 2.2 and the fact that the convolution in time domain results in multiplication
in frequency domain, the baseband equivalent of the receive signal is given as
y(t) =
∞∫
−∞
H(f, t)X(f)ei2piftdf (2.24)
=
∞∫
−∞
H(f, t)T
∞∑
l=−∞
x(lT )ei2pif(t−lT )df
= T
∞∑
l=−∞
x(lT )

 ∞∫
−∞
H(f, t)ei2pif(t−lT )df


= T
∞∑
l=−∞
x(lT )h((t− lT ), t)
= T
∞∑
l=−∞
h(lT, t)x(t− lT )
=
∞∑
l=−∞
(Th(lT, t))x(t− lT )
Now, the delay τ is given in terms of the discrete intervals lT . Assuming the delay
spread of Td, the number of taps L in the delay line is given as L = Td/T . Assuming
discrete time t = kT , k = 0, 1 . . . and setting T = 1, the receive signal is finally given as
y(k) =
L−1∑
l=0
hl(k)x(k − l) (2.25)
The resulting tapped delay line model is depicted in Fig. 2.7. The channel coefficients
hl are modeled as complex numbers, where both the real and imaginary parts are zero
mean Gaussian distributed random variables [49, 53]. This is reasonable, because each
channel coefficient at particular delay l is produced by a superposition of a large number
of random events.
The frequency selective channel is transformed to more attractive frequency flat channel
in current standards by OFDM. This technique will be dealt with in subsequent sections.
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Figure 2.10: CP-OFDM transceiver
2.1.2.1 Cyclic prefix OFDM
An OFDM single antenna communication system model featuring the standard compo-
nents is depicted in Fig. 2.10. The rest of this section will guide the reader through the
system and explain the relevant transmit/receive building blocks in detail.
2.1.2.1.1 Encoder / decoder.
The user generated binary data is first encoded by a linear error correcting code. The
linear codes can be classified as block or convolutional. The standard rate 1/2 (171, 133)
convolutional code [54] is used in simulations performed in this thesis.
The encoding introduces redundancy which is exploited at the receiver in order to correct
bit errors. Linear codes are powerful against single errors. In case of error bursts,
their performance is significantly degraded. Interleaving is employed to cope with burst
errors [54–56]. An interleaver scrambles the bit positions within the codeword according
to some rule. The interleaved codeword is transmitted through a channel, which can
introduce a burst of errors (Fig. 2.11). Such situation is common for a wireless channel,
as a deep fade over a codeword duration renders the latter completely incorrect. At the
receiver, the codeword is deinterleaved, effectively spreading the multiple errors within
a burst over a number of codewords. This results in a number of codewords each having
just a single error, which can be effectively corrected by the linear code (Fig. 2.11).
The soft-decision Viterbi decoding is used in all simulations in this thesis if not stated
otherwise. The details on the construction and decoding of convolutional codes are
outlined in Appendix A.
Interleaved Data
bits 1 2 3 45 6 7 89 10 1213 14 15 16
bits
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1211
11
13 14 15 16
Deinterleaved Data
error burst
errors spread out
Figure 2.11: Interleaving
Chapter 2. Background 21
The performance of a communication system is measured at the output of the channel
decoder in terms of BER for a range of SNR values. The SNR is denoted as the ratio of
bit energy Eb to the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power spectral density N0.
2.1.2.1.2 Modulation / demodulation
Next, the encoded binary data has to be mapped to physical signals (sine and cosine)
for transmission through the air. This task is performed by modulation. Modulation
defines the mapping of bits to a symbol. A symbol is a combination of sine and cosine
waves with a given amplitude and phase shift [49]. A modulation scheme is defined by
the modulation alphabet A. For example, 4-quadrature amplitude modulation (4-QAM)
[49] alphabet contains following symbols: A = {−1− 1i,−1 + 1i,+1 + 1i,+1− 1i}. The
size of modulation alphabet |A| defines the number of bits nb that are mapped to a
modulation symbol through a following relation:
nb = log2(|A|) (2.26)
That is, in case of 4-QAM, two bits are mapped to each of the four allowed symbols.
The mapping of four bit tuples {00, 01, 10, 11} to a particular symbol can be done in a
number of ways. One of the possible mappings is illustrated in Fig. 2.12
10 00
0111
Figure 2.12: 4-QAM Gray mapping
The depicted constellation diagram represents the Gray-mapped 4-QAM modulation
[49]. It can be observed, that bit 0 is mapped to +1 and bit 1 is mapped to −1.
Therefore, the modulation operation can be expressed in vector form as
x = vT c (2.27)
where x is the resulting symbol, v =
[
1 i
]T
in case of 4-QAM and c is the (code) bit
tuple where bit values are mapped to {−1,+1} as discussed above.
The main advantage of Gray mapping is that the nearest symbols differ in only one
bit. At the receiver, the symbols affected by AWGN have to be mapped back to the
symbols from the modulation alphabet. This operation is referred to as demodulation.
The scatter plot of 4-QAM Gray-mapped constellation is depicted in Fig. 2.13. It shows
the noisy symbols as blue crosses. These noisy symbols are quantized to the nearest
symbols from A in the Euclidean distance sense.
Chapter 2. Background 22
10 00
0111
noisy received
symbol
Figure 2.13: 4-QAM scatter plot
Assume that the symbol 11 → −1 − 1i was transmitted. The wrong misinterpretation
as −1 + 1i or +1− 1i due to noise is more likely than the misinterpretation to +1 + 1i
because of the largest Euclidean distance between −1− 1i and +1+1i. Therefore, with
Gray mapping, a symbol error results in a single bit error. It is easy to verify that it is
not the case for a different mapping.
Next, the vector of modulated data symbols, forming the t-th OFDM symbol vector,
is defined in frequency domain as x˜(t) ∈ CN×1, where N is the number of orthogonal
sub-carriers. The vector of time domain symbols is formed by applying IFFT of size N .
x(t) =


x(tN)
...
x(tN +N − 1)


N×1
=
1
N
FHN x˜(t) (2.28)
where 1NF
H
N is the IFFT matrix of size N ×N . The IFFT matrix is given as
1
N
FHN =
1
N


f00 f10 · · · f(N−1)0
f01 f11 · · · f(N−1)1
...
...
. . .
...
f0(N−1) f1(N−1) · · · f(N−1)(N−1)

 (2.29)
with fnk = e
j 2pi
N
nk, n, k = 0, . . . , N − 1. The FFT matrix is denoted FN .
2.1.2.1.3 Cyclic prefix
Although OFDM sub-carriers are orthogonal to each other, the channel may introduce
inter-symbol interference in time domain as explained in Sec. 2.1.1. The reflected ver-
sions of the (t − 1)-th time domain symbol vector may arrive at the receiver exactly
at same time the t-th time domain symbol vector arrives at the receiver when channel
delay spread is larger than the symbol duration. In order to mitigate the ISI, OFDM
time domain symbol vector x(t) is cyclically extended, by copying last Ng data symbols
to the front. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.14. With Ng picked larger or equal to the
maximum delay spread of the channel, the ISI lands exactly within the duration of the
cyclic prefix and does not affect the user data.
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Figure 2.14: Cyclic prefix
The addition of the cyclic prefix can be expressed as a matrix operation
xcp(t) = Acpx(t) (2.30)
where
Acp =


0 INg
IN−Ng 0
0 INg


(N+Ng)×N
is the cyclic prefix insertion matrix. The length of the cyclically extended OFDM symbol
vector is now given in data symbols by Ntot = N +Ng.
The cyclically extended OFDM symbol vector is then transmitted through the quasi-
static frequency selective fading channel [49]. “Quasi-static” means that the CIR is
constant during the transmission of the whole t-th OFDM symbol vector. The multipath
spread of the channel is characterized by maximum delay spread L, measured in data
symbols. As described in 2.1.1, this channel is modeled as a tap delay line with L taps.
Hence, in order to combat ISI, Ng has to be picked larger or equal to L. The CIR vector
h(t) is
h(t) =


h0(t)
...
hL−1(t)


L×1
where the index t is kept to highlight that the channel may vary from one OFDM symbol
vector to the next. The k-th (0 ≤ k ≤ Ntot − 1) received data symbol from the t-th
OFDM symbol vector is given by the discrete time convolution with the CIR vector:
ycp(tNtot + k) =
L−1∑
l=0
hl(t)xcp(tNtot + k − l) + n(tNtot + k) (2.31)
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Here, n(tNtot + k) is the element of the AWGN noise vector, and is zero mean with
variance 12σn
2 per complex dimension.
Consider an OFDM symbol vector at time t = 1. The 0-th received data symbol from
that OFDM symbol vector is obtained from Eq. 2.31 as
ycp(Ntot + 0) = h0(1)xcp(Ntot − 0) + h1(1)xcp(Ntot − 1) + · · ·
· · ·+ hL−1(1)xcp(Ntot − (L− 1)) + n(Ntot + 0)
(2.32)
Obviously, the terms with index less than Ntot are coming from the previous (t− 1)-th
OFDM symbol vector and are representing the ISI. For the t-th receive OFDM symbol
vector convolution with CIR is expressed in matrix form as
ycp(t) = Htoep(t)xcp(t) +H
ISI
toep(t)xcp(t− 1) + n(t) (2.33)
where Htoep(t) and H
ISI
toep(t) of size Ntot × Ntot are Toeplitz matrices [57], defined as
follows
Htoep(t) =


h0(t)
...
. . .
hL−1(t) · · · h0(t)
. . .
...
. . .
hL−1(t) · · · h0(t)


(2.34)
HISItoep(t) =


hL−1(t) · · · h1(t)
. . .
...
hL−1(t)

 (2.35)
The removal of ISI terms HISItoep(t) is performed by cutting off the first Ng data symbols
of the OFDM symbol vector ycp(t). In matrix form this operation is expressed as
y(t) =
[
y(tN)
y(tN +N − 1)
]
N×1
= ADEcpycp(t) (2.36)
where
ADEcp =
[
0 IN
]
N×Ntot
(2.37)
is the cyclic prefix removal matrix.
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Hence, the frequency domain receive symbol vector is given by
y˜(t) = FNy(t)
= FN (ADEcpycp(t))
= FN (ADEcp(Htoep(t)xcp(t) +H
ISI
toep(t)xcp(t− 1) + n(t)))
= FN (ADEcpHtoep(t)xcp(t) +ADEcpn(t))
= FN (}ADEcpHtoep(t)Acp
1
N
FHN x˜(t) +ADEcpn(t))
=
1
N
FN (ADEcpHtoep(t)Acp)F
H
N x˜(t) + FNADEcpn(t)
=
1
N
(FNHcir(t)F
H
N )x˜(t) + n˜(t) (2.38)
The matrix Hcir(t) = ADEcpHtoep(t)Acp is a circulant matrix [57] and has the following
form
Hcir(t) =


h0(t) 0 · · · 0 · · · hL−1(t) hL−2(t) · · · h1(t)
h1(t) h0(t) 0 · · · 0 0 hL−1(t) · · · h2(t)
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
hL−2(t) · · · · · · h0(t) 0 · · · · · · 0 hL−1(t)
hL−1(t) · · · · · · · · · h0(t) 0 · · · · · · 0
0 hL−1(t) · · · · · · · · · h0(t) 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · 0 hL−1(t) hL−2(t) · · · · · · h0(t)


N×N
(2.39)
As can be seen from Eq. 2.39, the circulant matrix is a Toeplitz matrix where each row
is rotated one element to the right, relative to the preceding row. Circulant matrices
possess following properties [57]:
1. The eigenvectors of any circulant matrix are the columns of FHN
2. The eigenvalues of any circulant matrix equal the FFT of the first column of the
matrix itself. That is


h˜0
h˜1
...
h˜N−1

 = FN


h0
...
hL−1
0(N−L)×1


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Regarding these properties the eigenvalue decomposition of Hcir(t) is given as
Hcir(t) =
1
N
FHN


h˜0
. . .
h˜N−1

FN = 1N FHNH˜d(t)FN (2.40)
where H˜d is the diagonal matrix with elements h˜k =
L−1∑
l=0
hle
−j 2pi
N
kl, with 0 ≤ k ≤ N .
Plugging Eq. 2.40 into Eq. 2.38 and dropping the OFDM symbol vector index t, the
system equation for single antenna or single-input single-output (SISO) CP-OFDM is
obtained as follows:
y˜ = FN
1
N
FHNH˜dFN
1
N
FHN x˜+ n˜
= H˜dx˜+ n˜
(2.41)
Hence, for each of the N orthogonal sub-carriers the frequency selective channel is trans-
formed to a frequency flat channel with single tap weight h˜k. The data is easily recovered
by multiplying the received frequency domain symbol vector by the inverse of the diag-
onal channel matrix H˜d
ˆ˜x = H˜−1d y˜ (2.42)
The estimated symbol data is then passed to channel decoding.
2.1.2.2 Unique word OFDM
OFDM systems require insertion of a guard interval (GI) of duration TGI into the time
domain data frame in order to combat inter-symbol interference caused by multipath
propagation. Conventional OFDM systems use the cyclic prefix, which is simply a copy
of a data fraction, and is therefore random. On the contrary, UW-OFDM signaling uses
a deterministic sequence in the GI, denoted as the unique word [9]. Frame structures of
CP-OFDM compared with UW-OFDM are outlined in Fig. 2.15.
CP1CP1 CP2 CP2 CP3
UWUW UW
DATA DATA
DATA DATA
Figure 2.15: UW vs CP frame structure
Since UW is a known sequence, it can be used for synchronization or channel estimation
purposes. The spectral efficiency of UW system remains unaffected. It can be observed
from Fig. 2.15 that UW is the part of the FFT interval of duration TFFT , whereas CP
is not. Therefore, the length of the UW-OFDM frame is reduced from TFFT + TGI to
TFFT , thus retaining the overall spectral efficiency [10].
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More importantly, UW generation introduces a form of coding across sub-carriers [58].
UW can be generated by both systematic and non-systematic encoding [11].
2.1.2.2.1 Systematic generation of UW
In UW-OFDM the available N = Nd+Nr sub-carriers are shared by data and redundant
symbols [9]. The Nd sub-carriers are occupied by data symbols and the remaining
Nr sub-carriers are dedicated to redundant symbols. Therefore the frequency domain
symbol vector x˜ ∈ CN×1 can be denoted as consisting of data and redundant parts
x˜ =
[
d˜H x˜Hr
]H
, where d˜H ∈ CNd×1 is the part reserved for data, and x˜Hr ∈ CNr×1
contains redundancy. UW is generated in two steps [9]:
1. A zero UW is generated, such that the time domain OFDM symbol vector is given
as x =
[
xHd 0
]H
and x = 1NF
H
N x˜.
2. The nonzero UW uH ∈ CNr×1 is added in the time domain resulting in x′ =
x+
[
0 uH
]H
.
The redundancy is added during the first step, and it is considered in detail here. The
IFFT on the frequency domain symbol vector must yield
1
N
FHNP
[
d˜
x˜r
]
=
[
xd
0
]
(2.43)
Here, P is the introduced permutation matrix that allocates data and redundant sub-
carriers in such a way that energy contribution of the redundant sub-carrier symbols is
minimal. The matrix in Eq. 2.43 can be renamed as
1
N
FHNP =M =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
where Mij are sub-matrices of an appropriate size. From matrix multiplication in
Eq. 2.43
M21d˜+M22x˜r = 0
The generation of redundant sub-carrier symbols x˜r from the data symbols follows di-
rectly as
x˜r = Td˜ (2.44)
where T = −M−122M21, T ∈ CNr×Nd .
In style of block coding theory, the frequency domain symbol vector x˜ can be interpreted
as a code word of a complex RS (Reed-Solomon)-code [58]:
x˜ = P
[
d˜
x˜r
]
= P
[
I
T
]
d˜ = Gd˜ (2.45)
whereG ∈ C(Nd+Nr)×Nd is the code generator matrix that introduces correlations within
the symbol vector x˜. The interpretation as the RS code is valid, because it is defined as
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a set of codewords whose Fourier transform produces a consecutive set of zeroes. This
is exactly the case in Eq. 2.43 with the only difference that the encoding is performed
on the set of complex numbers [11].
The second step adds the UW in the time domain. The transmit UW-OFDM symbol
vector is now denoted x′ = x+
[
0H uH
]H
. The frequency domain version u˜ ∈ CNr×1
of the unique word is obtained as
u˜ = FN
[
0
u
]
This allows the transmit time domain symbol vector to be rewritten as
x′ =
1
N
FHN (x˜+ u˜) =
1
N
FHN (Gd˜+ u˜) (2.46)
Next, x′ is transmitted over the same multipath channel, characterized by the CIR vector
h(t) =


h0(t)
...
hL−1(t)


L×1
, as indicated in Sec. 2.1.2.1.
Consider two time domain transmit symbol vectors
[
x′(t− 1)
x′(t)
]
=


d(t− 1)
u(t− 1)
d(t)
u(t)

 (2.47)
It can be recognized that the ISI terms caused by of x′(t− 1) fall within the duration of
UW vector u(t− 1).
The receive symbol vector is the result of the discrete convolution of the CIR and the
transmit symbol vector, which is expressed as multiplication with Htoep(t) as given in
Eq. 2.35:
y(t) = Htoep(t)


u(t− 1)
d(t)
u(t)

+ n(t) (2.48)
The structure of the transmitted UW-OFDM frame is now equivalent to the frame
with added cyclic prefix in case of CP-OFDM. The inclusion of u(t− 1) is modeled by
multiplication with a copy matrix Θc, similar to cyclic prefix insertion matrix given in
Eq. 2.1.2.1.3:
Θc =


0 INr
IN−Nr 0
0 INr

 (2.49)
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The t-th time domain receive symbol vector is given as
y(t) = ΘxHtoep(t)Θcx
′(t) (2.50)
where Θx is the UW extraction matrix similar to cyclic prefix removal matrix given in
Eq. 2.37:
Θx =
[
0N×Nr IN
]
(2.51)
Clearly, the matrix given below
Hcir(t) = ΘˇxHtoep(t)Θˇc (2.52)
is the same block circulant matrix as in Eq. 2.39, as the UW insertion and extraction
matrices transform the block convolution matrix in the same way as the CP insertion
and removal matrices. Therefore, the block eigenvalue decomposition ofHcir is the same
as in the CP-OFDM case.
Dropping the time index t for simplicity, the receive symbol vector is therefore reformu-
lated as
y˜ = FNHcirx
′ + FNn
=
1
N
FNHcirF
H
N (Gd˜+ u˜) + FNn (2.53)
Using the eigenvalue decomposition of the circulant matrix in Eq. 2.40, the system
equation for UW-OFDM is given as
y˜ = H˜dGd˜+ H˜du˜+ n˜ (2.54)
where H˜d is the same diagonal matrix as in Eq. 2.41, containing flat fading tap coeffi-
cients on the main diagonal. Subtracting the known component H˜du˜ from the frequency
domain receive symbol vector y˜ yields the final UW-OFDM system equation
y˜ − H˜du˜ = H˜dGd˜+ H˜du˜+ n˜− H˜du˜
y˜′ = H˜dGd˜+ n˜
(2.55)
2.1.2.2.2 Non-systematic generation of UW
Opposed to systematic UW generation, where the redundancy is placed at dedicated sub-
carriers, non-systematic UW generation spreads the redundancy among all sub-carriers
[11]. The generator matrix is now denoted G¯, and is given as
G¯ = AP
[
I
T¯
]
(2.56)
where A ∈ R(Nd+Nr)×(Nd+Nr) is non-singular, and permutation matrix P is same as with
the systematic UW generation. The generator matrix still has to produce zeroes at the
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have shown that due to these properties, the system with G′′ outperforms the system
with G′ in a scenario where no outer channel code is used. In a coded system, however,
the UW-OFDM system with G′ outperforms the one with G′′ in terms of BER.
As the obtained generator matrices distribute portions of a single data symbol over
a number of codeword symbols they can be interpreted as a combination of channel
independent precoder and a channel encoder [11]. Since G′′ is obtained with random
initialization, it is possible to obtain multiple random generator matrices. These random
G′′ generator matrices introduce another degree of freedom to the system in Eq. 2.55.
2.2 MIMO
The multiple-input multiple-output or MIMO is referred to multiple inputs to the chan-
nel from a number of transmit antennas and multiple outputs from the channel to
a number of receive antennas respectively. MIMO systems have been researched thor-
oughly over the past decade [59–62] and are now part of most wireless standards [51, 63].
Systems with multiple antennas at either or both ends of the communication link can
be subdivided in two classes [62]:
• The ones that try to overcome multipath fading effects by providing diversity.
• The others that exploit multipath fading by performing spatial multiplexing.
Systems employing multiple antennas at either the transmitter (MISO) or the receiver
(SIMO) provide diversity and have been used already in the last century in order to
improve the communication reliability [64, 65]. The purpose of these systems is to
overcome the effects of fading by combining multiple independent versions of the same
transmit symbol. The receive diversity is illustrated in Fig. 2.17a. Note that in case of
co
mb
in
er
(a) Receive Diversity
de
mu
x
(b) Spatial Multiplexing
Figure 2.17: Diversity vs spatial multiplexing
just one antenna at both sides of the link the transmit signal can be severely degraded.
TheMr versions of the same transmitted signal will very likely undergo different amount
of fading. Then a gain in BER is achieved by combining these received copies. The well-
known types of receive diversity combining are selective combining, equal gain combining
(EGC) and maximum ratio combining (MRC) [66–68]. With selective combining the
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copy with the largest channel coefficient is picked for the output. With EGC, the copies
of the transmitted signal are added together. With MRC, the copies are scaled according
to the values of channel coefficients and added to produce the output.
Transmit diversity is referred to combining symbols from multiple transmit antennas
at a single receive antenna. The transmit symbols can not be identical copies, as the
receive antenna would get simply a scaled superposition of the same transmit symbol.
A form of space-time coding has to be employed at the transmitter. This is realized by
space-time codes [69, 70].
Systems with multiple antennas on both the receiver and transmitter side (MIMO) can
provide either diversity or spatial multiplexing [71]. This thesis addresses the latter and
leaves the diversity topic out of scope.
Spatial multiplexing is illustrated in Fig. 2.17b. It offers throughput increase, as ide-
ally Mt data streams can be transmitted simultaneously [72] over same time slot and
frequency band. The operation of spatial multiplexing is explained next.
The generic spatial multiplexing MIMO system equation is given below
y = Hx+ n (2.61)
The transmit data is composed of Mt streams forming transmit symbol vector x. Each
transmission path between any transmit/receive antenna pair (i, j) is characterized by a
channel coefficient hij . These coefficients form the channel matrix H which is assumed
to be known at the receiver side. In reality, this matrix is estimated from pilot signals by
channel estimation, but it is out of scope of this work. The vector of receive symbols is
denoted y and n is the vector of AWGN. It should be noted that, as system equation is
generic, superscripts denoting OFDM frequency domain are omitted. In later sections,
detection algorithms used in this work will be first explained for this generic system
equation. Only then they will be cast for CP- or UW-OFDM.
The goal of the receiver in a spatial multiplexing MIMO system is to retrieve the transmit
symbol vector x, knowing y and H. Assuming no noise at the receiver for simplicity
and square H, the transmit vector is obtained as
x = H−1y (2.62)
The unambiguous solution exists only if the channel matrix contains linearly independent
rows and is invertible. This is the case with very high probability, when elements of the
channel matrix are independently identically distributed (i.i.d) [73]. Physically, this
situation corresponds to existence of a large number of scatters and a lot of independent
transmission paths. In that sense the multipath environment is exploited at the receiver
and the transmitted data can be recovered. However, the i.i.d channel model represents
an ideal case and is used for computation of upper bounds on achievable throughput.
In reality, there is some amount of spatial correlation between the channel responses
observed by adjacent antennas. This correlation reduces the achievable throughput of
a spatial multiplexing system [62]. It is therefore necessary to use the accurate channel
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model to obtain realistic simulation results. The MIMO channel model is elaborated in
detail in the next section.
2.2.1 Channel model
A number of models for MIMO channels have been proposed recently [74]. Geometric
models are based on the layout of physical surroundings (scatterers). Parametric models
abstract physical layout and propagation in order to describe the channel by a set of
paths with statistically known AoA and angle of departure (AoD) characteristics. These
angles are defined as the azimuth angle of incoming or departing plane wave with respect
to the broadside of the receive or transmit antenna. Correlation based models specify
the spatial correlation between the channel matrix entries. A number of standardized
models has been developed that share the aspects of the aforementioned model classes
[73].
The UW-OFDM single-antenna system has been assessed against the 802.11a standard
[10]. Consequently, the related MIMO supporting CP-OFDM standard 802.11n is ad-
dressed in this work. The standardized 802.11n channel model [75] will be therefore
used in simulations throughout this chapter.
The purpose of a MIMO channel model is to specify the correlation between adjacent
antennas on both the transmitter and receiver side. Each channel impulse response
between any antenna pair is a superposition of numerous propagation paths. Therefore
channel matrix elements are complex Gaussian distributed random variables, where h
is vectorized version of H:
p(h) =
1
πMtNrdetCH
exp(−hHC−1H h) (2.63)
The matrix CH specifies the correlation between the elements of h. Zero correlation
reduces the model to independent identically distributed variables. In that case CH =
σ2I. The i.i.d model has been used initially in MIMO channel modeling and is still
useful for identifying upper bounds on system performance.
The complex correlation coefficient between two receive antennas i and j is defined in
the following. The channel coefficients at two receive antennas are denoted as hmi and
hmj , assuming transmit path m is fixed. Assuming a frequency selective channel, the
correlation coefficient for each of the L tap delays is
c
Rxij
Txm
=
E{hmih∗mj} − E{hmi}E{h∗mj}√
σ2hmiσ
2
hmj
(2.64)
As the channel matrix entries are random variables with zero mean and unit variance
[76], the correlation coefficient reduces to
c
Rxij
Txm
= E{hmih∗mj} (2.65)
The spatial correlation between adjacent antennas depends on AoA, AoD statistics and
power azimuth spectrum (PAS) [77]. PAS identifies the distribution of the received
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power as a function of AoA. The 802.11n model defines several clusters of scatterers
characterized by same mean AoA and mean AoD. For each cluster, PAS is found to follow
the Laplacian distribution [78]. Another parameter impacting the spatial correlation is
the angular spread, which is obtained from PAS. First the PAS is normalized in order
to fulfill the properties of a probability density function.
Pnorm(ϕ) =
P (ϕ)∫
P (ϕ)dϕ
(2.66)
The angular spread is then defined as the square root of the second central moment of
PAS, where ϕo is the mean AoA.
σa =
√∫
(ϕ− ϕ0)2P (ϕ)dϕ (2.67)
direction of
 propagation
plane wave antenna array
Figure 2.18: Reception by two neighboring antennas
The PAS and spatial correlation coefficient form a Fourier transform pair. Therefore, the
correlation coefficient can be obtained as IFFT of PAS. The other method of computation
of spatial correlation between two adjacent antennas is to directly obtain the correlation
between their channel impulse responses, given the PAS.
Consider the receive antenna array, consisting of antennas a and b depicted in Fig. 2.18.
The antennas are separated by a distance d. Assuming plane wave propagation, the
wave requires to travel additional d sinϕ distance to reach antenna b, with respect to
antenna a. The channel impulse response at both antennas is obtained from PAS as
given in Eq. 2.68 and 2.69, where ψ is some initial phase.
ha(ϕ) =
∫ pi
−pi
ejψ
√
P (ϕ)dϕ (2.68)
hb(ϕ) =
∫ pi
−pi
ej(ψ+
2pid sinϕ
λ
)
√
P (ϕ)dϕ (2.69)
The correlation between the two responses is then obtained as
c(d, ϕ0) = E{ha(ϕ)h∗b(ϕ)} =
∫ pi
−pi
e−
j2pid sinϕ
λ P (ϕ)dϕ (2.70)
= crr(d, ϕ0) + jcri(d, ϕ0) (2.71)
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where crr is the correlation between the real parts of channel impulse responses and
cri is the correlation between the real and the imaginary parts. In the extreme case of
ϕ0 = 0
o and σa = 0
o, it is evident that the correlation is maximal. The wave arrives
perpendicular to the array and does not incur any time difference between the antennas,
while zero angular spread means that there is no angular variation in the received power.
Defining the normalized distance between antennas as D = 2pidλ the spatial correlation
coefficients are finally obtained as
crr(D,ϕ0) =
∫ pi
−pi
cos(D sinϕ)P (ϕ)dϕ (2.72)
cri(D,ϕ0) =
∫ pi
−pi
sin(D sinϕ)P (ϕ)dϕ (2.73)
It can be observed from Eq. 2.72 and 2.73 that the spatial correlation depends on the
distance between the antennas: the larger the distance, the less correlation. It also
depends on the angular spread. When angular spread is small, most power would arrive
to both antennas from the same angle. This would imply that the magnitudes of the
responses at both antennas are almost identical, only with the difference in phase, due
to antenna separation D, leading to high correlation.
After correlation coefficients are obtained for both transmitter and receiver, the transmit
and receive correlation matrices CTx and CRx are formed. Thereafter the 802.11n
model applies to the Kronecker model [79] to form the final channel matrix, with spatial
correlation taken into account.
The Kronecker model assumes that the correlation matrices at the transmitter and
receiver are separable. The overall correlation matrix equals the Kronecker product of
transmit and receive correlation matrices.
CH = CTx ⊗CRx (2.74)
Finally the channel matrix is computed as follows, where Hi.i.d is the matrix with un-
correlated coefficients.
H = C
1/2
RxHi.i.dC
1/2
Tx (2.75)
The computation in Eq. 2.75 is repeated for each tap delay.
2.2.2 MIMO cyclic prefix OFDM
Consider the MIMO CP-OFDM transceiver model depicted in Fig. 2.19. The general-
ization of CP-OFDM signal model to the MIMO case is straight forward. There are Mt
parallel data symbol vectors x˜m , 1 ≤ m ≤Mt that are transmitted simultaneously over
Mt transmit antennas. Hence, on each k-th sub-carrier, k = 0, . . . , N − 1, the Mt data
symbols from respective data symbol vectors are transmitted simultaneously over Mt
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Figure 2.19: MIMO CP-OFDM transceiver
antennas. Therefore, x˜(k) is now a vector, given as
x˜(k) =


x˜1(k)
...
x˜Mt(k)


Mt×1
(2.76)
Here, the compound vector of transmitted symbols with respect to sub-carriers and
transmit antennas is denoted as
x˜ =


x˜(0)
...
x˜(N − 1)


MtN×1
(2.77)
where x˜(k) is from Eq. 2.76.
Each data stream fed to the respective transmit antenna is transformed to the time
domain by a IFFT block. The Mt IFFT blocks work in parallel as outlined in Fig. 2.19.
Mathematically, this parallel operation is expressed as the Kronecker product of the
IFFT matrix and the identity matrix of size Mt -
1
N (F
H
N ⊗ IMt). As the data on sub-
carriers and transmit antennas is regarded as a single compound vector x˜, the compound
time domain vector x is formulated as
x =
1
N
(FHN ⊗ IMt)x˜ (2.78)
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In more detail:
x =
1
N


fH11IMt f
H
12IMt · · · fH1NIMt
fH21IMt f
H
22IMt · · · fH2NIMt
...
...
...
...
fHN1IMt f
H
N2IMt · · · fHNNIMt


MtN×MtN


x˜1(0)
...
x˜Mt(0)
x˜1(1)
...
x˜Mt(1)
...
x˜1(N − 1)
...
x˜Mt(N − 1)


MtN×1
(2.79)
The insertion of the cyclic prefix is expressed as multiplication by the Aˇcp matrix anal-
ogous to Sec. 2.1.2.1
xcp = Aˇcpx (2.80)
where Aˇcp is the SISO cyclic prefix insertion matrix augmented to the appropriate size
by the Kronecker product with the identity matrix of size Mt
Aˇcp =


0 INg
IN−Ng 0
0 INg

⊗ IMt (2.81)
The multipath channel between the i-th transmit and j-th receive antennas is modeled
as a L− 1 tapped delay line with coefficients hij(l), l = 0, . . . , L− 1 generated from the
802.11n channel model. Therefore, in MIMO case, the CIR is a matrix
H =


H0
...
HL−1

 (2.82)
where the sub-matrices Hl contain the channel coefficients of all paths between the Mt
transmit and Mr receive antennas relative to the tap delay l:
Hl =


h11(l) · · · h1Mt(l)
...
. . .
...
hMr1(l) · · · hMrMt(l)


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Again, to remove ISI, first MrNg elements of receive OFDM time domain symbol vector
ycp are removed analogous to the single-antenna CP-OFDM by multiplying with CP
removal matrix AˇDEcp
y = AˇDEcpycp (2.83)
where AˇDEcp is the SISO CP removal matrix augmented to appropriate size by the
Kronecker product with the identity matrix of size Mr
AˇDEcp =
[
0 IN
]
⊗ IMr (2.84)
At the receiver side, the compound frequency domain received symbol vector y˜ ∈
CNMr×1 is given analogous to Eq. 2.38:
y˜ = (FN ⊗ IMr)y
= (FN ⊗ IMr)(AˇDEcpHtoepxcp + AˇDEcpn)
=
1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)(AˇDEcpHtoepAˇcp)(FHN ⊗ IMt)x˜+ (FN ⊗ IMr)AˇDEcpn
=
1
N
((FN ⊗ IMr)Hcir(FHN ⊗ IMt))x˜+ n˜
(2.85)
where Hcir = AˇDEcpHtoepAˇcp is a block circulant matrix. It has the following form:
Hcir =


H0 0 · · · 0 · · · HL−1 HL−2 · · · H1
H1 H0 0 · · · 0 0 HL−1 · · · H2
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
HL−2 · · · · · · H0 0 · · · · · · 0 HL−1
HL−1 · · · · · · · · · H0 0 · · · · · · 0
0 HL−1 · · · · · · · · · H0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · · · · 0 HL−1 HL−2 · · · · · · H0


NMr×Mt
(2.86)
Assuming the eigenvalue decomposition of the block circulant matrix Hcir as given in
Eq. 2.40, and performing FFT at the receiver side, the system equation for MIMO
CP-OFDM is obtained as follows:
y˜ =
1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)(FHN ⊗ IMt)H˜b
1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)(FHN ⊗ IMt)x˜+ (FN ⊗ IMr)n
= H˜bx˜+ n˜
(2.87)
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Here, H˜b is a block diagonal matrix given as
H˜b =


H˜(0)
. . .
H˜(k)
. . .
H˜(N − 1)


(2.88)
where the diagonal block H˜(k) contains the flat fading frequency domain coefficients
of all existent paths between Mt transmit and Mr receive antennas relative to the sub-
carrier k, k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
H˜(k) =


h˜11(k) h˜12(k) · · · h˜1Mt(k)
h˜21(k) h˜22(k) · · · h˜2Mt(k)
...
...
. . .
...
h˜Mr1(k) h˜Mr1(k) · · · h˜MrMt(k)


Mr×Mt
2.2.3 Detection
The transmitted data in a spatial multiplexing MIMO system can be recovered by linear
and nonlinear detection. In case of linear detection the estimate of the transmit data
vector is obtained by linearly combining the elements of the receive data vector. Among
linear schemes, linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE) detection performs the
best [80]. Nonlinear detection is represented by successive interference cancellation [72]
and maximum likelihood (ML) detection. In terms of BER, ML detection outperforms
other linear and nonlinear methods [81], however its complexity increases exponentially
with the number of antennas and constellation size [82]. Even though LMMSE is inferior
to ML in terms of BER it is still attractive because of its very low complexity. Successive
interference cancellation is in between in terms of performance and complexity.
Based on the above, only LMMSE and ML detection will be considered in this work, as
they represent the lower/upper bounds in terms of complexity/performance respectively.
In the following sections, both methods are outlined for the general linear model given
in Eq. 2.61.
2.2.3.1 LMMSE
The objective of LMMSE estimator is to minimize the mean square error between the
transmit symbol vector x and the estimate of the transmit symbol vector xˆ. The mini-
mum mean square error is given as
mmse = minE{(x− xˆ)2}
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where E{·} denotes expectation. By constraining the estimator to be linear, the estimate
of the transmit symbol vector is written as [83]
xˆ =WHy (2.90)
where W is the linear estimator, also called the linear combiner.
Therefore, the goal is to find the optimal WH , that minimizes Eq. 2.89. Expanding
Eq. 2.89 and plugging Eq. 2.90 into Eq. 2.89 the cost function is obtained as
E{(x− xˆ)2} = E{(x− xˆ)(x− xˆ)H}
= −E{xyH}W + E{xxH}+WHE{yyH}W −WHE{yxH}
= −Cxy +Cxx +WHCyyW −WHCxy
(2.91)
where Cxx is the transmit covariance matrix, Cyy is the receive covariance matrix and
Cxy is the transmit/receive covariance matrix.
The minimum of the mean square error cost function in Eq. 2.91 is found by taking the
derivative with respect to W and setting it to zero. Thereby, WH is obtained as
WH = CxyC
−1
yy (2.92)
Now, the covariance matrix Cxy in Eq. 2.92 is expanded as
Cxy = E{x(Hx+ n)H}
= E{xxH}HH + E{xnH}︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
= CxxH
H
(2.93)
The receive covariance matrix Cyy is expanded as follows
Cyy = E{(Hx+ n)(Hx+ n)H}
= HE{xxH}HH +HE{xnH}︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+E{nxH}︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
HH + E{nnH}
= HCxxH
H +Cnn
(2.94)
In the latter equations, the respective expectations are zero due to the fact that the
transmit symbol vector x and AWGN noise vector n are uncorrelated. The matrix Cnn
is the noise covariance matrix.
Hence, the LMMSE estimate in Eq. 2.90 is given as
xˆ = CxxH
H(HCxxH
H +Cnn)
−1y (2.95)
It is easy to rewrite the estimate in a more convenient form. This is is achieved by
allowing the following identity [84]
CxxH
H(HCxxH
H +Cnn)
−1 = (HHC−1nnH
H +C−1xx)
−1HHC−1nn (2.96)
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It can be easily shown that the identity is correct by left multiplying with (HHC−1nnHH+
C−1xx) and right multiplying with (HCxxHH +Cnn) both sides of Eq. 2.96.
Thus, using the identity in Eq. 2.96, the LMMSE estimate is equivalently reformulated
as
xˆ = (HHC−1nnH+C
−1
xx)
−1HHC−1nny (2.97)
This form of the estimate is favorable, because the size of the matrix to be inverted is
smaller than that of the matrix to be inverted in Eq. 2.95.
Assuming i.i.d. Gaussian distributed transmit data and additive noise, the data and
noise covariance matrices are
Cxx = σ
2
xI
Cnn = σ
2
nI
where σ2n is the AWGN noise variance and σ
2
x is the transmit data variance. The LMMSE
estimate is in this case given as
xˆ =
(
HHH+
σ2n
σ2x
I
)−1
HHy (2.98)
2.2.3.1.1 Soft output generation
In order to improve BER performance, the decoder should take the a priori probabilities
of the input bits into account. This information is defined in terms of log-likelihood
ratios and has to be passed from the detector to the channel decoder. The LLRs are
computed for each bit of the estimated transmit symbol vector x. In the binary domain,
the symbol vector x is regarded as a two-dimensional array, where index j refers to the
symbol position within the symbol vector and index b refers to the b-th bit of the j-th
symbol.
The LLR for each bit xj,b equals
Lj,b = log
P (xj,b = 1|y,H)
P (xj,b = 0|y,H) (2.99)
where P (·) denotes probability of an event. Using Bayes theorem (Eq. A.21) and as-
suming equal probability of transmit bit values, the LLR is expressed as
Lj,b = log


∑
x∈χ1
j,b
p(y|x,H)
∑
x∈χ0
j,b
p(y|x,H)

 (2.100)
where χ1j,b and χ
0
j,b are sets of all transmission vectors with bit position b of symbol j
equal to one or zero respectively and p(·) denotes probability density function (pdf).
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The multivariate complex Gaussian probability densities in Eq. 2.100 are given as
p(y|x,H) = 1
(πσ2n)
Mr
exp
(
−‖Hx− y‖
2
2
σ2n
)
(2.101)
Therefore, the LLR is reformulated as
Lj,b = log


∑
x∈χ1
j,b
exp
(
−‖Hx−y‖22
σ2n
)
∑
x∈χ0
j,b
exp
(
−‖Hx−y‖22
σ2n
)


= log
∑
x∈χ1
j,b
exp
(
−‖Hx− y‖
2
2
σ2n
)
− log
∑
x∈χ0
j,b
exp
(
−‖Hx− y‖
2
2
σ2n
) (2.102)
The number of terms that have to be evaluated in Eq. 2.102 equals 2nbMt , where nb is
the number of bits per modulation symbol.
Using max-log approximation (log
∑
s
as = max as) [85], Eq. 2.102 is simplified as given
below
Lj,b ≈ 1
σ2n
(
min
x∈χ0
j,b
‖y −Hx‖22 − min
x∈χ1
i,b
‖y −Hx‖22
)
(2.103)
Now, direct computation of probabilities and logarithm is eliminated, but still 2nbMt
Euclidean distances need to be computed. The complexity of this computation grows
exponentially with nb and Mt and is therefore not well tailored for hardware implemen-
tation.
Further simplification was proposed in [86]. Instead of computing LLR on the receive
symbol vector y, the output xˆ of the LMMSE is considered. It can be reformulated as
xˆ =WHy
= x+ (WHH− IMt)x+WHn
(2.104)
where the second term is the residual interference. Assuming the residual interference
(WHH−IMt)x to be approximately Gaussian, the model in Eq. 2.104 can be considered
as a set of Mt independent SISO Gaussian channels.
Therefore, the approximate LMMSE-based LLR is computed for each of the Mt inde-
pendent streams or elements of the transmit symbol vector x
L¯j,b ≈ 1
σ2e
(
min
xj∈χ0b
|xˆj − xj |2 − min
xj∈χ1b
|xˆj − xj |2
)
(2.105)
where σ2e is the diagonal element of the MMSE matrix Cee, which is given as
Cee = σ
2
n
(
HHH+
σ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
(2.106)
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The sets χ0b and χ
1
b contain all binary representations of symbol j, for which the bit at
position b equals zero or one respectively. Therefore, the number of Euclidean distances
to be evaluated has been reduced to 2nbMt. Furthermore, it is to note that in case of
QAM modulation and Gray mapping L¯j,b is a piecewise linear function that depends
only on the real or the imaginary part of xˆj [86].
For example, in case of 4-QAM and Gray mapping used in this work, the LLRs are
computed separately for in-phase and quadrature components
L¯j,1 =
4
σ2e
<{xˆj} (2.107)
L¯j,2 =
4
σ2e
={xˆj} (2.108)
2.2.3.1.2 Cyclic prefix
In case of MIMO CP-OFDM the frequency domain system equation is given in Eq. 2.87.
As H˜b is a block diagonal matrix, the detection can be regarded as solvingN independent
linear systems. Each system is equivalent to generic MIMO system equation (Eq. 2.61),
where vectors and matrices are defined in frequency domain
y˜(k) =


y˜1(k)
y˜2(k)
...
y˜Mr(k)

 = H˜(k)


x˜1(k)
x˜2(k)
...
x˜Mt(k)

+ n˜(k) (2.109)
Thus, for each sub-carrier k, and with Cnn = Nσ
2
nI, Cxx = σ
2
xI, the LMMSE estimate
is given as
ˆ˜x(k) =
(
H˜H(k)H˜(k) +
Nσ2n
σ2x
I
)−1
H˜H(k)y˜(k) (2.110)
2.2.3.2 Maximum likelihood
As the name suggests ML estimation seeks to maximize the likelihood of received symbol
vector y, given the transmit symbol vector x.
xˆ = argmax
x∈AMt
py|x(y|x) (2.111)
The pdf in Eq. 2.111 is exactly the multivariate Gaussian pdf, given in Eq. 2.101. The
maximizazion of pdf in Eq. 2.101 can be performed on its logarithm, since logarithm
is a strictly monotonic function. The constant term in Eq. 2.101 is irrelevant for the
maximization.
xˆ = argmax
x∈AMt
(
−‖Hx− y‖
2
2
σ2n
)
(2.112)
To maximize the term in Eq. 2.112 it is sufficient to minimize the Euclidean distance
between the receive signal vector y and the transmit symbol vector x. Hence, the
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maximization is replaced by minimization as expressed in Eq. 2.113
xˆ = argmin
x∈AMt
‖y −Hx‖22 (2.113)
The brute force approach to solving this minimization problem is to search through
all possible transmit symbol vectors and pick the one with the minimum Euclidean
distance. This approach is not practical for MIMO OFDM systems, as its complexity
grows exponentially with increasing the constellation size and the number of antennas
[82].
In order to solve the ML problem with practical complexity the sphere decoding algo-
rithm has been proposed.
2.2.3.2.1 Sphere decoding
Sphere decoding (SD) relates to the problem of finding a closest vector in a lattice
which was initially introduced in [87]. The algorithm was soon adapted to the problem
of maximum likelihood detection of received data in a MIMO communication system
[88]. The algorithm has rapidly gained close attention from the research community and
a number of versions have been developed [89, 90]. Subsequent improvements aimed
at reducing the algorithm complexity [91, 92]. Versions of the algorithm particularly
suitable for hardware implementation were proposed by the authors of [93].
The idea underlying the SD is to map the minimization problem in Eq. 2.113 to a
tree search. First, the QR decomposition of the channel matrix H is performed. The
result of this decomposition is the unitary matrix Q and the upper triangular matrix R.
Next, the system equation (Eq. 2.61) is transformed by multiplication with the complex
conjugate of Q
y¯ = Rx+QHn (2.114)
where y¯ = QHy. The quality of the received signal is not affected by the latter trans-
formation. The reason is that the altered noise vector n¯ = QHn has the same statistics
as the initial noise vector n due to the properties of Q [57]. Therefore, the minimization
problem can be reformulated as
xˆ = argmin
x∈AMt
‖y¯ −Rx‖22 (2.115)
The Euclidean distance to be minimized in Eq. 2.115 is denoted as ∆(x)
∆(x) = ‖y¯ −Rx‖22 (2.116)
This Euclidean distance is to be computed for a particular transmit symbol vector x. As
R is upper-triangular, y¯−Rx is an upper triangular system of equations. This implies
that the Euclidean distance ∆(x) can be obtained by parts corresponding to the partial
symbol vectors, x(i) of size Mt − i+ 1, i =Mt, . . . , 1.
The upper triangular system of equations can be mapped to a tree. The number of
levels in the tree, excluding the root, is given by Mt. Each node on the level i below the
Chapter 2. Background 45
root represents a possible value of the partial transmit symbol vector x(i). Each node
is labeled with a partial Euclidean distance (PED), denoted as ∆i(x
(i)). The PED of
each child node on level i can be easily computed from the PED of the respective parent
node on level i+ 1 [93].
∆i(x
(i)) = ∆i+1(x
(i+1)) + |δi(x(i))|2 (2.117)
Here, |δi(x(i))| is the positive Euclidean distance increment mapped to the branch con-
necting the parent node on level i+1 to the child node on level i. The distance increments
are easily obtained from Eq. 2.116 as follows
|δi(x(i))|2 = |y¯i −
Mt∑
j=i+1
rijsj − riixi|2 (2.118)
The mapping of a MIMO system withMt =Mr = 3 and real valued modulation alphabet
{+1,−1} to a tree is shown in Fig. 2.20.
root
level 3
level 2
level 1
Figure 2.20: Tree search
The leaf nodes of the tree represent all possible transmit symbol vectors. The search
through the tree is initiated to obtain the leaf node with the smallest Euclidean distance
to the receive symbol vector.
The search through the tree can be performed either by breadth-first or depth-first tree
traversal [94]. The breadth-first tree traversal is a non-recursive scheme which starts at
the root and traverses the tree in downward direction only, whereas depth-first traversal
is a recursive scheme.
Irrespective of the tree traversal strategy, visiting all available nodes in the tree corre-
sponds to exhaustive ML search. Therefore, in order to decrease the number of visited
nodes, the parts of the tree have to be pruned. The search is restricted to nodes, whose
corresponding PEDs lie inside a hypersphere of radius ρ
‖y¯ −Rx‖22 < ρ2 (2.119)
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Equation 2.119 is referred to as the sphere constraint (SC) [93]. If PED of a node violates
the SC:
∆i(x
(i)) > ρ2 (2.120)
that node and all its children will be pruned from the tree.
The sphere decoding algorithm is summarized in Alg. 1
• The algorithm starts at the root and initializes the PED of the root and the SC
(line 2).
• The depth first tree traversal is initiated. Starting from the level below the root,
a level specific list Si containing the transmit symbols from the alphabet A is
established (line 4, function listInit). For each symbol in the list its Euclidean
distance increment δ(x(i)) is computed by Eq. 2.118. The distance increments are
then sorted in ascending order [95]. The value of the receive vector y¯(i) is stored
as well. Its value is specific for the current level, therefore it is labeled with index
i.
As the Euclidean distance increments are sorted in ascending order, the one which
adds the least amount to the overall Euclidean distance is used to obtain the PED
of level i by Eq. 2.117. The used symbol is removed from the list (line 6).
• If the PED of the node on current level does not violate the SC (line 11), the
symbol value is fixed. It is necessary to subtract the portion of xi from the current
receive symbol vector y¯(i). This update is performed as follows:
y¯(i−1) = y¯(i) − rixi (2.121)
where ri is the i-th column of R.
• If a leaf node is not yet reached, the algorithm moves one level down (line 14). The
list initialization is called with the updated version of the receive symbol vector
(line 15).
• If a leaf node is reached (line 16), the current best solution vector is found. The
SC is tightened by setting it equal to the overall Euclidean distance corresponding
to the reached leaf node (line 18).
• SC violation by PED of a node at level i implies that all children of that nodes
will also violate the SC as the Euclidean distance increments of branches leading
to them would only increase the PED. Hence, it is moved up one level (line 22).
The best ML solution is sought with the next symbol from Si (line 6).
• If the list on the current level is empty, it is moved up one level (line 8).
• The search terminates when the root is reached (line 5).
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Algorithm 1 Sphere decoding algorithm
1: Input: y¯, R,A. Output: xˆML.
2: ∆Mt+1(x
(Mt+1)) = 0, ρ2 =∞
3: i =Mt
4: Si = listInit(i, y¯
(i),R,A)
5: while i < Mt + 1 do
6: get first xi and its |δi(x(i))|2 from Si. Remove these entries from Si.
7: if isempty(Si) then
8: i = i+ 1
9: else
10: ∆i(x
(i)) = ∆i+1(x
(i+1)) + |δi(x(i))|2 . update PED
11: if ∆i(x
(i)) < ρ2 then
12: if i > 1 then . not at a leaf node yet
13: update y¯(i) (Eq. 2.121)
14: i = i− 1
15: Si = listInit(i, y¯
(i),R,A)
16: else . new best ML solution found
17: xˆ = x(1)
18: ρ2 = ∆i(x
(i))
19: i = i+ 1;
20: end if
21: else
22: i = i+ 1
23: end if
24: end if
25: end while
26: function Si =listInit(i, y¯
(i),R,A)
27: for all xi ∈ A do
28: compute Euclidean distance increments (Eq. 2.118)
29: si =
[
xi δi(x
(i))
]
30: end for
31: Sort the rows si of Si in ascending order
32: end function
2.2.3.2.1.1 Soft output generation
Consider the LLR computation in Eq. 2.103. Here, for every bit, one of the minima
corresponds to the ML metric, obtained by the SD algorithm.
λML =
1
σ2n
‖y −Hxˆ‖22 (2.122)
where xˆ = xML is the ML solution of Eq. 2.113, obtained by SD. The other minimum
corresponds to the ML solution vector with the flipped b-th bit of the j-th symbol.
λMLj,b =
1
σ2n
min
x∈χ
(xML
j,b
)
j,b
‖y −Hx‖22 (2.123)
Here, xMLj,b is the bit-wise complement of the ML solution, or the ML counter-hypothesis.
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Figure 2.21: Repeated tree search
Using the above definitions, the LLR is reformulated as
Lj,b =

λ
ML − λMLj,b if xMLj,b = 0
λMLj,b − λML if xMLj,b = 1
(2.124)
For each bit, the ML metric λML is obtained by the SD algorithm. Thereafter, for each
bit it is necessary to obtain the ML counter-hypothesis λMLj,b .
This solution to this problem was initially provided by the repeated tree search (RTS)
sphere decoding [96]. Consider the example tree given in Fig. 2.21. It corresponds
to a MIMO system with Mt = 3 transmit and Mr = 3 receive antennas and 4-QAM
Gray mapped modulation alphabet. Therefore, the transmitted symbol is mapped to
B
2 ∈ {0, 1}2.
The binary version of the ML solution vector obtained by first run of the SD is highlighted
in red. During this first run, the ML metric λML is computed. Next, the ML counter-
hypothesis metric of the first bit of the first symbol λML1,1 has to be computed. The
first bit of the first symbol of the ML solution (bit 0) is complemented and fixed. This
fixing corresponds to pre-pruning the root left-hand side of the tree. Thereafter the SD
is rerun on that reduced tree and λML1,1 is obtained. The third run of the SD computes
the ML counter-hypothesis λML1,2 for the second bit of the first symbol. The search starts
from the initial tree. The second bit of the ML solution (bit 1) is complemented and
fixed. This fixing corresponds to pruning the second and fourth branches from the root.
The SD then searches through this reduced tree and obtains λML1,2 . The tree pre-pruning
and SD search is repeated for all remaining Lj,b. Each new run, the SD operates on a
newly reduced tree. However, the complexity increase is given by nbMt additional runs.
This increase in complexity has been addressed in the single tree search (STS) SD [97].
The complexity reduction is achieved by searching for the ML solution and all counter-
hypotheses concurrently. The main idea is in formulating update rules and the pruning
criterion on a list containing the ML λML and counter ML λMLj,b metrics.
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2.2.3.2.2 Likelihood ascent search
Likelihood ascent search is the quasi-ML detection algorithm developed for massive
MIMO systems [98–100]. Therefore, it is a natural candidate for MIMO UW-OFDM.
The algorithm performs a sequence of local searches based on an initial solution vector
in order to arrive as close as possible to the ML solution. The local search operates on
the neighborhood of the initial solution. The neighborhood is defined as a set of vectors
that differ from initial vector in up to η positions. For example, the 1-neighborhood of
a vector x = [+1− 1− 1 + 1] contains the following vectors
S1(x) = {[−1− 1− 1 + 1], [+1 + 1− 1 + 1], [+1− 1 + 1+ 1], [+1− 1− 1− 1]}
(2.125)
In general, the size of η-neighborhood is given as
|Sη(x)| =
(
Mt
η
)
(2.126)
In case η = Mt, the neighborhood contains all possible solution vectors, and the search
within this neighborhood corresponds to the global search. It has been shown that the
local search provides good results for η ≤ 3 for massive MIMO systems with hundreds
of antennas [98].
The stateflow of LAS algorithm with search within up to S3(x) is depicted in Fig. 2.22.
The LAS algorithm starts with some initial solution vector x(0), for example the LMMSE
estimate.
Next, the search within S1(x
(0)) is initiated. If a vector with shorter Euclidean distance
is found, it is declared the current solution. The search is continued within the 1-
neighborhood of the current solution. This sub-procedure is denoted 1-LAS. If no vector
with shorter Euclidean distance can be found, current solution vector represents a local
minimum.
An attempt to escape from this local minimum is performed by initiating a search within
2-neighborhood of the current solution vector. This sub-procedure is denoted 2-LAS. If
a better vector is found, it is declared the current solution and the search restarts with
1-LAS.
If a better vector is not found in 2-neighborhood, a search within S3(x) of the current
solution vector. This sub-procedure is denoted 3-LAS. If this search is successful, the
search goes on with 1-LAS. Otherwise, the current solution vector is declared the final
solution.
The number of performed search stages can be varied and represents the tradeoff between
performance and complexity. Running solely 1-LAS features the least complexity, but
the risk to get stuck in the local minimum is significant. Running all three search stages
is expected to provide the closest to ML solution at the cost of much longer run-time
due to large size of the 3-neighborhood.
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Figure 2.22: Stateflow of 3-LAS algorithm
2.3 Fault tolerance
Fault tolerance is the property of the system to operate properly in the event of a
failure (or multiple faults) within its components [5]. Traditionally, fault tolerance was
of concern in safety critical applications such as aviation or spacecraft [5]. The reliability
R(t) is a traditional measure of fault tolerance of a software/ hardware system. It is
defined as the probability that the system will be functional up to the time t, given that
it was operational at time 0:
R(t) = P (T > t) (2.127)
where T is the lifetime of the system. This classical fault tolerance measure is suitable
for systems that can fail permanently. This is the case for the general purpose computing
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systems. For example, a fault in the control path of a microprocessor will most likely
put it out of order.
Opposed to general purpose computing, digital signal processing (DSP) systems gen-
erally do not fail completely (if only data processing is concerned), but rather their
performance is gracefully degraded. DSP applications are characterized by their per-
formance metrics such as BER or SNR. Therefore, faults in these systems will degrade
the quality of the output in terms of the performance metrics [16]. Recent trends in the
fault tolerant design of DSP systems trade off slight degradation in quality for signifi-
cant energy savings. Opposed to general purpose computing, where all faults could be
critical, DSP systems allow certain amount of faults. Consequently the new fault toler-
ance measures designed specifically for DSP applications differ from the classical fault
tolerance measures. For example, new DSP fault tolerance measures address correcting
errors in the statistical sense [19].
Fault tolerant design addresses the means to mitigate the effect of faults on the sys-
tem’s behavior/performance. For any system, this is done by exploiting some sort of
redundancy. Usually, hardware, information or time redundancy, or a combination of
these is employed [5]. In that sense, fault tolerance has parallels to communications,
where information redundancy or time redundancy is used to mitigate the influence of
the communication channel [19]. For example, the memory can be regarded as a channel
too. Hence, application of error detecting/correcting codes is similar to communications,
whereas different error profiles necessitate the use of different codes.
2.3.1 Faults and errors
In terms of fault tolerance, the notions of “fault” and “error” are distinguished. By
definition, the fault is a model of a defect or other deviation in the hardware circuit
[5]. A fault does not necessarily result in an error. Consider an AND logic gate with
stuck-at-0 fault at its output. This fault permanently sets the output of the gate to
logical-0. This fault will result in an error only if both inputs of the AND gate would
be set to logical-1. Therefore, an error is defined as the manifestation of a fault.
AND
Figure 2.23: Stuck-at-0 fault
In terms of duration, the faults are classified as permanent, transient and intermittent
[5]. A permanent fault sets a hardware component permanently out of use. These faults
are addressed by testing [101]. A transient fault causes a temporary malfunction, but is
gone after some time and the normal operation is restored. An intermittent fault causes
the component to oscillate between normal and faulty states.
The transient faults are in the scope of this work. One source of transient faults is the
voltage overscaling [102, 103]. VOS refers to setting the supply voltage of the hardware
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circuit below the value, for which the correct operation is guaranteed. Consider a circuit
depicted in Fig. 2.24. The input to the combinational part is stored in the left register.
The combinational part computes a function of the input and stores the result in the
right register. The registers are operated with the clock frequency fclk. The critical
path delay Tcp of the combinational part is defined as the wost case delay over all
possible input transitions [102]. The correct operation is ensured when the clock period
Tclk =
1
fclk
is greater or equal than the critical path delay
Tclk ≥ Tcp (2.128)
The gates forming the combinational part are driven by the supply voltage Vdd. The
supply voltage has to be set such that the condition in Eq. 2.128 is satisfied. The relation
between supply voltage Vdd and circuit delay τc is given by [104]
τc =
CLVdd
β(Vdd − Vt)α (2.129)
where CL is the load capacitance, α is the velocity saturation index, β is the gate
transconductance and Vt is the device threshold voltage. The voltage for which Tclk = Tcp
is referred to Vdd−crit. Obviously, reducing the supply voltage below Vdd−crit leads to
an error at the output in case the critical path through the circuit is excited. Hence,
Vdd−crit is a lower bound on the supply voltage.
VOS introduces input-dependent errors whenever a critical delay path through the cir-
cuit is excited. Consider that the combinational part in Fig. 2.24 is a five-bit carry ripple
adder (CRA) [105] depicted in Fig. 2.25. It is made of five full adders (FA)s. The inputs
to the CRA are a = 00111 and b = 01011. Assume that the delay of the full adder is
TFA = 3 ns. The critical path delay is Tcp = 5TFA as the carry bit in the least significant
bit (LSB) propagates all the way to the most significant bit (MSB). Assuming Tclk = 15
FA FA FA FA FA
Figure 2.25: Carry ripple adder
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ns, the operation condition (Eq. 2.128) is satisfied, and the correct result c = 100010 is
written to its output register.
Suppose now the supply voltage is reduced such that TFA = 5 ns. This implies that
the accurate result will be available up to its MSB in Tcp = 25 ns. However, the clock
period is still Tclk = 15 ns. Therefore, by the end of the clock period, only three
bits of the output will be written to the output register and the stored output will be
c = 00010 instead of c = 10010. The erroneous output of the adder will propagate
further (Fig. 2.24 can be a sub-block of a larger system). If the inputs do not excite the
critical path, the output of the adder will be stored correctly. For example, this is the
case with a = 000110 and b = 000001.
Another major source of transient faults are the hits by highly energetic particle (protons,
neutrons, alpha particles), also referred to as the single event upset (SEU) [106, 107].
As it passes through an electronic device, the particle creates additional charge along
its path. If this charge is collected at a sensitive node of a circuit, the logical value
at this node may get flipped, potentially causing a soft error [108]. Soft error in a
memory element (flip-flop) persists until the memory element is rewritten [109]. SEU in
combinational logic will result in a soft error only if the wrong value would propagate to
the next memory element [110]. This is the case if three possible masking effects do not
occur. Logical masking prevents the propagation of the SEU, if any of the subsequent
gates on the path is driven by the control value, as illustrated in Fig. 2.26. Electrical
masking occurs when the wrong logical value is attenuated by the electrical properties
of gates on the path, such that the resulting pulse is of insufficient magnitude to be
reliably stored in a memory element. Timing masking occurs, when the wrong logical
value reaches the memory element outside its clocking interval.
An expression for estimating the soft error rate is given by [111]
Ps ∝ AF exp
(
−Qcrit
Qs
)
(2.130)
where A is the area, F is the particle flux, Qcrit is the critical charge required to flip the
logic value at a node, and Qs is the collection efficiency. As the technology scales, Qcrit
reduces proportionally as well as Qs. Therefore, the probability of an effective particle
hit at a node remains approximately the same. However, the number of nodes per chip
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increases while the clock period and pipeline depth reduces [110]. Thus, the chip-level
soft error rate will increase.
Additionally, the hardware faults can be classified as benign and malicious [5]. A benign
fault simply puts the component out of order. A malicious fault alters the output of
the component or the result of the computation in such a way that it looks reasonable.
However, such altered result can be used in gaining information about secret keys stored.
Therefore, malicious attacks on cryptographic circuits are based on injecting such faults.
2.3.2 Redundancy
The redundancy used for fault tolerance can be classified as hardware, information and
time redundancy. In hardware redundancy, the classical approach is the N-modular
redundancy (NMR) or M -out-N redundancy[5]. Here, the component is duplicated N
times as depicted in Fig. 2.27. The voter performs majority voting on N outputs. The
system is functional as long as M components are functional and fails (majority voting
chooses wrong value), when more than M components fail. Given the reliability of the
component R(t), the reliability of an NMR system (under assumption of uncorrelated
failures in the components and reliable infrastructure) is the probability that at least M
component are functional at time t
RNMR(t) =
N∑
i=M
(
N
i
)
Ri(t)(1−R(t))N−1 (2.131)
The most common example of NMR is the triple modular redundancy (TMR). Taking
the reliability of the voter Rvoter(t) into account, the reliability of a TMR system is
given by [5]
RTMR(t) = Rvoter(t)
3∑
i=2
(
3
i
)
Ri(t)(1−R(t))3−i (2.132)
= Rvoter(t)(3R
2(t)− 2R3(t))
NMR is able to mask permanent and transient faults. Extensions of NMR include
dynamic and hybrid redundancy [5]. In dynamic redundancy, one component is active at
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a time, and N − 1 component form a reserve. In case the fault of the active component
is detected, it is replaced by one from the reserve. Hybrid redundancy employs N
modules organized in NMR and K spare modules. The system constantly monitors
the components forming the NMR in order to avoid the situation when more than M
components are out of order. In case one out of N components is out of order, it is
replaced by the component from the K spare ones.
Information redundancy uses error detecting /correcting codes. Codes are commonly
applied to protect memories against transient faults. Since soft errors due to particle
strikes are relatively rare, single error detecting/correcting block codes are employed
(parity, Hamming code) [5]. The usage of more powerful codes such as Berger or cyclic
codes is less widespread, since they introduce a large amount of overhead in terms of area
and power consumption. The NMR system considered previously can be interpreted as
a repetition code, where outputs of the N components represent the codeword. The
voter then performs majority decoding.
In order to detect faults in arithmetic circuits, arithmetic codes are used. These codes
are preserved under arithmetic operations [5].
Algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT) is another information redundancy based ap-
proach. The redundancy is implemented at the application level by introducing redun-
dant computations. As the exact computations depend on the particular algorithm,
the implementation will differ for from one class of applications to the other. ABFT
has been implemented for matrix computations (matrix multiplication, matrix inversion,
etc) [112]. The redundancy is implemented using a checksum code [113]. Given a matrix
A, the column checksum matrix Ac is defined as
Ac =
[
A
eTA
]
(2.133)
where eT =
[
1 1 . . . 1
]
Similarly, the row checksum matrix is defined as
Ar =
[
A Ae
]
(2.134)
Finally, the full checksum matrix is given as
Af =
[
A Ae
eTA eTAe
]
(2.135)
Full checksum matrix allows error detection and correction. Consider an example matrix
A:
A =
[
1 2
1 3
]
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The respective full checksum matrix is given as
Af =


1 2 3
1 3 4
2 5 7


Now assume that an error has happened at the element a12 of matrix A:
Af =


1 4 3
1 3 4
2 5 7


Recomputing the row and column checksum matrices indicates that the parities do not
match for row 1 and column 2. Hence, the position of the erroneous element is identified.
The error is corrected by finding the difference between the recomputed row checksum
and the current checksum and adding the difference to the affected element [112]. The
same can be performed for column checksums. That is, for the considered example, the
difference d between row checksums is given as
d = a13 − (a11 + a12) = −2
and the corrected element is obtained as
aˆ12 = a12 + d = 2
In matrix multiplication, if the terms are protected by the column and row checksum
matrices respectively, the resulting matrix is protected by the column and row checksums
of the matrix product [112]
AcBr =
[
A
eTA
] [
B Be
]
=
[
AB ABe
eTAB eTABe
]
(2.136)
Therefore, the error protection is maintained for matrix multiplication. ABFT has been
extended to weighted checksum codes [114] and generalized for real-number codes [115].
The main advantage of ABFT is small hardware overhead. The drawbacks are the time
penalty, lack of general applicability and the need to recompute in case of high error
rates [116].
Stochastic logic [117] presents a different computing paradigm compared to the conven-
tional logic. Stochastic circuits operate on probabilities instead of logical or arithmetic
values used in conventional logic. This allows using simple logic gates to perform arith-
metic operations. For instance, the multiplication is performed by just a single AND
gate [118]. The input to the gate are two independent random bit streams X1 and X2
as shown in Fig. 2.28. The number of ones in the input stream X identifies the input
probability value x. The output is the random bit stream Y , with output probability y
given as
y = P (Y = 1) = P (X1 = 1 and X2 = 1) = P (X1 = 1)P (X2 = 1) = x1x2 (2.137)
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Figure 2.28: Multiplication by an AND gate in a stochastic circuit
Therefore, an AND gate implements multiplication. Scaled addition is implemented with
a multiplexer [118]. The precision depends on the number of bits in the input/output
stream. The stochastic logic exhibits inherent redundancy. A single error at the gate
output due to transient fault will not affect the result, given the number of bits in the
stream is sufficiently large. This requirement is at the same time the main drawback of
the stochastic logic. Large bit streams require random number generators of large size
and introduce a time penalty. Another issue is that the correct operation requires ran-
dom streams to be uncorrelated. Despite these drawbacks, stochastic logic has been used
to implement several DSP systems, such as low density parity check (LDPC) decoder
[119] and image processing [120].
2.3.3 Stochastic computation
Conventional hardware redundancy systems try to correct or mask all occurring errors.
Stochastic computation [19] (not to be confused with stochastic circuits from the last
section), on the contrary, treats hardware errors as additional source of noise and tries
to provide good enough results from the application perspective. From the application
perspective, exact correction of all hardware errors may not be necessary. Such situation
arises in DSP applications that process inherently noisy data. Stochastic computation
is the extension of conventional hardware redundancy that tries to correct the errors in
statistical sense [121]. It does not strive to ensure completely error free operation, but
seeks to optimize the application specific metrics such as BER or SNR.
Most of the proposed stochastic computation systems target VOS-induced errors [19].
These systems are able to mitigate the impact of VOS, trading off slight performance
degradation for significant energy savings due to reduction of the power supply voltage.
Stochastic computation design has been applied to a variety of DSP applications, such
as digital filtering [122], FFT [123] and Viterbi decoder [124].
The key representative of stochastic computation approach is the algorithmic noise tol-
erance (ANT) [21]. The ANT architecture is depicted in Fig. 2.29. The main block
computes its output ya, which can be affected by the VOS-induced error η due to crit-
ical path delay violation. Parallel to the main block there is a low complexity replica
which computes the estimate of the main block output ye. This low complexity replica
is termed the estimator. Due to its lower complexity, for example by use of reduced pre-
cision [23], the reduction in Vdd does not incur any error. However, reducing precision
truncates the LSB and the output of the estimator contains a precision error e compared
to the error free output y0 of the main block. Further, the difference in statistics of η
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and e is exploited. The final output is picked according to the following decision rule
yˆ =

ya, if |ya − ye| < Th
ye, otherwise
(2.138)
The output of the main block is used if the difference between the output of the main
block and the estimator is below a certain threshold Th. Otherwise, the error is detected
and the low precision output of the estimator is used. The value of the threshold Th
is chosen as the maximum difference between the correct output of the main block and
the estimator
Th = argmax
∀input
|y0 − ye| (2.139)
Figure 2.29: Algorithmic noise tolerance
Algorithmic soft error tolerance (ASET) is the extension of ANT which addresses soft
errors in addition to VOS-induced errors [125]. In ANT, the estimator block is assumed
error free. Since a particle can also hit the estimator circuit, this assumption is relaxed
in ASET. Now, the assumption is that during a clock cycle at most one internal node
in the main block or the estimator can have a logic value flipped. The ASET system is
depicted in Fig. 2.30. In addition to the main block, the estimator is now built of two
identical blocks, E1 and E2. The decision rule is outlined in Eq. 2.140. The decision
block compares the main block output ya and the output of the first estimator ye1. If
the difference dE(ya, ye1) (Euclidean distance) between them is less than the threshold
Th, output of the main block is used as the final output. Otherwise, an additional
comparator checks whether the outputs of the estimators ye1, ye2 are equal. If it is the
Figure 2.30: Algorithmic soft error tolerance
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case, the single SEU assumption implies that the main block is erroneous and the output
of the second estimator is used as the final output. In case the outputs of the estimators
are different, the same assumption implies that the error has occurred in either one of
them. Then, the output of the main block is passed to the overall output.
yˆ[n] =


ya, if d
E(ya, ye1) ≤ Th
ya, if d
E(ya, ye1) > Th
and dH(ye1, ye2) = 1
ye2, if d
E(yaye1) > Th
and dH(ye1, ye2) = 0
(2.140)
Another similar approach is termed soft NMR by the authors of [22]. The soft NMR
system is depicted in Fig. 2.31. In contrast to traditional NMR, the voter in soft NMR
is a Bayesian detector that treats the N available outputs as noisy observations, con-
taminated by the additive error ηi, whose statistics pη(η) are assumed to be known or
can be obtained experimentally. It then combines in order to optimize some predefined
cost function. The advantage over the conventional NMR is that the soft NMR is able
to produce good estimate even if all N outputs are erroneous. This is achieved by using
the error statistics. The soft NMR treats the computations in the N modules as a noisy
communications channel.
The soft voter is considered a realization of a Bayesian detector. The latter tries to
minimize the associated cost in making a decision. Define C(yˆ, y0) the cost in choos-
ing yˆ as the correct value, given that y0 is indeed the correct value. Denoting the
δ(y1, . . . , yN ) = yˆ the decision rule based on the N observations, the average cost is
given as
E{C(δ(y1, . . . , yN ), Y0)} (2.141)
where Y0 is the random variable representing the correct output. The goal is to find the
decision rule that minimizes the average cost. The detector must be constrained to a
predefined hypothesis set H such that yˆ ∈ H.
The average cost is application dependent. For example, in DSP applications, the ap-
propriate metric is the MMSE. The MMSE cost function is C = (yˆ − y0)2. In case of
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Gaussian error statistics, it is known that the cost function is minimized when yˆ is the
mean of the observations. Thus, the soft voter chooses the output out of the set of
allowed outputs H that is closest to the mean of the observations.
yˆ = argmin
∀y0∈H
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
y0 −
N∑
i=1
yi
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2.142)
2.3.4 Unified channel and memory error model
Stochastic computation approaches represent a form of hardware redundancy and are
therefore applicable to computational sub-components of a larger DSP implementation.
Concerning MIMO receivers, the authors of [126] argue that due to the memory dom-
inance of the respective implementations it is worth to concentrate on memory errors,
and develope a unified statistical model that combines memory errors due to VOS and
channel noise.
Based on this model, the Viterbi algorithm [127] and the breadth-first search detector
[6] have been modified to take the VOS-induced errors within the receiver’s buffering
memory into account. These memory error resilient algorithms trade off slight BER
performance degradation for significant reduction in power consumption due to VOS.
The statistical memory and channel noise model is outlined next.
Consider a MIMO receiver depicted in Fig. 2.32. As the buffering memory stores the
real and imaginary parts separately, the system model in Eq. 2.61 is considered real
valued in this section.
It should be noted that the buffering memory contains m receive symbol vectors y
corresponding to the period of time where the channel matrix H is constant (channel
coherence time). The elements of the receive vectors may be either contaminated by the
memory errors (highlighted in red) or be memory error free as shown in Fig. 2.33.
The memory errors in model developed in [126] are due to VOS. The effect of volt-
age scaling on embedded memories has been researched extensively [128–130]. The
induced error can be modeled as spatially uniformly distributed random variable where
the probability of failure for each cell in the memory is the same Pe(Vdd) for a fixed
supply voltage, Vdd, and linearly increases in the logarithmic domain with reduction of
the supply voltage [129, 130].
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Figure 2.33: Faulty buffer memory
The receive symbols are stored in the buffering memory in fixed point representation.
That is, for each complex yi, two fixed point numbers for real and imaginary parts
are stored, both possibly containing memory errors. The fixed point representation is
defined by two parameters:
• d - length (number of bits) of integer part.
• f - length (number of bits) of fractional part.
The length l of the fixed point number is l = d + f . Therefore any bit stored in the
buffering memory can be flipped with the same probability Pe. For a fixed point number
of length l, each bit position from 0 to l − 1 can be flipped with same probability Pe.
Hence, the probability to have k bits flipped is given by
P (k) =
(
l
k
)
P ke (1− Pe)l−k (2.143)
The value of the error at a particular bit position j depends on the fixed point format
[d].[f ] and the error free bit value yji of i-th element of the receive symbol vector y
eji =

+2
(j−f) when yji = 0
−2(j−f) when yji = 1
(2.144)
The pdf of the i-th element of the receive vector after the memory is in general given as
p(y¯i) =
l∑
k=0
P (k)p(yi, k) (2.145)
The pdf p(yi, 0) defines the distribution of y¯i when there is no bit flip and in this case
y¯i = yi. The pdf p(yi, 1) defines the distribution of y¯i when there is just a single bit flip.
This pdf is given as
p(yi, 1) =
l−1∑
j=0
pj(yi, 1) (2.146)
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Figure 2.34: Pdf of memory error
where pj(yi, 1) is the pdf of y¯i given the error at bit position j, where the error value is
given in Eq. 2.144 Defining pj,g(yi, 2) as the pdf of y¯i given two bit flips at bit positions
j and g, the pdf of y¯i given two bit flips is
p(yi, 2) =
1
2!
l−1∑
j=0
l−1∑
g=0,
g 6=j
pj,g(yi, 2) (2.147)
In general, in case of k bit flips
p(yi, k) =
1
k!
l−1∑
j1=0
l−1∑
j2=0,
j2 6=j1
. . .
l−1∑
jk=0,
jk 6=j1,
... ,jk 6=jk−1
pj1,j2,... ,jk(yi, k) (2.148)
As Pe is typically a low value, the probability to have multiple bit flips within same yi is
negligible. Figure 2.34 illustrates the probability density function of the memory errors
for the [4].[8] fixed point format and Pe = 10
−1. It can be observed that even for such
high bit flip probability, the pdf contains prominent peaks at zero and ±2(j−f). Indeed,
this pdf can be approximated by a discrete probability mass function with nonzero values
at 0 and ±2(j−f), j = 0, . . . , l − 1, that correspond to single bit flips at bit positions
j = 0, . . . , l − 1.
Hence, pdf of i-th element of receive vector after the memory y¯i = yi+e
j
i , j = 0, . . . , l−1
is
p(y¯i) = P (0)p(yi, 0) + P (1)p(yi, 1)
= P (0)p(yi, 0) + P (1)
l−1∑
j=0
pj(yi, 1)
(2.149)
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where P (0) = (1− Pe)l and P (1) = Pe(1− Pe)l−1.
2.3.5 Fault-based attacks and countermeasures
Cryptographic algorithms are employed in most contemporary systems. An example of
such algorithms are ciphers, constructed such that the secret key can not be obtained
by any other means except the brute force guessing, and the latter is not realizable in a
practical amount of time [131].
Unfortunately, it has been recently shown that even though the algorithm itself is math-
ematically invincible, information that can be used to guess the secret key in a practical
amount of time, can be gained from its actual implementation [30]. For example, power
consumption of the circuit can be related to the individual steps of the encryption algo-
rithm which in turn can be correlated to the secret key. Such attacks are referred to as
side channel attacks [132].
Fault-based attacks are a sub-class of side-channel attacks [31]. By maliciously injecting
faults to a specific location of a circuit that implements the cipher the attacker obtains
a distorted cipher-text. By comparing the distorted cipher-text and the correct one the
number of key candidates may be drastically reduced, such that the brute force search
becomes feasible. This technique is denoted differential fault analysis (DFA) [32, 133].
A number of fault-based attacks on classical ciphers has been reported [134]. A number
of fault-based attacks on the advanced encryption standard (AES) implementation has
been reported in [34, 38, 135]. The attacks on state-of-the-art lightweight ciphers, such
as LED [136] and PRESENT [137] has been reported in [35, 39–41]. The attacks can
be mounted with very few fault injections, given the ability of the attacker to precisely
control the time and location of the injection.
The methods to inject fault can be classified based on their cost and precision. The low
cost methods comprise power supply variation, tampering the clock signal, overheating
the circuit, illumination with high energy light source such as ultraviolet lamp [31].
Reducing the supply voltage introduces transient faults. Their impact grows with lower
supply voltage. This method is not precise, but has been reported effective on large
circuits [138]. Altering the clock cycle length results in multiple errors in stored byte
or multiple bytes [139]. Temperature rise has been reported to cause multiple bit flips
in a dynamic random access memories [140]. The main advantage of this method is its
simplicity. The main drawback is the risk of destroying the circuit.
The high cost and precision methods include using laser or x-ray beams. Commercially
available fault injection workstations contain a laser emitter, focusing lens and stepper
motors that allow very precise targeting of circuits [31].
Countermeasures against fault-based attacks include protective techniques that com-
plicate fault-injection, such as shielding or placing the critical structures into physical
locations that are hard to access, and methods to detect the faults once they happen
[30, 31]. The detection approaches can be further subdivided into methods that identify
physical fault-injection attempts and error-detection techniques working on the logical
level. Instances of physical detectors are light sensors which are activated when the
circuit packaging is being opened in order to gain access to its internal structures, or
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Figure 2.35: Simple duplication with complementary redundancy
voltage-level detectors that report attempts to lower the power-supply voltage in order
to introduce delay faults. These countermeasures are complicating the analysis, but can
be overcome by a sophisticated attacker with access to state-of-the-art equipment.
Logic-level detection employs hardware redundancy, time redundancy and information
redundancy. Hardware redundancy is based on NMR and its variations [30]. Examples
of these methods are simple duplication with comparison where results of two identical
cryptographic blocks are compared and multiple duplication with comparison which is
a standard NMR with fault detection. Simple duplication with complementary redun-
dancy (SDCR) is depicted in Fig. 2.35. The duplicated circuit operates on the com-
plemented input. In case the outputs of the two circuits match, the attack is detected.
SDCR protects against multiple errors, since it is difficult to inject different errors with
complementary effects.
Time redundancy is implemented by running the circuit several times with the same
input and comparing the results. One of such method is referred to as simple or multiple
time redundancy with comparison depending on the number of redundant computations
[141]. Recomputing with swapped operands is performed by first computing the result
with big endian and little endian bits of the input swapped. Finally, with recomputing
with shifted operands [142], the cryptographic function is recomputed with the operands
shifted by a given number of bits. The result is shifted backward and compared to the
original result.
The main drawback of hardware redundancy methods is the introduced significant area
and power overhead. The drawback of time based redundancy is in the time penalty,
introduced by the need of running the same encryption or decryption algorithm several
times.
Information redundancy is based on error-detecting or error-correcting codes [5] and its
application to circuit protection is treated in detail in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Detection of virtual massive
MIMO systems
Unique word signaling introduces correlations between individual sub-carriers. There-
fore, the UW system model (Eq. 2.55) can be interpreted as a MIMO system with the
number of virtual receive antennas given by the number of sub-carriers N . As N is a
large number (N = 64 in 802.11n) [51], UW system can be treated as a virtual massive
MIMO system from the detection viewpoint.
Unique word signaling has been initially introduced for single-antenna systems. The
inherent coding across sub-carriers results in BER performance gain compared to SISO
CP-OFDM [10, 11]. MIMO-like system model allows linear and maximum likelihood
MIMO detection [12], which is not applicable to SISO CP-OFDM. However, exponential
complexity of sphere decoding restricted its use only to UW-OFDM systems with low
number of sub-carriers [12, 13].
UW-OFDM clearly outperforms CP-OFDM in the SISO case [9–11]. However, as current
standards employ MIMO with Mt transmit and Mr receive physical antennas [51, 63], it
makes sense to employ it in UW-OFDM too. This chapter introduces the generalization
of UW-OFDM scheme to a MIMO system and compares its performance against a
MIMO CP-OFDM system. The comparison is conducted for both linear and nonlinear
receivers. The employment of multiple antennas increases the system size further and
MIMO UW-OFDM can be regarded as a virtual massive MIMO system with hundreds
of virtual antennas. It is therefore impossible to apply SD to MIMO UW-OFDM. Thus,
direct comparison of ML performance cannot be done. Hence, it is resorted to quasi-ML
algorithms initially introduced for massive MIMO systems [143].
First, likelihood ascent search algorithm [98, 99] is adapted to MIMO UW-OFDM.
Next, concentrating on the virtual massive MIMO interpretation of MIMO UW-OFDM,
this chapter addresses the problem of memory dominance of the receiver. It has been
shown that the traditional small-scale MIMO receivers are memory dominated, as dif-
ferent buffering memories occupy up to 50% of chip area [144]. In MIMO UW-OFDM
this memory dominance is even more pronounced due to much larger system size. As
discussed in the background chapter of this thesis, the aggressive technology downscal-
ing denies the assumption of deterministic hardware operation. Therefore, the detection
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will be modified such that it takes the possibility of faulty memory into account. The
proposed method is developed using the statistical model of channel noise and memory
errors, outlined in Sec. 2.3.4. The novelty of the proposed solution is emphasized by
its ability to handle multiple memory errors, whereas previous schemes assumed single
memory errors only [6]. It is to note that the proposed algorithm is suited to massive
MIMO systems in the general sense. MIMO UW-OFDM is taken here as an example of
a system employing several hundreds of (virtual) receive antennas.
The MIMO UW-OFDM is introduced and its performance comparison to MIMO CP-
OFDM is treated in Sec. 3.1. Memory error resilient detection that builds up on the
detection methods introduced for MIMO-UW OFDM in Sec. 3.1 is outlined in Sec. 3.2.
3.1 MIMO unique word OFDM
The generalization of UW-OFDM to a MIMO system is performed similarly to the CP-
OFDM case (Sec. 2.1.2). There are again Mt parallel transmit data symbol vectors
d˜ ∈ CNd×1. Grouping to the compound transmit frequency domain data symbol vector
with respect to sub-carriers and transmit antennas is done as follows:
d˜ =


d˜(0)
...
d˜(Nd − 1)


NdMt×1
=


d˜1(0)
...
d˜Mt(0)
d˜1(1)
...
d˜Mt(1)
...
d˜1(Nd − 1)
...
d˜Mt(Nd − 1)


(3.1)
The generation of the encoded compound frequency domain symbol vector x˜ ∈ CNMt×1
is done as in Eq. 2.45. The difference to SISO case is the generator matrix Gˇ obtained by
augmenting the SISO generator matrix to the appropriate size by the Kronecker product
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with IMt .
Gˇ = G⊗ IMt = (3.2)
=


g11IMt g12IMt · · · g1NdIMt
g21IMt g22IMt · · · g2NdIMt
...
...
...
...
gN1IMt gN2IMt · · · gNNdIMt


(Nd+Nr)Mt×NdMt
The encoded frequency domain compound symbol vector is therefore given as
x˜ = Gˇd˜ = (3.3)
= Gˇ


d˜1(0)
...
d˜Mt(0)
d˜1(1)
...
d˜Mt(1)
...
d˜1(Nd − 1)
...
d˜Mt(Nd − 1)


Random initialization introduced in Sec. 2.1.2.2 produces random non-systematic gen-
erator matrices G′′ every time the optimization algorithm is run. This allows encoding
each of the Mt data streams by a different generator matrix G
′′
m, where m = 1, . . . ,Mt.
In this case the compound frequency domain transmit symbol vector is obtained as
x˜ = Gˇ′′s d˜ (3.4)
where Gˇ′′s is generated as follows
Gˇ′′s = G
′′
1 ⊗


1 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0

+ · · ·+G
′′
Mt ⊗


0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1

 (3.5)
The transformation to the time domain is performed as in the CP case by theMt parallel
IFFT modules. Therefore, the compound time domain symbol vector is obtained similar
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to Sec. 2.2.2 as
x =
1
N
(FHN ⊗ IMt)Gˇd˜ (3.6)
Next, the vector of non-zero UWs is added to x, similar to the SISO case.
x′ = x+
[
0 uH
]H
(3.7)
Here, the compound vector of non-zero UWs is given as
u =


u(Nd)
...
u(N − 1)


NrMt×1
=


u1(Nd)
...
uMt(Nd)
u1(Nd + 1)
...
uMt(Nd + 1)
...
u1(N − 1)
...
uMt(N − 1)


The frequency domain version of the compound unique word vector is obtained by FFT
as given below
u˜ = (FN ⊗ IMt)
[
0 uH
]H
(3.8)
Therefore, the compound time domain transmit symbol vector is the following
x′ =
1
N
(FHN ⊗ IMt)(Gˇd˜+ u˜) (3.9)
The latter symbol vector is transmitted over the same MIMO multipath channel, dis-
cussed in Sec. 2.2.2. The linear block convolution matrix is given in the MIMO case
as
Htoep =


H0
...
. . .
HL−1 · · · H0
. . .
...
. . .
HL−1 · · · H0


(N+Nr)Mr×(N+Nr)Mt
(3.10)
Here again, as with SISO UW-OFDM, the ISI terms fall within the duration of the UW
vector u(t − 1) of x′(t − 1). At the receiver side, neglecting the AWGN vector, the
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compound time domain receive symbol vector y(t) is given similar to Eq. 2.48:
y(t) = Htoep(t)


u(t− 1)
d(t)
u(t)

 (3.11)
The structure of the transmitted compound OFDM symbol vector is equivalent to the
signal with added cyclic prefix in case of CP-OFDM. The inclusion of u(t−1) is modeled
by multiplication with a copy matrix Θˇc, similar to cyclic prefix insertion matrix in
Eq. 2.81:
Θˇc =


0 INr
IN−Nr 0
0 INr

⊗ IMt (3.12)
where Θˇc is obtained from the SISO copy matrix, augmenting it to the appropriate size
by the Kronecker product with the identity matrix of size Mt.
The t-th compound time domain receive symbol vector, neglecting the AWGN, is given
as
y(t) = ΘˇxHtoep(t)Θˇcx
′(t) (3.13)
where Θˇx is the UW extraction matrix similar to cyclic prefix removal matrix in Eq. 2.84.
It is obtained from SISO UW extraction matrix by augmenting it to the appropriate
size by the Kronecker product with the identity matrix of size Mr:
Θˇx =
[
0N×Nr IN
]
⊗ IMr (3.14)
Clearly, the matrix given below
Hcir = ΘˇxHtoepΘˇc (3.15)
is the same block circulant matrix as in Eq. 2.86, as the UW insertion and extraction
matrices transform the block convolution matrix in the same way as the CP insertion
and removal matrices. Therefore, the block eigenvalue decomposition ofHcir is the same
as in the CP-OFDM case.
Thereby, dropping the time index t, the compound receive frequency domain symbol
vector is obtained at the receiver side by Mr parallel FFT blocks as
y˜ = (FN ⊗ IMr)Hcirx′ + (FN ⊗ IMr)n
=
1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)Hcir(FHN ⊗ IMt)(Gˇd˜+ u˜) + (FN ⊗ IMr)n
(3.16)
Eigenvalue decomposition of Hcir results in the following compound receive frequency
domain symbol vector
y˜ = H˜bGˇd˜+ H˜bu˜+ n˜ (3.17)
where H˜b is the block diagonal matrix, with blocks containing MIMO flat fading channel
coefficients relative to the sub-carriers, as given in Eq. 2.88.
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Subtracting the known part H˜bu˜ at the receiver side results in final MIMO UW-OFDM
system equation
y˜′ = H˜bGˇd˜+ n˜ (3.18)
3.1.1 LMMSE detection
The system equation (Eq. 3.18) for MIMO UW-OFDM looks similar to the one of the
MIMO CP-OFDM. However, the sub-carriers are not independent anymore. Recall the
general form of the LMMSE estimate of the transmit frequency domain symbol vector
x˜:
ˆ˜x =
(
H˜Hb C
−1
nnH˜b +C
−1
xx
)−1
H˜Hb C
−1
nn y˜
′ (3.19)
where the noise covariance matrix is Cnn = E
{
n˜n˜H
}
= Nσ2nI and the transmit symbol
vector covariance matrix is Cxx = E
{
x˜x˜H
}
= σ2dGˇGˇ
H . As in UW-OFDM only the
data part d˜ of x˜ is of interest, its LMMSE estimate is obtained as follows:
ˆ˜
d = Gˇ−1
(
H˜Hb H˜b +
(
GˇGˇH
)−1 Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
H˜Hb y˜
′
=
(
H˜Hb H˜bGˇ+ (Gˇ
H)−1Gˇ−1Gˇ
Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
H˜Hb y˜
′
=
(
GˇHH˜Hb H˜bGˇ+
Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
GˇHH˜Hb y˜
′
(3.20)
In case of random non-systematic generator matrices Gˇ′′m, m = 1, . . .Mt the LMMSE
estimate is of the form
ˆ˜
d =
(
Gˇ′′Hs H˜
H
b H˜bGˇ
′′
s +
Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
Gˇ′′Hs H˜
H
b y˜
′ (3.21)
where Gˇ′′s is given in Eq. 3.5.
Due to the correlation between sub-carriers introduced by generator matrix Gˇ, the
LMMSE estimate is calculated once for all sub-carriers and data streams, as opposed to
the CP-OFDM case. However, it is to note that the size of the matrix to be inverted has
increased from Mr ×Mt to less favorable NdMr × NdMt. This increase in complexity
can be tackled as discussed further.
3.1.1.1 Complexity-reduced LMMSE for systematic MIMO UW-OFDM
The complexity of the LMMSE estimator for MIMO UW-OFDM is dominated by the
matrix inversion in Eq. 3.20. The size of the matrix to be inverted is NdMr×NdMt. Ex-
ploiting the structure of the systematic generator matrix Gˇ, reduced-complexity version
of the LMMSE is obtained similar to SISO UW-OFDM [13].
The receive frequency domain symbol vector y˜′ has to be resorted by multiplying with
transposed permutation matrix PˇT . This matrix is obtained from the SISO permutation
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matrix by the Kronecker product with the identity matrix of size Mr
PˇT = PT ⊗ IMR (3.22)
The resorted receive symbol vector is then given as
y˜′ = PˇT
1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)Hcir(FHN ⊗ IMt)Gˇd˜+ PˇT n˜ (3.23)
The resorted H˜b is in this case defined as follows
H˜b = Pˇ
T 1
N
(FN ⊗ IMr)Hcir(FHN ⊗ IMt)Pˇ (3.24)
After resorting, the block channel matrix Hˇb is easily decomposed into information and
redundancy parts:
H˜b =
[
H˜b,d 0
0 H˜b,r
]
(3.25)
where H˜b,d ∈ CNdMr×NdMt and H˜b,r ∈ CNrMr×NrMt .
Using the unsorted systematic generator matrix Gˇu,
Gˇu =
[
I
T
]
⊗ IMt (3.26)
it can be easily shown that
H˜bGˇu =
[
H˜b,d 0
0 H˜b,r
][
I
T
]
⊗ IMt =
[
H˜b,d
H˜b,r(T⊗ IMt)
]
(3.27)
The matrix to be inverted from Eq. 3.20 can be reformulated as(
GˇHu H˜
H
b H˜bGˇu +
Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1
=
=
(
H˜Hb,dHb,d + (T⊗ IMt)HH˜Hb,rH˜b,r(T⊗ IMt) +
Nσ2n
σ2d
I
)−1 (3.28)
Next, two block diagonal matrices are defined
Dd = H˜
H
b,dH˜b,d +
Nσ2n
σ2d
I, Dd ∈ CNdMr×NdMt (3.29)
Dr = H˜
H
b,r, Dr ∈ CNrMr×NrMt (3.30)
Applying the matrix inversion lemma [145] to the right hand side of Eq. 3.28, and
renaming T ⊗ IMt = Tˇ , reduced complexity LMMSE estimate of the transmit symbol
vector is defined as follows:
ˆ˜
d = (D−1d −D−1d TˇH(TˇD−1d TˇH +D−1r )−1TˇD−1d )
[
H˜Hb,d Tˇ
HH˜Hb,r
]
y˜′ (3.31)
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The inversion of block diagonal matrices Dd and Dr is reduced to Nd + Nr matrix
inversions of size Mr ×Mt. The same number of matrix inversions is performed in the
MIMO CP-OFDM LMMSE detection. Additionally, the inversion ofNrMr×NrMt -sized
matrix (TˇD−1d Tˇ
H +D−1r )−1 has to be performed. Thus, the complexity is comparable
for both methods, due to the systematic structure of the UW-OFDM generator matrix.
Obviously, this simplification is not applicable in the case of non-systematic MIMO
UW-OFDM.
The complexities of both algorithms are compared in terms of number of matrix inver-
sions. The results are depicted in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Complexity comparison
Algorithm MIMO-CP LMMSE MIMO-UW Red. Compl. LMMSE
Operation Size Count Size Count
Inversion Mr ×Mt N Mr ×Mt Nd +Nr = N
Inversion ∅ ∅ NrMr ×NrMt 1
3.1.2 Sphere decoding for MIMO UW-OFDM
By regarding H˜dG as a virtual channel matrix, SISO UW-OFDM can be regarded as a
virtual MIMO system. Therefore, SD has been applied to SISO UW-OFDM detection
[12]. However, the exponential complexity of SD restricted its use only to systems with
a low number (N = 24) of sub-carriers [12], [13]. MIMO UW-OFDM can be interpreted
as a virtual massive MIMO system, where the virtual channel matrix is H˜bGˇ. In this
case the ML solution is given as
ˆ˜
d = argmin
d˜∈ANdMt
∥∥∥y˜′ − H˜bGˇd˜∥∥∥2
2
(3.32)
The size of the transmit symbol vector is increased to NdMt× 1, leading to a very large
tree and prohibitive complexity.
Therefore, SD will only be used for MIMO CP-OFDM detection in this work. It will
provide a ML performance reference for MIMO-UW OFDM.
3.1.3 LAS for MIMO UW-OFDM
Since MIMO UW-OFDM can be interpreted as a virtual massive MIMO system, LAS
detection algorithm can be directly applied. The MIMO UW-OFDM system model can
be transformed to real numbers
y′ = Hd+ n (3.33)
with the real-value decomposition[
<(y˜′)
=(y˜′)
]
=
[
<(H˜bGˇ) −=(H˜bGˇ)
=(H˜bGˇ) <(H˜bGˇ)
][
<(d˜)
=(d˜)
]
+
[
<(n˜)
=(n˜)
]
(3.34)
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Now the size of vectors and matrices has doubled: y′ ∈ R(2MrN×1), H ∈ R(2MrN×2MtNd),
d ∈ R(2MtNd×1), n ∈ R(2MrN×1).
LAS sub-procedures, with necessary extensions relative to the original algorithm, are
detailed in next section.
3.1.3.1 Maximum a posteriori probability LAS
The original LAS algorithm starts with the initial solution given by
d(0) = Q(dˆlmmse) (3.35)
where Q(.) quantizes the LMMSE estimate to the nearest neighbor in A2NdMt [143].
It will be shown in simulation reported later in Sec. 3.1.4 that the quality of the soft
outputs computed according to Eq. 3.55 is not adequate for coded MIMO UW-OFDM.
The performance of soft decision decoded LAS is worse than the performance of soft
decision decoded LMMSE. As LAS algorithm quantizes the LMMSE estimate, it ignores
the LLR provided by latter (Eq. 2.105). Therefore it makes sense to modify the initial
LAS algorithm such that it takes the soft output of LMMSE as its initial solution.
As LAS is essentially an improvement of LMMSE solution, the LLR provided by LMMSE
can be used as a priori information in deciding which symbols have to be updated
during LAS search procedures (Sec. 2.2.3.2.2). The detection method that uses a-priori
probability of the transmit symbol is referred to as maximum a posteriori probability
(MAP) [146]. The MAP estimate of data symbol vector d is given as
dˆMAP = argmax
d∈A2NdMt
P (d|y′,H) (3.36)
Using Bayes theorem, Eq. 3.36 can be reformulated as
dˆMAP = argmax
d∈A2NdMt
(
p(y′|d,H)P (d)
p(y′)
)
(3.37)
= argmax
d∈A2NdMt
(
p(y′|d,H)P (d))
where the second equality is given by the fact that the pdf of y′ does not depend on d.
The first term in the second equality is exactly the likelihood in Eq. 2.111. Taking the
logarithm of Eq. 3.37, the maximization is turned into minimization
dˆMAP = argmin
d∈A2NdMt
(‖y′ −Hd‖22
σ2n
− logP (d)
)
(3.38)
where the second term is the a priori probability of the transmit vector d. It is given as
the product of probabilities of individual symbols.
P (d) =
2NdMt∏
j=1
P (dj) (3.39)
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Assuming 4-QAM with Gray mapping, the values of symbols represent the bit values,
dj,b = dj . Symbol probabilities P (dj = +1) and P (dj = −1) are obtained from LMMSE
LLR given in Eq. 2.107 as [55]
P (dj = +1) =
exp(L¯j)
1 + exp(L¯j)
(3.40)
P (dj = −1) = 1
1 + exp(L¯j)
(3.41)
Hence, the initial MAP cost is given as
C(0) = ‖y′ −Hd(0)‖22 − log(P (d(0))) (3.42)
If the a priori probabilities of the individual symbols are the same, the second term
in minimization of Eq. 3.38 is neglected and the MAP cost of initial solution vector is
identical to the ML cost of the original LAS
C(0) = ‖y′ −Hd(0)‖22 = d(0)
T
HTHd(0) − 2yTHd(0) (3.43)
In 1-LAS, the search in the one symbol neighborhood of the current solution vector
is performed by updating one symbol position of current solution vector per iteration.
Consider the j-th symbol, j = 1, . . . , 2NdMt, changed in (i+1)-th iteration. The update
is formulated as
d(i+1) = d(i) + γ
(i)
j uj (3.44)
where uj is the unit vector with j-th element set to one. For any iteration i, it is
necessary that d ∈ A2NdMt . This implies that γ(i) is restricted to certain integer val-
ues. For example, in case of 16-QAM, the real-valued symbol alphabet is given as
A = {−3,−1,+1,+3} and γ(i) is therefore restricted to {−6,−4,−2,+2,+4,+6} [143].
In case of 4-QAM, the symbol alphabet is A = {−1,+1} and allowed γ(i) values are
{−2,+2}.
Updating a symbol at position j results in the probability change for that symbol from
P (dj) to P (d¯j). Here, symbol d¯j represents the sign flipped version of symbol dj . In-
troducing matrix Υ = HTH with elements υij and vector z
(i) = HT (y −Hd(i)), with
elements z
(i)
j , the change of MAP cost from iteration i to i+ 1 is given by
∆Ci+1j = C
(i+1) − C(i)
= ‖y′ −H(d(i) + γ(i)j uj)‖
2
2
− logP (d(i) + γ(i)j uj)− ‖y′ −Hd(i)‖
2
2 + logP (d
(i))
= γ
(i)2
j υjj − 2γ(i)j z(i)j + logP (dj)− logP (d¯j)
(3.45)
The last equality contains the difference between a priori probabilities of two possible
values of the symbol which is changed at position j. The probabilities of symbols at
positions different from j do not change from iteration i to iteration i + 1, and are
therefore canceled out in the subtraction. This way, MAP LAS takes the confidence in
the individual symbols provided by the LMMSE initial estimate into account.
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In order to decrease the the overall MAP cost, the MAP cost change should be negative.
Hence, the symbol position p with minimum MAP cost difference is obtained:
p = argmin
j=1,... ,2NdMt
∆Ci+1j (3.46)
If ∆Ci+1p < 0, vectors d
(i) and z(i) for the (i+ 1)-th iteration are updated as follows
d(i+1) = d(i) + γ(i)p up (3.47)
z(i+1) = z(i) − γ(i)p υp (3.48)
where υp is the p-th column of matrix Υ. If ∆C
i+1
p > 0, then a 1-neighborhood local
minimum (which may be or may be not the global minimum) is reached and the 1-LAS
sub-procedure is terminated. The resulting vector d is the solution of 1-LAS algorithm.
The algorithm then tries to escape from the assumed local minimum and improve the
MAP cost further by initiating the 2-LAS sub-procedure (Fig. 2.22). 2-LAS searches for
a two-symbol update that would further increase the likelihood. There are
(
2NdMt
2
)
two symbol position combinations. Denote the tuple of symbol positions to be updated
as t = {j, q}. The update rule for the i+ 1 iteration can then be written as
d(i+1) = d(i) + γ
(i)
j uj + γ
(i)
q uq (3.49)
The MAP cost difference for the two-symbol update is written as
∆Ci+1t (γ
(i)
j , γ
(i)
q ) = C
(i+1) − C(i) =
= γ
(i)2
j υjj + γ
(i)2
q υqq − 2γ(i)j γ(i)q υjq − 2γ(i)j z(i)j − 2γ(i)q z(i)q +
+ logP (dj)− logP (d¯j) + logP (dq)− logP (d¯q)
(3.50)
In order to find the optimum values the brute-force method is to evaluate [143]
(γ˙
(i)
j , γ˙
(i)
q ) = argmin
j,q
∆Ci+1t (γ
(i)
j , γ
(i)
q ) (3.51)
In case of 4-QAM, however, search for optimum γ˙
(i)
j is not necessary, as it may take
only values from {−2,+2}, depending on the sign of d(i)j . The MAP cost differences
are computed for all t = {j, q}-tuples and the tuple o = {p, r} with the minimum cost
difference is obtained
o = argmin
t
∆Cm+1t (γ
(i)
j , γ
(i)
q ) (3.52)
Finally, if ∆Ci+1o (γ
(i)
p , γ
(i)
r ) < 0 the update rule for d(i+1), z(i+1) vectors is given by
d(i+1) = d(i) + γ(i)p up + γ
(i)
r ur (3.53)
z(i+1) = z(i) − (γ(i)p υp + γ(i)r υr) (3.54)
2-LAS terminates after a single iteration. If the 2-symbol update improved the MAP
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cost, the 1-LAS sub-procedure is initiated again (Fig. 2.22). Otherwise, 3-LAS sub-
procedure starts a 3-neighborhood search. The computations are similar to the ones in
2-LAS and can be derived in a straightforward way. If the iteration of 3-LAS is able to
improve the MAP cost, 1-LAS is initiated again. If not, the algorithm terminates and
the current solution vector d is declared the final solution.
3.1.3.1.1 Soft output generation
Soft output generation for the original LAS is proposed in [143]. The confidence in each
bit is formulated as
Rj,b ≈
‖y′ −Hdˆb=1j ‖
2
2
− ‖y −Hdˆb=0j ‖
2
2
‖hj‖22
(3.55)
where dˆb=1j and dˆ
b=0
j are the LAS solution vectors with b-th bit of symbol j set to 1 or
0, respectively, hj is the j-th column of H. It is to note that the soft output in Eq. 3.55
represents a rather coarse approximation of max-log LLR in Eq. 2.103, as other vectors
belonging to χ1j,b and χ
0
j,b are simply neglected.
The derived soft value is efficiently reformulated in terms of z and Υ, which are readily
available upon the termination of the LAS algorithm. Note that dˆb=0j and dˆ
b=1
j differ
only in the j-th entry, and hence
dˆb=1j = dˆ
b=0
j + γjuj (3.56)
As dˆb=1j and dˆ
b=0
j are available, γj is obtained from Eq. 3.56. Substituting Eq. 3.56 in
Eq. 3.55 yields
Rj,b‖hj‖22 = ‖y′ −Hdˆb=0j − γj,bhi‖
2
2
− ‖y −Hdˆb=1j ‖
2
2
= γ2j ‖hj‖22 − 2γj,bhTj (y′ −Hdˆb=0j )
= −γ2j ‖hj‖22 − 2γj,bhTj (y′ −Hdˆb=1j )
(3.57)
In case of 4-QAM and real-valued system, it holds dˆj,b = dˆj . If dˆj = 0 then dˆj=0 = dˆ,
and dividing Eq. 3.57 by ‖hj‖22 yields
Rj = γ
2
j − 2γj
zj
υjj
= 4 + 4
zj
υjj
(3.58)
If dˆj = 1, then dˆj=1 = dˆ, then
Rj = −γ2j − 2γj
zi
υjj
= −4 + 4 zi
υjj
(3.59)
For proposed MAP LAS, the max-log MAP LLR for each symbol/bit is given as
Lj = min
d∈χ(−1)j
(
‖y′ −Hd‖22
σ2n
− logP (d)
)
− min
d∈χ(+1)j
(
‖y′ −Hd‖22
σ2n
− logP (d)
)
(3.60)
where χ
(−1)
j and χ
(+1)
j are sets of transmit symbol vectors with symbol at position j
being −1 or +1.
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Equation 3.60 requires computation of 22NdMt Euclidean distances. In order to reduce
the computational complexity, a following approximation is proposed (Eq. 3.61): In case
MAP LAS changes the symbol, its hard-decision value is taken as the soft output. In
case the symbol is not changed, the LLR provided by LMMSE initial solution is used.
L˙j =

dj when sign(dj) 6= sign(L¯j)
L¯j when sign(dj) = sign(L¯j)
(3.61)
3.1.3.2 LAS performance improvement using Gˇ′′s
As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2.2, non-systematic generator matrices G′ and G′′ exhibit band
and full structures respectively. The MIMO version of these matrices share the same
structure as depicted in Fig. 3.1. Therefore, it is to expect that MIMO UW-OFDM
system with Gˇ′′ outperforms the one with Gˇ′ in the uncoded scenario.
In a coded system, the system with Gˇ′ will perform better than Gˇ′′. In an uncoded
(a) Gˇ′ (b) Gˇ′′
Figure 3.1: MIMO UW-OFDM non-systematic generator matrices
system, the BER performance of LAS can be improved when the Mt data streams are
coded with differentG′′m, yielding a compound generator matrix Gˇ′′s . The LAS algorithm
regards the virtual channel matrix HbGˇ
′′ as a true massive MIMO channel matrix. It
has been shown that LAS performance degrades when the channel matrix is correlated
[143]. Therefore, for LAS it is important that the entries of the matrix are as much
uncorrelated as possible. This is not the case for UW-OFDM, as generator matrix G′′
introduces correlations between diagonal blocks of Hb. Therefore, by using generator
matrix Gˇ′′s , the introduced correlation in HbGˇ′′s is less, as this matrix is made of Mt
distinct G′′ (Eq. 3.5). Hence, it is to expect that using Gˇ′′s would bring additional LAS
performance improvement.
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Table 3.2: MIMO system parameters
OFDM system 802.11n UW
FFT size N 64 64
data subcarriers Nd 52 40
guard interval/ redundant subcarriers Ng/ Nr 16 16
redundant sub-carrier indices
{2, 6, 10, 14, 17, 21,
Ir {} 24, 26, 38, 40, 43,
47, 50, 54, 58, 62}
zero subcarriers Nz 8 8
zero subcarrier indices Iz {0, 29, 30,. . . , 35}
transmit antennas Mt 4 4
receive antennas Mr 4 4
3.1.4 Performance comparison
Simulation of MIMO CP- and UW-OFDM systems is performed in order to obtain BER
results. Next, the gains in dB are compared for MIMO CP- and UW-OFDM systems in
case of LMMSE and ML detection at BER = 10−6.
3.1.4.1 Simulation parameters
Parameters of UW-OFDM system are where possible picked same as in CP-OFDM based
802.11n standard. The system parameters are summarized in Table 3.2.
The recorded 10,000 multipath channel realizations are used in all simulations. The
channel coefficients are obtained from standardized 802.11n channel model (model C)
[75]. The channel is assumed constant for 100 OFDM symbol vectors. Modulation is
4-QAM with Gray mapping. In case of a coded system, information bits are encoded by
(133, 171) convolutional code with constraint length 7 and code rate 1/2 (Sec. 2.1.2.1).
At the receiver side, the detected bits are decoded by soft-decision Viterbi decoder
implemented in a Matlab routine.
3.1.4.2 Simulation results
The BER results for LMMSE detection are depicted in Fig. 3.2 and 3.3. MIMO UW-
OFDM clearly outperforms 802.11n in both uncoded and coded systems. In an uncoded
system, using non-systematic generator matrix Gˇ′′ provides maximum gain over 802.11n.
In a coded system, the advantage of the UW system with generator matrix Gˇ′ over
802.11n is most pronounced. The performance of these generator matrices in coded and
uncoded systems coincides with the SISO OFDM case [11]. The system with systematic
generator matrix Gˇ performs worse than the systems with non-systematic generator
matrices Gˇ′ and Gˇ′′ in both coded and uncoded scenarios.
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Table 3.3: Run-time comparison
MIMO CP-OFDM (802.11n) MIMO UW-OFDM
LMMSE 1 1.08
SD 2.22 ∅
1-LAS ∅ 1.3
2-LAS ∅ 4.0
3-LAS ∅ 309.0
The complexity of LMMSE MIMO-UW OFDM is therefore almost the same as the com-
plexity of LMMSE MIMO CP-OFDM. In order to achieve better than SD performance
in uncoded scenario, 3-LAS requires two orders of magnitude more time. In coded sce-
nario, even with this complexity increase, 3-LAS still performs slightly worse than SD.
1-LAS shows little complexity increase relative to LMMSE detected MIMO CP-OFDM,
and requires almost twice less time than SD. It also is able to get relatively close to SD
in terms of performance in both uncoded and coded scenarios, as shown in simulation
results.
3.2 Memory error resilient detection
It has been shown in Sec. 3.1 that the LMMSE detection is attractive for MIMO UW-
OFDM, since its complexity grows linearly with the number of antennas. In this section
the LMMSE will be modified to take the memory errors discussed in Sec. 2.3.4 into
account.
Consider a general complex number MIMO system equation
yc = Hcxc + nc (3.62)
The system model in Eq. 3.62 can be decomposed to real-valued numbers
y = Hx+ n (3.63)
using the real-value decomposition given in Eq. 3.64(
<{yc}
={yc}
)
=
(
<{Hc} −={Hc}
={Hc} <{Hc}
)(
<{xc}
={xc}
)
+
(
<{nc}
={nc}
)
(3.64)
It is to note that this is not a compulsory step. However, now all operations considered
further are real-valued, at the cost of doubling the size of vectors and matrices.
The receive symbol vector y is stored in a buffering memory prior to detection (Fig. 2.32).
As the channel is constant for the duration of multiple symbol vectors, the memory can
be regarded as a matrix (Fig. 2.33). The number of columns (m) equals the number
of symbol vectors, received during the coherence time of the channel. Number of rows
equals Mr ×N , for both MIMO CP- and UW-OFDM. The memory may be faulty and
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Figure 3.9: Pdf of receive vector element
The LMMSE estimate in Eq. 2.95 is optimal in minimum mean square sense when
the transmit symbol vector x and the noise vector n are independent and Gaussian
distributed [83]. Due to memory errors, this assumption does not hold anymore. Figure
3.9 depicts the distribution of an element of the receive symbol vector y¯ stored in the
[4].[8] fixed point format. Clearly, this distribution is not Gaussian. The difference to
Gaussian bell curve is most prominent at the tails of the depicted distribution. Therefore,
in presence of memory errors, the LMMSE estimate is expected to produce a poor result.
It is known that any distribution can be well approximated by a mixture of Gaussian
distributions [148, 149]. Hence, the framework of Gaussian mixture (GM) model can be
used as a starting point for derivation of a suitable detection scheme that takes memory
errors into account. The pdf of a Gaussian mixture distributed random vector r is given
as [150]
p(r) =
M∑
m=1
PmN(µ
m
r ,C
m
rr) (3.65)
where µmr is the mean of m-th component, C
m
rr is the covariance matrix of m-th com-
ponent and Pm is the probability of drawing the m-th component from available M
components. Obviously,
M∑
m=1
Pm = 1.
At first glance, it makes sense to regard the joint effect of AWGN and memory errors as a
GM distributed noise vector n¯, with component covariance matrices σ2nmI. As transmit
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symbol vector x and noise vector n¯ are independent, their joint pdf can be written as
p(x, n¯) = N(µx,Cxx)
M∑
m=1
PmN(µ
m
n¯ ,C
m
n¯n¯) (3.66)
=
M∑
m=1
PmN(µ
m,Cm) (3.67)
Thus, the joint pdf of x and n¯ is GM distributed as shown in Eq. 3.67 [151], with
µm =
[
µx
µmn¯
]
,Cm =
[
Cxx 0
0 Cm
n¯n¯
]
(3.68)
A following relation can be derived from the system equation [150]:[
y
x
]
=
[
Hx+ n¯
x
]
=
[
H I
I 0
][
x
n¯
]
= H¯
[
x
n¯
]
(3.69)
Equation 3.69 shows that
[
y
x
]
is related to x through a linear transformation. This
implies that if x and n¯ are jointly GM distributed, then so are x and y [83]. Therefore,
the joint distribution of x and y is
p(y,x) =
M∑
m=1
PmN(H¯µ
m, H¯CmH¯T ) (3.70)
where H¯µm is given as
H¯µm =
[
µmy
µx
]
=
[
Hµx + µ
m
n¯
µx
]
(3.71)
and
H¯CmH¯T =
[
Cmyy C
m
yx
Cmxy C
m
xx
]
=
[
HCxxH
T +Cmn¯n¯ HCxx
CxxH
T Cxx
]
(3.72)
Since the joint distribution is available, it is possible to derive the conditional mean
E{x|y} which is the MMSE estimator [83]. The marginal pdf of y is [152]
p(y) =
M∑
m=1
Pmp
m(y) (3.73)
where pm(y) is Gaussian with mean µmy and covariance matrix C
m
yy.
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Joint distribution and conditional distribution are connected by Bayes’ rule [83]:
p(x|y) = p(y,x)
p(y)
=
M∑
m=1
Pmp
m(y,x)
M∑
m=1
Pmpm(y)
=
M∑
m=1
Pmp
m(y)pm(x|y)
M∑
m=1
Pmpm(y)
=
M∑
m=1
αm(y)p
m(x|y)
(3.74)
where
αm(y) =
Pmp
m(y)
M∑
m=1
Pmpm(y)
=
Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |HCxxHT+Cmn¯n¯|
1
2
e−
1
2
(y−(Hµx+µmn¯ ))T (HCxxHT+Cmn¯n¯))−1(y−(Hµx+µmn¯ ))
∑M
m=1 Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |HCxxHT+Cmn¯n¯|
1
2
e−
1
2
(y−(Hµx+µmn¯ ))T (HCxxHT+Cmn¯n¯))−1(y−(Hµx+µmn¯ ))
(3.75)
The coefficient αm(y) can be regarded as the probability that n¯ is drawn from component
pdf m, given the receive vector y. Obtaining the mean of the conditional distribution
p(x|y):
E{x|y} =
∫
xp(x|y)dx
=
∫
x
M∑
m=1
αm(y)p
m(x|y)dx
=
M∑
m=1
αm(y)
∫
xpm(x|y)dx
(3.76)
As pm(y|x) is conditional density of joint Gaussian pm(y,x), pm(y|x) is also Gaussian.
The integrals of the individual m components are then the LMMSE estimators of that
particular m-th component as given in Eq. 2.95.
Therefore, the MMSE estimate for a Gaussian mixture is given as
xˆ =
M∑
m=1
αm(y)(µx +CxxH
T (HCxxH
T +Cmn¯n¯))
−1(y − (Hµx + µmn¯ )) (3.77)
The MMSE estimator for a GM is nonlinear, as the coefficients αm(y) are non-linear in
y. Taking into account that transmit symbol vector and the m noise components are
zero mean with Cxx = σ
2
xI and Cn¯n¯ = σ
2
nmI the nonlinear MMSE (NMMSE) estimate
Chapter 3. Detection of virtual massive MIMO systems 88
is given in a more convenient form as
xˆ =
M∑
m=1
αm(y)σ
2
xIH
T (Hσ2xIH
T + σ2nmI)
−1y (3.78)
with coefficients αm(y)
αm(y) =
Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |Hσ2xIHT+σ2nmI|
1
2
e−wm∑M
m=1 Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |Hσ2xIHT+σ2nmI|
1
2
e−wm
(3.79)
where the exponents wm are given as
wm =
1
2
yT (Hσ2xIH
T + σ2nmI)
−1y (3.80)
It is to observe that if there is only one noise component, M = 1, the coefficient α1(y)
equals one and the MMSE estimate coincides with the LMMSE estimate in Eq. 2.95.
3.2.1 NMMSE-based single error correction
The general NMMSE estimator is next adapted to mitigate the effect of memory errors.
First, the attention is restricted to single bit flips within the integer part, as they cause
the largest error values. In this case the mixture component probabilities Pm are: the
probability to have no memory errors P (k = 0) and d equal probabilities P (k = 1) to
have a single bit flip at one of of the integer bit positions j, j ∈ {l−1, . . . , f}. Therefore,
there would be d + 1 noise components: nominal channel AWGN noise n in case there
are no memory errors and d components where each noise term includes the bit flip at
bit position j, j ∈ {l − 1, . . . , f}.
The problem with this approach is that according to memory error model in Sec. 2.3.4,
the value of eji actually depends on the value of y
j
i . Thus, it is not possible to separate out
eji from y¯i and form n¯i = ni+ e
j
i . Therefore, the same channel AWGN noise vector with
covariance matrix σ2nI is present in all d+ 1 mixture components. The first component
assumes receive vector to be memory error free (y¯ = y), while remaining components
assume that some elements of receive vector are affected by bit flips at position j,
y¯j = y + eju (3.81)
where ej are the error values given in Eq. 2.144. Vector u contains ones at i-th position
for which the bit flip at bit position j occurs and zero otherwise. First, the assumption
of having single bit flip in just a single element i of the receive vector taken in [6] is
considered valid. Therefore, the receive vector y¯ may contain single element i affected
by a single bit flip at position j, j ∈ {l− 1, . . . , f}. This implies that vector u is a unit
vector.
Finally the mixture contains: receive vector y with no memory errors with component
probability P (k = 0) and d components where receive vector y¯j has a bit flip at position
j, j ∈ {l − 1, . . . , f} at some element i with same component probability P (k = 1).
Since possible error values are known, the position i of error-affected vector element can
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be identified. When an element of the receive vector contains a flip in the integer part,
the pdf of y¯ will deviate from the nominal multivariate Gaussian distribution given in
the nominator of the NMMSE coefficient α(m=1)(y¯) in Eq. 3.79. The exponent w(m=1)
given in Eq. 3.80 will assume a large value and the coefficient α1(y¯) will be close to zero.
The receiver has the potentially error-affected vector at its disposal, but does not know
whether the error has occurred, nor the affected element of the vector. Therefore, for
each possible bit flip position j (corresponding to mixture components, m > 1), the
single bit flip correction values βji are computed for all i elements of the receive vector.
Since the value of the assumed bit flip depends on the value of the receive vector, the
correction values are obtained as
βji =

(2y¯
j
i − 1)2(j−f) when j = l − 1
(−2y¯ji + 1)2(j−f) when j 6= l − 1
(3.82)
The exponents wji are obtained with applied single-bit corrections
wji =
1
2
(y¯ + βjiui)
T (Hσ2xIH
T + σ2nI)
−1(y¯ + βjiui) (3.83)
where ui is the unit vector containing one at position i and zeros at other positions.
When the applied single-bit correction indeed corrects the error, the deviation from
the nominal Gaussian density would decrease and the respective wji will decrease too.
Otherwise, the correction actually introduces an error, forcing respective wji to increase.
By finding the minimal exponent wji for a given j, j ∈ {l − 1, . . . , f}, the index i of the
receive vector element where the bit flip at position j occurred is identified.
Next, the coefficients αm(y¯) are obtained with minimal exponent values. It is to note
that as the division by the sum of nominators in Eq. 3.79 is just scaling, the nominator
of coefficient and the coefficient itself will be used interchangeably.
αm(y) = Pm
1
(
√
2π)2Mr |Hσ2xIHT + σ2nI|
1
2
e−w
j
min (3.84)
Finally, the NMMSE estimate is computed by Eq. 3.78 with component coefficients
computed previously. The single error correction algorithm is summarized in Alg. 2 for
MIMO CP-OFDM. Real-valued frequency domain vectors and matrices are assumed.
Its detailed operation is outlined next:
• The algorithm is executed sequentially for all N sub-carriers.
• The bit values ¯˜yji of the integer part of all elements ¯˜yi of receive vector ¯˜y are
extracted by bitGet function in line 5 of Alg. 2.
• For each integer part bit position j of all elements i of receive vector ¯˜y, the cor-
rection values are computed by Eq. 3.82, assuming that a single-flip occurred at
exactly this position.
• For each integer part bit position j and all elements i of ¯˜y, compute exponents wji
by Eq. 3.83 with correction values applied.
Chapter 3. Detection of virtual massive MIMO systems 90
Algorithm 2 NMMSE-based single error correction for MIMO CP-OFDM
1: for k = 1, . . . , N do
2: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
3: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
4: ¯˜yji (k) =bitGet(
¯˜y(k), j)
5: end for
6: end for
7: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
8: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
9: if j = l − 1 then
10: βji = (2
¯˜yji (k)− 1)2(j−f)
11: else
12: βji = (−2¯˜yji (k) + 1)2(j−f)
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
17: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
18: wji =
1
2(
¯˜y(k) + βjiui)
T (H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + βjiui)
19: end for
20: end for
21: for all j do
22: wjmin = mini
wji
23: end for
24: for all m do
25: αm(¯˜y(k)) =
Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |H˜(k)σ2xIH˜T (k)+σ2nI|
1
2
e−w
j
min
∑(d+1)
m=1 Pm
1
(
√
2pi)2Mr |H˜(k)σ2xIH˜T (k)+σ2nI|
1
2
e−w
j
min
26: end for
27: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
28: wjmin → βjsm
29: end for
30: ˆ˜x(k) =
d+1∑
m=1
αm(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + βjsmusm)
31: end for
• For each integer bit position j, obtain minimum exponent wjmin. Recall that the
j-th bit flip position corresponds to the mixture component m > 1. For m = 1,
minimization is not required, since y¯ is assumed memory error free and w(m=1) is
obtained by Eq. 3.80.
• Compute component coefficients αm(¯˜y) with obtained wjmin and w(m=1) by Eq. 3.84.
• Finally, the NMMSE estimate is computed by Eq. 3.78 with correction values βjsm
applied, where sm are the indexes of vector elements for which minimum exponent
values wjmin were obtained.
The inverse of H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI and its determinant can be precomputed for all N
sub-carriers for the duration when the channel matrix H˜b is constant. The correction val-
ues βji can be stored in a look-up table, because their values are predefined for a specific
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fixed point format. The remaining operation are simply matrix-vector multiplications,
except the exponentiation in Eq. 3.79.
It has been found by numerical simulation that the optimal fixed point format for MIMO
CP-OFDM is [4].[8]. The component probabilities are
P1 = P (k = 0) = (1− Pe)4
P2...5 = P (k = 1) = Pe(1− Pe)3
For example, if j = l − 1 = 11 and ¯˜yji (k) = 1, the assumed correct value of the sign bit
is y˜ji (k) = 0. This implies that the bit flip in the sign bit from 0 to 1 has happened, and
the error value is −2(j−f) = −23. Therefore, the correction value is computed as +23.
In case the error has really occurred at this bit position of this receive vector element,
the corresponding wji will be the minimum for this j and the corrections applied to j-th
bit position of other elements only introduce the error.
The NMMSE estimator will be
ˆ˜x(k) =α1(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1 ¯˜y(k)+
α2(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + β11s2us2)+
α3(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + β10s3us3)+
α4(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + β9s4us4)+
α5(¯˜y(k))σ
2
xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + β8s5us5)
(3.85)
where usm is the unit vector with one at position sm and zero at all other positions. The
exponent values w
(j 6=11)
i for the bit positions other than j = 11 will be all very large, due
to the single-flip single element assumption. The corrections introduced for these bit
positions will only introduce the actual error. Therefore, the coefficients αm(y¯) will for
j 6= 11 will all be near zero, effectively leaving only the LMMSE estimate with corrected
receive symbol vector (y¯(k) + β11s2us2) in Eq. 3.85.
3.2.1.1 log-NMMSE
It is convenient to transform the computation of coefficients to log domain:
αm(y¯) = log
(
Pm
1
(
√
2π)2Mr |Hσ2xIHT + σ2nI|
1
2
e−w
j
min
)
= log (Pm)− log
(
(
√
2π)2Mr |Hσ2xIHT + σ2nI|
1
2
)
− wjmin
(3.86)
The first two terms have to be computed once for the particular channel matrix H.
Further, it is not necessary to compute NMMSE estimate as given in Eq. 3.85. Instead,
maximum coefficient αmax(y¯) is found:
αmax(y¯) = max
m
αm(y¯) (3.87)
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Algorithm 3 log-NMMSE for MIMO CP-OFDM
1: for k = 1, . . . , N do
2: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
3: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
4: ¯˜yji (k) =bitGet(
¯˜y(k), j)
5: end for
6: end for
7: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
8: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
9: if j = l − 1 then
10: βji = (2
¯˜yji (k)− 1)2(j−f)
11: else
12: βji = (−2¯˜y(k)ji + 1)2(j−f)
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
17: for i = 1, . . . , 2Mr do
18: wji =
1
2(
¯˜y(k) + βjiui)
T (H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + βjiui)
19: end for
20: end for
21: for all j do
22: wjmin = mini
wji
23: end for
24: for all m do
25: αm(¯˜y(k)) = log (Pm)− log
(
(
√
2π)2Mr |H˜(k)σ2xIH˜T (k) + σ2nI|
1
2
)
− wjmin
26: end for
27: αmax(¯˜y(k)) = max
m
αm(y¯(k))
28: αmaxm (¯˜y(k))→ βzs
29: ˆ˜x(k) = σ2xIH˜
T (k)(H˜(k)σ2xIH˜
T (k) + σ2nI)
−1(¯˜y(k) + βzsus)
30: end for
The maximum coefficient identifies the single error that caused the maximal deviation
from the nominal Gaussian pdf. The value of this error is given by the maximal coefficient
index m that corresponds to the bit flip position j. The vector element i where this
error has occurred is given by the index for which the minimal exponent was obtained
for the maximal coefficient.
The LMMSE estimate corresponding to αmax(y¯) is declared the final solution.
xˆ = σ2xIH
T (Hσ2xIH
T + σ2nI)
−1(y¯ + βzsu) (3.88)
where βzs is the correction value corresponding to index s of vector element for which
minimum exponent value wjmin was obtained for αmax(y¯).
The proposed log-NMMSE for MIMO CP-OFDM is outlined in Alg. 3, where the lines
different to Alg. 2 are highlighted, while the unchanged lines are shaded gray.
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3.2.2 Iterative NMMSE-based multiple error correction
In case of MIMO UW-OFDM, or in massive MIMO in general, the assumption of sin-
gle error within the receive symbol vector does not hold. The generalization of the
algorithms developed in Sec. 3.2.1 to the multiple error scenario is performed next.
Again, the mixture is assumed to contain d+ 1 components, where the first component
assumes receive vector to be memory error free, while the remaining components assume
that some elements of receive vector are affected by bit flips at position j, as given by
Eq. 3.81. Vector u contains ones at i-th position for which the bit flip at bit position
j occurs and zero otherwise. The simplifying assumption of having single bit flip in
just a single element i of the receive vector taken in [6] cannot be fulfilled in MIMO
UW-OFDM due to large memory size required. Therefore, the receive vector y¯ may
contain multiple elements i affected by a single bit flip at position j, j ∈ {l− 1, . . . , f}.
This implies that vector u may contain multiple ones.
Similarly, the mixture contains: receive vector y¯ with no memory errors with component
probability P (k = 0) and d components where receive vector y¯j has a bit flip at position
j, j ∈ {l − 1, . . . , f} at some elements i with same component probability P (k = 1).
Since possible error values are known, the positions i of error-affected vector elements
can be identified one by one. When an element of the receive vector contains a flip
in the integer part, the pdf of y¯ will deviate from the nominal multivariate Gaussian
distribution given in the nominator of the NMMSE coefficient α(m=1)(y¯) in Eq. 3.79.
The exponent w(m=1) given in Eq. 3.80 will assume a large value and the coefficient
α1(y¯) will be close to zero.
The receiver has the potentially error-affected vector at its disposal, but does not know
whether or how many error(s) have occurred, nor the affected element(s) of the vector.
Therefore, for each possible bit flip position j (corresponding to mixture components,
m > 1), the single-bit flip correction values βji are computed for all i elements of the
receive vector. Since the value of the assumed bit flip depends on the value of the receive
vector, the correction values are obtained by Eq. 3.82.
The exponents wji are obtained with applied single-bit corrections by Eq. 3.83. When the
applied single-bit correction indeed corrects the error, the deviation from the nominal
Gaussian density would decrease and the respective wji will decrease too. Otherwise, the
correction actually introduces an error, forcing respective wji to increase. By finding the
minimal exponent wji for a given j, j ∈ {l − 1, . . . , f}, the index i of the receive vector
element where the bit flip at position j occurred is identified.
Next, the coefficients αm(y¯) with minimal exponent values are obtained. The direct
computation of coefficients by Eq. 3.79 reveals a numeric instability that is caused by
the multiple errors within the receive vector. Assume that y¯ contains two bit flips: one
at (l− 1)-th bit position in element s and the other at (l− 2)-th bit position in element
z. The minimum exponent value for (l − 1)-th bit flip position will be obtained with
the bit flip corrected, however, due to the remaining bit flip in element z, the value of
w
(l−1)
min may still be large. This would result in the zero coefficient for (l − 1)-th bit flip
position. The same would happen for w
(l−2)
min , due to influence of bit flip in element s.
This way all coefficients would be computed to zero, rendering the algorithm useless.
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The direct way to overcome this is to compute the minimum of the wjmin instead of
computing the coefficients:
wmin = min
m
wjmin (3.89)
The index of wmin would then identify the bit flip value and the position of the single-flip
value that caused the largest deviation from the nominal Gaussian pdf. The problem
with this direct approach is that the component probabilities Pm are not taken into
account. Therefore, the performance of this version of the iterative algorithm will be
suboptimal, as the simulation results in Sec. 3.2.4 will indicate.
The better way to avoid the numeric issue due to multiple errors is to compute the
coefficients in log domain by Eq. 3.86. In this case, the maximum coefficient identifies
the single error that caused the maximal deviation from the nominal Gaussian pdf. The
value of this error is given by the maximal coefficient index m that corresponds to the
bit flip position j. The vector element i where this error has occurred is given by the
index for which the minimal exponent was obtained for the maximal coefficient.
This way the correction is performed iteratively starting from the memory error which
caused the largest deviation and correcting one error per iteration. The iterative al-
gorithm with error position identification by Eq. 3.89 is summarized in Alg. 4 and the
iterative algorithm with coefficient computation in log domain is summarized in Alg. 5
for MIMO UW-OFDM. Real-valued frequency domain vectors and matrices are assumed.
The function and respective differences of the two algorithms are highlighted next.
• the initial receive vector ¯˜y′ is read from the buffering memory.
• Next, the main loop is executed until maximum number of iterationsmit is reached.
• Within an iteration, first the bit values ¯˜y′ji of the integer part of all elements ¯˜y′i of
receive vector ¯˜y′ are extracted by bitGet function in line 5 of Alg. 4, Alg. 5.
• For each integer part bit position j of all elements i of receive vector ¯˜y′, the
correction values are computed by Eq. 3.82, assuming that a single flip occurred
at exactly this position.
• For each integer part bit position j and all elements i of ¯˜y, exponents wji by
Eq. 3.83 with correction values applied are computed.
• For each integer bit position j, minimum exponent is obtained. Recall that the
j-th bit flip position corresponds to the mixture component m > 1. For m = 1,
minimization is not required, since ¯˜y′ is assumed memory error free and w(m=1) is
obtained by Eq. 3.80.
• In Alg. 4 compute wmin by Eq. 3.89. In Alg. 5 compute component coefficients
αm(¯˜y
′) with obtained wjmin and w(m=1) in log domain by Eq. 3.86.
• In Alg. 4, if wmin corresponds tom = 1, the algorithm is terminated as all errors are
assumed to have been corrected and LMMSE estimate of the current ¯˜y′(it) is output
(Eq. 3.90). In Alg. 5 the maximum component coefficient is obtained. If αmax(y¯)
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corresponds to m = 1, the algorithm is terminated as all errors are assumed to
have been corrected and LMMSE estimate of the current ¯˜y′(it) is output (Eq. 3.90).
ˆ˜
d = σ2dIGˇ
THTb (HbGˇσ
2
dIGˇ
THTb + σ
2
nI)
−1 ¯˜y′(it) (3.90)
• Otherwise, the correction value βzs corresponding to αmax(¯˜y′) in Alg. 5 or to wmin
in Alg. 4, where z indicates the bit flip position within the s-th vector element
where the memory error has occurred, is applied to ¯˜y′
¯˜y′(it+1) = ¯˜y′(it) + βzs (3.91)
• The subsequent iteration is started with ¯˜y′(it+1)
• In the last iteration, the LMMSE estimate with the last found correction value is
output as the final solution
ˆ˜
d = σ2dIGˇH
T
b (HbGˇσ
2
dIGˇ
THTb + σ
2
nI)
−1(¯˜y′(mit) + βzsus) (3.92)
The number of iterations mit can be picked arbitrarily and is the design parameter that
trades off computational complexity and performance.
It is worth to mention that the [4].[8] fixed point format does not fit the range of values
in MIMO UW-OFDM. It has been found by numeric experiment that the fixed point
format optimal for MIMO-UW is [6].[8]. In this format, the possible error values are
{±25,±24,±23,±22,±21,±20} with probability P (k = 1) = Pe(1 − Pe)5. It is obvious
that the largest possible memory error value is larger in case of MIMO UW-OFDM
compared to MIMO CP-OFDM.
3.2.3 Resilient likelihood ascent search
Any ML based detection algorithm can be modified to incorporate knowledge of memory
errors [6]. Here, this modification is performed for MIMO UW-OFDM LAS algorithm
from Sec. 3.1.3 following the approach in [6]. The derivation will be performed for MIMO
UW-OFDM (real-valued system in Eq. 3.33). Although it has been argued that the
single-flip single element assumption is not valid for MIMO UW-OFDM, the derivation
will be first performed under this assumption for clarity of exposition.
As the attention is restricted to errors in integer part only, the likelihood for any element
of the receive vector after the memory y¯′ can be written as
p(y¯′i|d) = P (k = 0)p(y′i, k = 0|d) + P (k = 1)
l−1∑
j=d
pj(y′i, k = 1|d) (3.93)
Assuming that elements of receive symbol vector contain independent Gaussian noise
and memory errors, the likelihood for y¯′ can be expressed as
p(y¯′|d) =
2NdMt∏
i=1
p(y¯′i|d) (3.94)
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Algorithm 4 Iterative NMMSE for MIMO UW-OFDM
1: Initialize ¯˜y′(it=1) = ¯˜y′
2: for it = 1, . . . ,mit do
3: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
4: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
5: ˜¯y′ji =bitGet(¯˜y
′, j)
6: end for
7: end for
8: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
9: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
10: Compute βji by Eq. 3.82
11: end for
12: end for
13: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
14: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
15: Compute wji by Eq. 3.83
16: end for
17: end for
18: for all j do
19: wjmin = argmin
i
wji
20: end for
21: Compute wmin by Eq. 3.89
22: if it 6= mit then
23: if m = 1 then
24: Output LMMSE estimate of ¯˜y′(it) (Eq. 3.90)
25: else
26: wmin → βzs
27: Update ¯˜y′(it+1) by Eq. 3.91
28: end if
29: else
30: wmin → βzs
31: Output LMMSE estimate with final correction, Eq. 3.92
32: end if
33: end for
Plugging Eq. 3.93 into Eq. 3.94:
p(y¯′|d) =
2NdMt∏
i=1

P (k = 0)p(y′i, k = 0|d) + P (k = 1) l−1∑
j=d
pj(y′i, k = 1|d)

 (3.95)
In [6] it is assumed that as P (k = 1) is much smaller than P (k = 0), terms of second
order or higher of P (k = 1) in Eq. 3.95 can be ignored, as their contribution is negligible.
Therefore, it is assumed that the vector contains either one bit flip or none (actually
valid only for MIMO CP-OFDM).
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Algorithm 5 Iterative log-NMMSE for MIMO UW-OFDM
1: Initialize ¯˜y′(it=1) = ¯˜y′
2: for it = 1, . . . ,mit do
3: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
4: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
5: ¯˜y′ji =bitGet(¯˜y
′, j)
6: end for
7: end for
8: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
9: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
10: Compute βji by Eq. 3.82
11: end for
12: end for
13: for j = f, . . . , l − 1 do
14: for i = 1, . . . , 2NMr do
15: Compute wji by Eq. 3.83
16: end for
17: end for
18: for all j do
19: wjmin = argmin
i
wji
20: end for
21: for m = 1, . . . , d+ 1 do
22: Compute αm(¯˜y
′) by Eq. 3.86
23: end for
24: αmax(¯˜y
′) = argmax
m
αm(¯˜y
′)
25: if it 6= mit then
26: if m = 1 then
27: Output LMMSE estimate of ¯˜y(it) (Eq. 3.90)
28: else
29: αmax(¯˜y
′)→ βzs
30: Update ¯˜y′(it+1) by Eq. 3.91
31: end if
32: else
33: αmax(¯˜y
′)→ βzs
34: Output LMMSE estimate with final correction, Eq. 3.92
35: end if
36: end for
The likelihood is then expressed as follows
p(y¯′|d) = P 2NdMt(k = 0)
2NdMt∏
i=1
p(y′i, k = 0|d)+
+ P (k = 1)P 2NdMt−1(k = 0)
2NdMt∑
s=1

 l−1∑
j=d
p(yis|d)
2NdMt∏
i=1,i 6=s
pj(y′i, k = 0|d)

 (3.96)
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Furthermore,
p(y¯′|d) = P
2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
exp
(
−‖Hd− y
′‖22
Nσ2n
)
+
+
P (k = 1)P 2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
2NdMt∑
s=1
l−1∑
j=d
exp
(
−‖Hd− y
′ ± 2(j−f)u‖22
Nσ2n
) (3.97)
As given in Eq. 2.112 the maximization yields the ML estimate. Therefore, in case of
the likelihood given in Eq. 3.97 the maximization becomes
dˆ = argmax
d∈A2NdMt
log(p(y¯′|d)) (3.98)
where
log(p(y¯′|d)) = log
(
P 2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
exp
(
−‖Hd− y
′‖22
Nσ2n
)
+
+
P (k = 1)P 2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
2NdMt∑
s=1
l−1∑
j=d
exp
(
−‖Hd− y
′ ± 2j−fu‖22
Nσ2n
))
(3.99)
Next, Eq. 3.99 can be further reformulated as
log(p(y¯′|d)) = log
(
exp
(
log c0 − ‖Hd− y′‖22
Nσ2n
)
+
+
2NdMt∑
s=1
l−1∑
j=d
exp
(
log c1 − ‖Hd− y′ ± 2(j−f)u‖22
Nσ2n
)) (3.100)
where
log c0 = Nσ
2
n log
(
P 2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
)
(3.101)
log c1 = Nσ
2
n log
(
P (k = 1)P 2NdMt(k = 0)
(πNσ2n)
2NdMt
)
(3.102)
Using max-log approximation the ML estimate is the given as
dˆ = argmax
d∈A2MtNd ,j=f,... ,l−1
(
log c0 − ‖y¯′ −Hd‖22, log c1 − ‖(y¯′ ± 2(j−f)u−Hd)‖
2
2
)
(3.103)
Therefore, the respective minimization in case of memory errors is given as
dˆ = argmin
d∈A2MtNd ,j=f,... ,l−1
(
‖y¯′ −Hd‖22 − log c0, ‖y¯′ ± 2(j−f)u−Hd‖
2
2 − log c1
)
(3.104)
Recall that in original LAS, the ML cost function afterm-th iteration is given in Eq. 3.43.
Now, looking at the minimization in Eq. 3.104, the ML cost function after m-th iteration
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in case there are no memory errors is given as
Cm0 = ‖y¯′ −Hd(i)‖
2
2 − log c0 = d(m)
T
HTHd(m) − 2y¯′THd(m) − log c0 (3.105)
In case of memory errors the ML cost function after m-th iteration is of the form
Cm1 = ‖(y¯′ ± 2(j−f)u)−Hd(m)‖
2
2−log c1 = d(m)
T
HTHd(m)−2(y¯ ± 2(j−f)u)THd(m)−log c1
(3.106)
The cost difference Cm+10 is therefore same as in original LAS:
∆Cm+10 = C
m+1
0 − Cm0 = γ(m)
2
i υii − 2γ(m)i z(m)i (3.107)
where z(m) = HT (y′ −Hd(m)), z(m)i is the i-th entry of z(m), and υii is the (i, i) - th
entry of the Υ = HTH matrix. The cost difference Cm+11 is given as
∆Cm+11 = C
m+1
1 − Cm1 = γ(m)
2
i υii − 2γ(m)i z¯(m)i (3.108)
where z¯(m) = HT ((y¯ ± 2(j−f))−Hd(m)), z¯(m)i is the i-th entry of z¯(m).
It can be concluded that the number of cost differences to be evaluated per iteration
is increased from 2NdMt in original LAS to (d + 1)2NdMt in single-flip single element
resilient version. This represents a severe increase in complexity, taking into account
the assumption of a single error within the receive symbol vector. As single-flip multiple
element is the true situation in MIMO UW-OFDM, the complexity of this approach is
daunting.
As LAS is just an extension of LMMSE in MIMO UW-OFDM, it makes more sense to
run iterative log-NMMSE first to correct most of the errors and thereafter run original
LAS on top of it. In this case, the complexity increase is only from log-NMMSE and
LAS could improve the BER further.
3.2.4 Simulation results
The BER results are obtained for both 802.11n and MIMO UW-OFDM system with
parameters from Table 3.2 in a coded scenario. The bit flip probabilities are set to
Pe = 10
−3 and Pe = 10−4. In coded scenario, MIMO UW-OFDM system is simulated
with Gˇ′, as it provides the best performance. In uncoded scenario, MIMO UW-OFDM
is generated with Gˇ′′s matrix, since it provides additional gain compared to Gˇ′′ when
LAS is employed.
Simulation results for MIMO CP-OFDM system under memory errors are shown in
Fig. 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13. The baseline LMMSE curve, where the memory is completely
error free is plotted in blue for reference. The LMMSE result under memory errors with
Pe bit flip probability is shown in red.
It can be observed that in the low SNR range, channel errors outweigh memory errors
and therefore the BER curves are identical to the memory error free case. As the SNR
increases, the memory errors outweigh the channel errors and introduce an error floor.
This floor is independent of SNR and depends solely on Pe.







Chapter 3. Detection of virtual massive MIMO systems 107
MIMO UW-OFDM is able to outperform SD of MIMO CP-OFDM in uncoded case. In
coded system ML MIMO CP-OFDM performance cannot be achieved.
It can be concluded that MIMO UW-OFDM can be used as an intermediate solution
between LMMSE MIMO CP-OFDM and ML MIMO CP-OFDM in a system employ-
ing four transmit and receive antennas. In case of 1-LAS, MIMO UW-OFDM exhibits
lower complexity than ML MIMO CP-OFDM and is able to achieve close to ML MIMO
CP-OFDM performance in both coded and uncoded setups. Obviously, the above con-
clusions are made without consideration of hardware implementation issues.
Proposed NMMSE iterative memory error resilient detection significantly reduces the
impact of memory errors on the system performance in terms of BER. The impact of
memory errors is more pronounced for MIMO UW-OFDM, since it represents a virtual
massive MIMO system. Here, multiple memory errors within the receive vector have
to be dealt with, opposed to MIMO CP-OFDM, where only single errors exist in the
receive vector. Running LAS on top of the proposed log-NMMSE is able to remove the
impact of memory errors completely for Pe = 10
−4.
The proposed modified detection algorithms include memory error detection and correc-
tion and can be regarded as a dynamic redundancy solution. Opposed to static memory
error correcting codes, which have to be implemented in hardware, consuming area and
power, proposed algorithms use available matrix-vector multiplication. Depending on
the current value of SNR and the memory error rate, it could be chosen dynamically
between standard LMMSE and proposed NMMSE-based algorithm. For example, in
case of low memory error rate (Pe < 10
−6), LMMSE estimate is computed. In case of
high memory error rate (Pe ≤ 10−4), the NMMSE-based detection is activated in order
to reduce the impact of memory errors on the BER.
It is to note that there exist SNR regions (lower SNR range), where the channel errors
still outweigh the memory errors. The proposed detection can be deactivated in that
region. As SNR increases, the memory errors start to outweigh the channel errors and
proposed detection should be activated. In future work it would be reasonable to obtain
a threshold value of SNR for a given value of Pe. It should be also stressed that for
high Pe and high SNR range, an error floor is inevitable even with proposed detection.
However, as the memory errors are considered to be the result of VOS, it should be
taken into account that this BER floor is traded off for a memory power reduction of
50% for Pe = 10
−3 [6].

Chapter 4
Reliability analysis of QR
decomposition
QR decomposition (QRD) encountered in Sec. 2.2.3.2 enables the tree based search used
in sphere decoding. In the virtual massive MIMO context, the QR decomposition can be
used for computation of matrix inverse [153] in the LMMSE estimate. Since hardware
implementation of MIMO UW-OFDM is not yet available, QR decomposition is treated
in the sphere decoding context. An implementation of a MIMO CP-OFDM closed loop
sphere decoding [97] is used in simulations within this chapter.
The QR decomposition can be performed by three distinct algorithm families, namely
Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process, Givens rotations and Householder reflections
[57]. These algorithms perform the same task, differ however in underlying linear alge-
braic transformations and the number of required arithmetic operations. Gram-Schmidt
process produces a unitary matrix from the input matrix by transforming it to an or-
thonormal basis. The upper triangular matrix, required for tree search is obtained as
a side product. Givens rotations zeroes an element of the input matrix one by one by
series of plane rotations until an upper triangular form is obtained. The unitary matrix
is obtained as a side product. The Householder transformation tries to zero out the
most elements of each column vector by reflection operations. The upper-triangular
matrix is derived after each Householder transform matrix is applied to each column
sequentially. A good comparison of these algorithms in terms of numerical complexity
is found in [154]. In terms of hardware implementation, the Householder reflections
reveal the highest complexity, since the Householder transformation matrices have to be
multiplied sequentially in order to obtain the unitary matrix. Modified Gram-Schmidt
process is used for MIMO channel preprocessing due to its numerical stability, compared
to classical Gram-Schmidt process which is prone to rounding errors [155]. Givens ro-
tations possess excellent numeric stability due to unitary rotations involved. For large
matrices, the inherent parallelism of Givens rotations makes the algorithm more suitable
for hardware implementation compared to other methods [154].
First, this chapter recapitulates the Givens rotations algorithm. Next, the basic hard-
ware implementation, namely the systolic array along with its variants, is discussed. In
terms of MIMO, the optimum performance is obtained if the QRD incorporates MMSE
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Figure 4.1: Rotation
sorting of the matrix columns [156]. However, sorting does not allow the direct applica-
tion of the systolic array architecture. The architecture of a new version of the MMSE
sorted Givens rotations algorithm based on conventional logic is next introduced [44].
The architecture is targeted for FPGA and synthesis results are discussed.
Finally, this chapter addresses the reliability analysis of combinational logic components
of the implemented QR decomposition algorithm. Fault injection is performed in order
to identify the the computational modules with the strongest impact of the overall
performance of sphere decoding in terms of FER [45].
4.1 Givens rotations
As mentioned previously, Givens rotations seeks to null out the elements of the input
matrix in order to obtain the upper-triangular form [157]. Consider a 1-by-Mt input
matrix H,
H =
[
h11 h12 . . . hMT
h21 h22 . . . hMT
]
In order to bring it to upper-triangular form, h21 element has to be nulled. This is
equivalent to rotating the vector
[
h11 h
∗
21
]H
along the angle ϕ as shown in Fig. 4.1.
Thereby, along with nulling the h21 coordinate, the h11 coordinate becomes equal to the
norm r of the vector
[
h11 h
∗
21
]H
.
In matrix form, the rotation is defined by the unitary matrix QH [57],
QH =
[
cosϕ sin∗ ϕ
− sinϕ cosϕ
]
(4.1)
where (∗) is the complex conjugate operation.
In general form, the rotation is given as
QHH = R (4.2)
or, in case of an example 1-by-Mt matrix[
cosϕ sin∗ ϕ
− sinϕ cosϕ
]
·
[
h11 h12 . . . hMT
h21 h22 . . . hMT
]
=
[
r h′12 . . . h
′
MT
0 h′22 . . . h
′
MT
]
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The sine and cosine of the rotation angle ϕ, as well as the vector norm are given as
cosϕ =
h11
r
sinϕ =
h21
r
r =
√
h211 + |h21|2
The matrix multiplication in Eq. 4.2 also updates the remaining elements of the two
rows involved in the rotation
h′1,2: MT = cos ·h1,2: MT + sin∗ ·h2,2: MT (4.3)
h′2,2: MT = − sin ·h1,2: MT + cos ·h2,2: MT (4.4)
For the arbitrary input matrixH, the matrix elements are nulled one by one until upper-
triangular form R is obtained. The nulling of i, j -th element of H, is performed by the
corresponding unitary matrix QH(i, j). The later is formed from the identify matrix I
of the appropriate size where the required elements are set as follows:
qHjj(i, j) = cosϕ
qHji (i, j) = sin
∗ ϕ
qHij (i, j) = − sinϕ
qHii (i, j) = cosϕ
The resulting rotation matrix is given in general form as
QH(i, j) =


1 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 . . . cosϕ . . . sin∗ ϕ . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 . . . − sinϕ . . . cosϕ . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 1


(4.5)
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Figure 4.2: Systolic array
The input matrix is brought to upper-triangular form by sequential multiplication with
element rotation matrices QH(i, j). Consider an example of 4-by-4 initial matrix
H =


? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

QH(2, 1)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

QH(3, 1)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
? ? ? ?

QH(4, 1)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?


(4.6)
QH(3, 2)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 0 ? ?
0 ? ? ?

QH(4, 2)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 0 ? ?
0 0 ? ?

QH(4, 3)−−−−−−→


? ? ? ?
0 ? ? ?
0 0 ? ?
0 0 0 ?


The overall unitary matrix QH is obtained by sequentially multiplying the individual
rotation matrices
QH = QHn . . .Q
H
2 Q
H
1 (4.7)
where n is the overall number of required rotations.
4.1.1 Systolic array
The inherent parallelism of Givens rotations is exploited by the systolic array architec-
ture [158]. The systolic array is depicted in Fig. 4.2. The array takes the form of the
resulting upper-triangular matrix. The input matrix is fed to the top row of the array
row wise, starting from the first row. After the decomposition is performed, the elements
of the resulting upper-triangular matrix R are stored within the registers of the array
elements.
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Boundary cell
Internal cell
to other internal cells
Figure 4.3: Boundary and internal cells of the systolic array
The array contains two types of elements: the boundary cell (denoted by a circle) and the
internal cell (denoted by a square). A boundary cell computes the rii diagonal element
of R. It also computes the sinϕ and cosϕ and passes them to the internal cell. An
internal cell computes the update of the remaining non-diagonal elements of the current
row, rij , i < j (Eq. 4.4).
Consider the architecture of the boundary cell, depicted in Fig. 4.3. As the first row of
the matrix,
[
h11 h12 h13
]
is fed to the array, the new value r′b of the diagonal element
is computed as
r′b =
√
(r2b + |hb|2) (4.8)
During the first cycle, the value rb stored in the register is still zero (array has been
initialized) and the value at the input of the register equals the norm of the complex
diagonal element: r′b = |h11|. Therefore, the boundary element stores the diagonal value
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normalized to a real number. The rotation parameters are computed as follows:
s = sinϕ =
hb
r′b
(4.9)
c = cosϕ =
rb
r′b
(4.10)
In the first cycle, s = h11/|h11| and c = 0, because rb = 0. The rotation parameters c
and s are then passed to the internal cells.
The architecture of the internal cell is depicted in Fig. 4.3. The internal cells gets as its
inputs the off-diagonal element hi of the input matrix row and the rotation parameters
c and s. The new off-diagonal row element r′i at the input of the register is computed as
r′i = cri + s
∗hi (4.11)
As c = 0 in the first cycle, r′i =
h∗11
|h11|hi, where hi = h12, h13. The value that is passed to
the next row of the array, h′i, is computed as
h′i = chi − sri (4.12)
during the first cycle this value equals zero, due to c = 0 and ri = 0. Therefore, in the
first cycle, the diagonal element of the input row is transformed to a real number and the
remaining row elements are normalized by the conjugate of the diagonal element divided
by its norm. No actual nulling has been yet performed. This architecture however
allows the rotation matrix given by Eq. 4.1, where the cosϕ assumes real values. This
also implies that the right hand side multiplier and the right hand side divider of the
boundary cell are real value circuits. The remaining multipliers and dividers as well as
all computational elements of the internal cell are complex value circuits.
During the second cycle, the second row of the matrix,
[
h21 h22 h23
]
is fed to the
top row of the array. The boundary cell now computes the final diagonal element of
the resulting upper-triangular matrix by Eq. 4.8. Obviously, r′b =
√|h11|2 + |h21|2.
The rotation parameters are computed by Eq. 4.10 and passed the to internal cells. The
internal cells of the first row update the remaining elements of the first row of the upper-
triangular matrix by Eq. 4.11. The updated elements of the second row are computed
by Eq. 4.12 and passed to the second row of the array, where the normalization of the
diagonal element and the remaining elements of the second input row is performed.
During the third cycle, the third row of the input matrix is fed to the top row of the
array. The top row performs nulling of the element h31, whereas the second row of the
array performs nulling of the element h32. The third row computes the diagonal element
r33 of R.
The array therefore requires as many cycles as there are matrix rows to output the upper-
triangular matrix. It can be observed that the array cells include square root and division
operations that are quite costly in hardware. A number of array modifications have been
proposed that try to remove these costly operations. The most prominent modifications
are Squared Givens Rotations [159] and Modified Squared Givens Rotations [160] that
exclude the square root operation and square root and division free Givens rotations
proposed by the authors of [161]. Unfortunately all mentioned methods violate the
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Figure 4.4: Systolic array with unitary matrix
unitarity of resulting Q and are therefore not applicable for QR decomposition in the
context of sphere decoding. Multiplying the noise vector with a non-unitary matrix in
Eq. 2.114 may lead to a severe noise enhancement.
The discussed systolic array keeps R in the registers of its cells. However, it does not
produce the overall unitary matrix QH . This matrix can be easily obtained using the
following identity
QHn . . .Q
H
2 Q
H
1 I = Q
H (4.13)
In terms of the systolic array this relation is implemented by adding the respective num-
ber of internal cells. The augmented array for the complete decomposition is depicted in
Fig. 4.4. The additional internal cells are fed with an identity matrix of the respective
size. Since the rotation parameters c and s are passed in each row from the boundary
cell to all internal cells, the array simply produces the elements of QH in the registers
of the additional internal cells. The functionality of the array elements is not affected.
4.2 MMSE sorted Givens rotations
In Sec. 2.2.3.2 it has been shown that the QR decomposition of the channel matrix
(Eq. 2.61) yields a triangular system of equations, where the i-th symbol of the receive
vector y¯ is given as
y¯i = riixi +
Mt∑
j=i+1
rijxj + n¯i (4.14)
Since y¯Mt is totally free of interference from subsequent levels, its value divided by
1
rMtMt
is used to obtain the estimate of xi. Proceeding further through the tree, interference free
estimates of the transmit vector x are obtained, given decisions on each level are correct.
The SNR of i-th level is determined by |rii|2, assuming σx = IMt [156]. It therefore makes
sense to start with the symbol with largest rii, in order to minimize error propagation.
In that sense the columns of R and Q have to be sorted appropriately.
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The approach in Eq. 4.14 does not take the noise statistics into account [156]. The
LMMSE estimate incorporates the noise variance. In order to incorporate MMSE crite-
rion into the QR decomposition, an augmented channel matrix is introduced
H¯ =
[
HT σnI
]
(4.15)
Then, Givens rotations operate on the composite matrix
Z(0) =
[
H I
σnI 0
]
(4.16)
such that the sequence of rotations, performed by unitary rotation matrices QHi yields
Z(N) = QHn · · ·QH1 Z(0) =
[
R QHa
0 QHc
]
(4.17)
where R is the desired upper triangular matrix, and QHa is the overall rotation matrix.
In terms of sphere decoding, MMSE criterion and proper sorting would decrease the
computational complexity [162]. The MMSE sorted Givens rotations algorithm is sum-
marized in Alg. 6. As discussed previously, the last diagonal element of R, rMtMt should
be the largest after the decomposition to allow optimal detection order. The problem
is that QRD starts from the first diagonal element, r11. Therefore, rii is minimized
in the order it is computed (1, . . . ,Mt) instead of being maximized in the order of de-
tection Mt, . . . , 1 [163]. Before computing r11, the column norms of H¯ are obtained,
and the column with the minimum norm is placed first (lines 6 and 7 of Alg. 6). The
column norms do not have to be computed again before obtaining r22. they are updated
iteratively (line 10 of Alg. 6).
Algorithm 6 MMSE sorted Givens rotations algorithm
1: Z = Z(0), p =
[
1 . . .MT
]
2: for j = 1, . . . ,MT do
3: νj = ‖hj‖ . initial column norms
4: end for
5: for i = 1, . . . ,MT do
6: k = argminj=i,... ,MT νj
7: exchange columns i and k in permutation vector p and in the first MR + i − 1
rows of H¯
8: perform Givens Rotations using matrices such that rows i + MR, . . . , i + 1 of
column zi become zero
9: for j = i, . . . ,MT do
10: νj = νj − ‖zij‖2 . update column norms
11: end for
12: end for
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4.2.1 Hardware implementation
The main drawback of sorting is that the systolic array architecture can not be applied
directly. After nulling all elements of current column, the columns need to be resorted,
based on their updated norms. Therefore, Z has to be stored in the memory and updated
after nulling of elements under a diagonal element is completed. Therefore, the rotation
processing can be performed by just a single line of systolic array.
It is open to decide how the Givens rotations are computed. Alg. 7 depicts Givens
rotations which follow the operation of systolic array cells in Fig. 4.3. Alg. 7 assumes
rotation matrix in Eq. 4.1. With this algorithm, a single rotation requires two cycles: one
for transforming the complex diagonal element to real domain and row normalization,
and second for the actual rotation.
Algorithm 7 Givens rotations 1
1: R = H, QH = I
2: for j = 1, . . . ,MT do
3: l =
√
rjj · r∗jj . normalize diagonal entry
4: n = r∗jj/l
5: rj(j : MT ) = rj(j : MT ) · n . normalize row j
6: QH = QH(j, j) ·QH , QHjj(j, j) = n
7: for i = j + 1, . . . ,MR do
8: l =
√
r2jj + rij · r∗ij
9: cosϕ = rjj/l
10: sinϕ = rij/l
11: rj(j : MT ) = cosϕ · rj(j : MT ) + sin∗ ϕ · ri(j : MT ) . perform rotation
12: ri(j : MT ) = − sinϕ · rj(j : MT ) + cosϕ · ri(j : MT )
13: QH = QH(i, j) ·QH . update rotation matrix
14: end for
15: end for
The transformation of diagonal element to real domain can be omitted by using the
rotation matrix
QH =
[
cos∗ ϕ sin∗ ϕ
− sinϕ cosϕ
]
(4.18)
The corresponding Givens rotations algorithm is summarized in Alg. 8. Here, with
one line of systolic array, one rotation is performed in a single cycle. This speed up
is gained at the cost of having all computational blocks complex-valued. Only the last
diagonal element has to be transformed to real domain, as it remains complex after
matrix multiplications by QH(i, j). Assuming MMSE sorting, this is not a problem due
to the structure of H¯. For example, consider augmented matrix H¯, obtained from 4x4
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channel matrix H:
H¯ =


h11 h12 h13 h14
h21 h22 h23 h24
h31 h32 h33 h34
h41 h42 h43 h44
σn 0 0 0
0 σn 0 0
0 0 σn 0
0 0 0 σn


(4.19)
Nulling the σn in row 2MT also normalizes the resulting diagonal element r44. Of course,
care has to be taken as sorting could change the columns, such that all elements in rows
below row MT in column MT are zero. In case if rotations are performed on each
element, without checking if it is already zero, diagonal element will be transformed to
real domain anyway. If such check is performed and respective rotation is skipped, a
rotation counter can be used for the last column. If the counter is zero, just a single
rotation has to be performed on any element of the column Mt in rows below row MT
and the diagonal element r44 will be transformed to real domain.
Algorithm 8 Givens rotations 2
1: R = H, QH = I
2: for j = 1, . . . ,MT do
3: for i = j + 1, . . . ,MR do
4: l =
√
rjj · r∗jj + rij · r∗ij
5: cosϕ = rjj/l
6: sinϕ = rij/l
7: rj(j : MT ) = cos
∗ ϕ · rj(j : MT ) + sin∗ ϕ · ri(j : MT ) . perform rotation
8: ri(j : MT ) = − sinϕ · rj(j : MT ) + cosϕ · ri(j : MT )
9: QH = QH(i, j) ·QH . update rotation matrix
10: end for
11: end for
12:
Alg. 8 is preferable over Alg. 7 due to less required cycles. However, complex division
operations that are costly in hardware are still required. In order to trade off divisions
for multiplications, inverse square root version of Givens rotations can be performed.
The respective algorithm is summarized in Alg. 9.
With fixed point arithmetic, the inverse square root operation can be efficiently imple-
mented using only shift operations and additions/subtractions [164]. Alg. 9 will be used
for rotation processing implementation.
4.2.1.1 Real-time requirements
In order to provide truly real-time compliant implementation, the QRD must satisfy the
stringent requirements posed by the current standards. Since the channel matrix evolves
over time, the QRD must be computed at a sufficient rate. The time span during which
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Algorithm 9 Givens rotations using inverse square root
1: R = H, QH = I
2: for j = 1, . . . ,MT do
3: for i = j + 1, . . . ,MR do
4: l2 = rjj · r∗jj + rij · r∗ij
5: inv sqrt = 1√
l2
; l = l2 · inv sqrt
6: cosϕ = rjj · inv sqrt; sinϕ = rij · inv sqrt
7: Perform Rotation
8: rj(j : MT ) = cosϕ
∗ · rj(j : MT ) + sinϕ∗ · ri(j : MT )
9: ri(j : MT ) = − sinϕ · rj(j : MT ) + cosϕ · ri(j : MT )
10: Update Rotation Matrix QH
11: end for
12: end for
H is valid (coherence time) is calculated by tcoh = c/(vr ·f), where c is the speed of light,
vr is the relative speed of the receiver, and f is the frequency. In LTE standards [63],
f = 2.4 GHz and vr is either 250 or 500 km/h, implying the coherence time of 1.8 ms
or 0.9 ms for vr = 250 km/h or vr = 500 km/h, respectively. During the coherence time
QRD must be performed for each of 1021 sub-carriers. This yields real-time constraints
of 1.763 µs or 0.881 µs for the complete QRD [164].
4.2.1.2 Architecture
The developed hardware architecture operates on fixed point numbers of the format
[M].[N] = [4].[8], which represents the best tradeoff between word length and numeric
accuracy, obtained from numeric experiments.
As already mentioned, systolic array cannot be used directly as MMSE sorted Givens
rotations requires column sorting. Therefore, the architecture incorporates a central
memory element to store the composite matrix Z, which is updated after the subsequent
rotations are performed. It also contains INNER PRODUCT block required for initial
column norm computation. The result is stored in NORM VECTOR memory. This
memory is updated by the NORM UPDATE block after column sorting is performed.
The PERMUTATION VECTOR block updates and stores the permutation vector to
keep track of the performed sorting.
The rotation processing is implemented by a single line of a systolic array. Compared
to the line of the classical systolic array in Fig. 4.4, which processes one matrix row at a
time, the current implementation is able to perform one nulling operation on two rows of
Z at the same time. Figure 4.5 depicts the QRD circuit architecture for Mt =Mr = 4.
The line of systolic array, used for rotation processing, contains two types of elements:
the BOUNDARY CELL, which computes the new diagonal element and cosϕ and sinϕ
values, and the INTERNAL CELL, which updates the remaining row elements. The
architectures of the boundary and internal cells are depicted in Fig. 4.6. They are
implemented according to Alg. 9. The boundary cell contains only real value processing
elements, since norm squared of the complex number in line 4 of Alg. 9 can be computed
by real-value operations. The internal cell contains complex value adders and multipliers.
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Figure 4.7: State machine of QR decomposition
Mt =Mr = 4 system. Other matrix memory regions are initialized according to Eq. 4.16.
Thereafter, the state machine changes to the INNER PRODUCT state.
INNER PRODUCT - This state is held for Mr cycles. In every cycle a column of the
matrix H¯ is read out from the matrix memory and its norm is computed. Therefore,
the matrix memory is switched to column mode. Thereafter, the state machine changes
to SWAP state.
SWAP - This state lasts for one cycle. Here, the column norms are compared, and the
permutation vector is obtained and stored in the PERMUTATION VECTOR register.
Thereafter, the state machine moves to SWAP MATRIX state, in case the column of
the matrix have to be permuted. If it is not the case, the state machine moves directly
to the ROTATION state.
SWAP MATRIX - The matrix column are permuted in this state in a single cycle,
according to the permutation vector obtained in the SWAP state. The matrix memory
is switched to the two column read and write mode.
ROTATION - In this state the actual nulling of the matrix element is performed. The
state lasts a variable number of cycles. The boundary cell computes the new value of
the diagonal element in one cycle. In the next cycle the internal cells compute the new
values of the off-diagonal elements. The state is held as long as all elements under the
diagonal element of the current column are zeroed out. Thereafter, the state machine
moves to NORM UPDATE state if further permutation of columns is possible. If not,
but other columns are to be rotated, the state machine moves again to the ROTATION
state. Otherwise, the state machine moves to VALID OUTPUT state. The matrix
memory is set to the two rows read and write mode.
NORM UPDATE - In this state the column norms are updated in a single cycle. There-
after, the state machine moves to SWAP state.
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VALID OUTPUT - In this state, the result of the QR decomposition is available in the
matrix memory. If the resulting matrices are requested (request out signal), the state
machine changes to the OUTPUT state. In case the start signal is applied, the state
machine moves to the IDLE state without outputting the result of the decomposition.
OUTPUT - In this state the upper triangular and orthogonal matrices are read out
column-wise and the state machine moves to IDLE state. The read out takes again Mt
number of cycles.
The number of cycles required to zero out elements of one columns varies from 8 cycles
for the Mt-th column and 14 cycles for the first column of H¯. In order to decrease the
number of cycles required by rotation, it is checked if a value to be zeroed out already
equals zero. In such a case, the rotation in the current row is skipped. This way, six
cycles can be saved, and for Mt ×Mr matrix H with Mt =Mr = 4, the overall number
of cycles required for complete rotation equals (22− 6) · 2 + 6 = 38. It is illustrated by
the following example:
H¯ =


h11 h12 h13 h14
h21 h22 h23 h24
h31 h32 h33 h34
h41 h42 h43 h44
σn 0 0 0
0 σn 0 0
0 0 σn 0
0 0 0 σn


4∗2+3−−−−→
cycles


h h h h
0 h h h
0 h h h
0 h h h
0 h h h
0 σn 0 0
0 0 σn 0
0 0 0 σn


4∗2+2−−−−→
cycles


h h h h
0 h h h
0 0 h h
0 0 h h
0 0 h h
0 0 h h
0 0 σn 0
0 0 0 σn


4∗2+1−−−−→
cycles


h h h h
0 h h h
0 0 h h
0 0 0 h
0 0 0 h
0 0 0 h
0 0 0 h
0 0 0 σn


4∗2−−−→
cycles


h h h h
0 h h h
0 0 h h
0 0 0 h
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


The actual sorting of columns of matrix H¯ takes 2 cycles (one for the search for the
column with the smallest norm, and one for the actual column swap). However, the
number of swaps is variable, as it could possibly occur, that the columns of H¯ are
initially in the proper order. This leads to the variable number of cycles for the whole
QRD, between 55 cycles in absence of swaps and 58 cycles if all three possible swaps
were required.
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Table 4.1: Implementation using multicycle constraints
Multi- Cycles Cycles STRATIX III STRATIX V
cycles per per Fmax Execution Fmax Execution
rotation QRD [MHz] time [µs] [MHz] time [µs]
0 2 55 - 58 37.54 1.54∗ 49.17 1.17∗
1 3 71 - 74 67.47 1.09∗ 98.9 0.75∗∗
2 4 88 - 91 74.28 1.22∗ 102.99 0.88∗∗
3 5 103 - 106 80.69 1.31∗ 99.81 1.06∗
Table 4.2: Implementation using register stages
Register Cycles Cycles STRATIX III STRATIX V
stages per per Fmax Execution Fmax Execution
rotation QRD [MHz] time [µs] [MHz] time [µs]
0 2 55 - 58 37.54 1.54∗ 49.17 1.17∗
2 4 88 - 91 79.6 1.14∗ 106.44 0.85∗∗
3 5 103 - 106 77.39 1.37∗ 122.96 0.86∗∗
4.2.1.3 Synthesis results
The architecture has been synthesized for Stratix III FPGA (EP3SL70F780C2) and
Stratix V FPGA (5SEE9H40C2). These FPGAs are manufactured with 65 nm and 28
nm technology processes respectively. The ultimate goal of the implementation is the
achievement of real-time requirements derived from the LTE standard, 1.763 µs or 0.881
µs for the complete QRD, depending on the maximal allowed relative receiver speed.
The time required for the QRD is the product of the number of cycles and the duration
of one clock cycle. The time-critical operation of QRD is the boundary cell of the systolic
array. Two speed-up techniques have been applied to that cell: multi-cycle and register
insertion. Both techniques increase the number of cycles per rotation (and therefore for
the entire QRD) but significantly decrease the cycle time.
The synthesis results are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The reported clock frequency
assumes the fast process corner and temperature of 0◦ C. The execution times that fulfill
the real-time requirement of 1.763 µs and of 0.881 µs are marked by one asterisk (*)
and two asterisks (**), respectively. Figures 4.8a and 4.8b visualize the execution times;
both real-time constraints are shown by horizontal lines.
The basic design without optimizations fulfills the lower real-time requirement, and the
stricter requirement can be achieved using multi-cycles or register stages. However, their
number should be low, since increasing this number beyond a certain threshold leads
to too many clock cycles, an increase that cannot be compensated by clock frequency
improvement. The extent of execution-time reduction is similar for both optimization
techniques. Note that multi-cycles are inserted automatically by the synthesis tool,
whereas registers are placed manually by the designer.
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Figure 4.8: Timing results
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Table 4.3: Area results
FPGA
Combinational Dedicated Total DSP
ALUTs(%) registers(%) Pins(%) blocks(%)
STRATIX III 46 3 84 65
STRATIX V 5 <1 78 42
1 2 3 4
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58
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Figure 4.9: Cycles/QRD vs cost
To assess the speed gain of the hardware architecture, time measurements of respective
software implementation have been performed, measuring roughly 5.4 milliseconds for
a single QRD. This is orders of magnitude slower than the hardware implementation
which works within a few microseconds. The area results for both FPGA families are
presented in Table 4.3. The circuit easily fits onto the respective FPGA.
In case of stricter execution time constraints, the design is easily scalable, by adding
processing lines to the architecture. Each rotation, or operation on two rows requires
one processing line. One additional processing line allows two nulling operations in one
cycle, with linear area cost increase. Figure 4.9 shows the cost and the number of cycles
required for the complete QRD depending on number of rotation processing lines.
4.3 Reliability analysis of combinational components
The reliability of individual computational sub-modules of implemented MMSE sorted
QRD is assessed by gate level FPGA-based fault injection.
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4.3.1 Simulation chain
Since virtual massive MIMO hardware is not yet available, the closed loop small-scale
MIMO system is used in simulation. The simulation chain of MIMO transmission and
reception system is depicted in Fig. 4.10. The channel encoder adds redundant bits to
the information word (same rate 1/2 convolutional encoder is used). The interleaver re-
duces dependencies between adjacent codeword bits. Next, the encoded word is 16-QAM
modulated, and finally a vector x of Mt symbols is formed and transmitted over Mt an-
tennas at the same time and in the same frequency. The MIMO channel is characterized
by the channel matrix H which contains gains associated with individual transmission
paths. The size of the channel matrix is Mr ×Mt, where Mr is the number of receive
antennas. The received symbol vector y is defined in Eq. 2.61.
The channel preprocessing block performs MMSE sorted QR decomposition on the chan-
nel matrix H. The result of the decomposition is the upper triangular matrix R and
unitary matrix Q. Equation 2.61 is then transformed to Eq. 2.114 by unitary matrix
QH .
The resulting triangular system of equations is then mapped to a tree search performed
by the sphere decoder. The soft-input soft-output SD determines the likelihood of the
bits demodulated from received vector y¯ using the a priori information La from the
channel decoder. Only the extrinsic information λe = λ − La is passed on to the soft
Viterbi decoder. The channel decoder uses the a priori information λa from the sphere
decoder for calculation of the estimated codeword and the a posteriori log-likelihood
ratios Λ of the codeword. The extrinsic information Le = Λ − λa is then returned to
the SD, closing the loop. As the channel decoder itself is operating with two iterations,
the MIMO receiver represents a doubly iterative architecture.
The system level performance is characterized by FER at the the output of the channel
decoder. The channel preprocessing block is implemented on an FPGA, allowing access
to individual gates of the design for fault injection. The remaining blocks of the simula-
tion chain are implemented in software (IT++ library [165]), using the same fixed point
number format and arithmetic as the hardware component.
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Figure 4.11: Fault injection architecture
4.3.2 Fault injection
The hardware errors in various sub-modules of channel preprocessing are assumed to be
the effects of transient faults at the outputs of the gates comprising the netlist. The
transient faults are simulated by fault injection similar to the work in [166].
First, the injection requires modification of the HDL (hardware description language)
design files to include redundant multiplexers and exclusive-or (XOR) gates as shown in
Fig. 4.11. The XOR gate flips the value of the gate output, and the multiplexer passes
the flipped value further, when the fault activ control signal is high. After the files
are automatically modified, the fault injection unit is connected to the respective sub-
module of the channel preprocessing block. The NIOS II processor receives the channel
matrix input data from the software part of the simulation chain and passes it to the
MMSE sorted QRD. After the decomposition is done, it sends the R and Q matrices
back to the software part of the simulation chain. It also sets the value of the fault
injection rate.
The architecture of the fault injection unit is depicted in Fig. 4.12. It takes as the
input a stream of m · 64-bit random numbers and outputs vectors of fault injection
stimuli with a configurable rate of ones. First, the random number inputs are fed into
m 64 : 6 Priority Encoders. As the received random number stream can be assumed
to be uniformly distributed, outputs of the Priority Encoders correspond to certain
probabilities.
Controlled via the parameter port rate outputs of the Priority Encoders are used to
generate in parallel m bits of a bit-stream with a certain rate of ones by the Rate
Adjustment block. This stream is then fed into an n-bit shift register that receives m
bits per clock cycle. The output of the shift register is connected to the fault activ
ports of the sub-module under injection. The fault injection unit allows generation of
ten distinct transient fault rates ψ, from 10−12 to 10−4.
4.3.3 Simulation results
Consider the channel preprocessing architecture depicted in Fig. 4.5. The INNER
PRODUCT, NORM VECTOR and NORM UPDATE blocks are required by sorting.
Sorting does not improve the FER performance, it reduces the complexity of the tree
search performed by the SD. Thus, the hardware errors in these blocks would not affect
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Figure 4.12: Fault injection controller
the FER, but would increase the number of tree passes, as the search would be started
from the suboptimal starting point. This complexity increase can be quantified, but it
is out of scope of this work. The errors in the internal memory can be countered by
standard protection techniques [167]. In general, protecting only integer parts of the
stored fixed point numbers may be sufficient.
The boundary and internal cells are the components actually performing the computa-
tion of the resulting Q and R matrices. Hence, the hardware errors within these com-
binational blocks will definitely affect the FER. The impact of hardware errors within
the boundary cell outweighs the impact of hardware errors within internal cells. This
is due to the fact that the sinϕ and cosϕ values computed by the boundary cell are
propagated to internal cells. Wrong sinϕ and cosϕ values will cause error propagation
and yield further computation of the rotation completely wrong.
FER results for faults injected at random locations of the boundary cell and random
internal cells, are shown in Fig. 4.13. For all fault injection rates the FER performance
is shown after the second iteration of the SD.
Starting from the SNR value of 10 dB the hardware errors start to outweigh the errors
introduced by the channel. It can be observed that in this high SNR region, for low
fault injection rates the FER performance is affected more by the errors within the
boundary cell. For fault injection rate of 10−9, for instance, FER for faults injected
in the boundary cell is almost one order of magnitude worse than the FER for faults
injected into the internal cells for all SNR values. As the fault injection rate increases,
it can be observed that the location of hardware errors has less and less impact on the
overall FER performance. It can be observed that faults injected into boundary cell
introduce the FER floor of 10−3 for fault injection rate of 10−9, FER floor of 10−2 for
fault injection rate of 10−6 and FER floor of 10−1 for fault injection rate of 10−5.
Consider the architecture of the boundary cell, depicted in Fig. 4.6. The upper four real
valued multipliers and three real valued adders are computing the 2-norm squared of the
rotated vector according to line 4 of Alg. 9. Next, the inverse square root is computed.
The left-side real valued multiplier obtains the main diagonal element of the R matrix
by multiplying the result of the inverse square root module by the 2-norm squared. The
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Figure 4.13: Boundary cell and internal cell under fault injection
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Figure 4.14: Fault injection, ψ = 10−10
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Figure 4.15: Fault injection, ψ = 10−9
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
E
b
/N
0
 / dB
F
E
R
 
 
2−Norm squared
Inverse sqrt
Real multiplier
Figure 4.16: Fault injection, ψ = 10−8
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Figure 4.17: Fault injection, ψ = 10−7
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Figure 4.18: Fault injection, ψ = 10−6
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Figure 4.19: Fault injection, ψ = 10−5
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Figure 4.20: Fault injection, ψ = 10−4
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hardware errors in that real valued multiplier would affect only the computation of the
main diagonal element. The hardware errors within the inverse square root block and the
2-norm squared calculation will propagate to both the new main diagonal value and the
sinϕ and cosϕ values. The errors that occur in the four right-side real valued multipliers
only affect the sinϕ and cosϕ values. The FER results when faults are injected into
2-norm squared, inverse square root and real multiplier hardware are depicted in Figures
4.14 to 4.20.
It can be observed that FER is less affected by the errors occurring in the inverse square
root block. For fault injection rate from 10−7 and to 10−5, the FER floor for faults
injected in the inverse square root is almost one order of magnitude lower than the
FER floors introduced by the errors within real multiplier and 2-norm squared. The
computation performed by the boundary cell is iterative. The newly computed diagonal
element is fed back to the boundary cell, for computing the next rotation. The 2-norm
squared and real multiplier are all taking part in computing the value of the diagonal
element, a hardware error within any one of them would render subsequent rotations
wrong. The inverse square root is also used when computing new diagonal element value
and it also computes the values of sinϕ and cosϕ. The results indicate that wrong new
diagonal value, due to errors within the real multiplier, affects the FER more than wrong
both new diagonal element and the sinϕ and cosϕ values, caused by errors in the square
root computation. The same holds for wrong both new diagonal element and the sinϕ
and cosϕ values due to errors in the 2-norm squared.
4.4 Summary
This chapter considered a new architecture for MMSE sorted QR decomposition which
meets the real-time constraints of the LTE standard. The architecture is based on
Givens rotations and incorporates circuitry that implements sorting. The high speed
is achieved by applying design optimizations (multicycles or register stage insertion) on
the base architecture. Higher speed can be easily achieved at the cost of area.
A fault injection based reliability analysis of computational components of implemented
MMSE sorted QRD is performed. The most vulnerable block within the channel pre-
processing is identified as the boundary cell. Errors occurring in the boundary cell have
more impact on the FER performance than errors occurring within the internal cells’
hardware. This FER degradation is quantified as a FER floor in the high SNR region.
Within the boundary cell, the inverse square root turns out to be the least critical.
The real multiplier has more impact, even as it only computes the new diagonal value,
whereas the 2-norm squared and inverse square root affect both the new diagonal element
and sinϕ and cosϕ values. The experimental results show that due to the iterative
function of the boundary cell, the incorrect value of new diagonal is impacting the FER
performance stronger than incorrectly computed sinϕ and cosϕ values.
Therefore, the fault tolerant implementation of the boundary cell must specifically ad-
dress the protection of the new diagonal element computation. As the errors in the latter
rotations are less critical, it can be considered to provide varying amount of protection
to first and subsequent iterations of the boundary cell.

Chapter 5
Evaluation of robust codes
Traditional methods to protect circuits against faults, such as triple modular redun-
dancy [5], are impractical in most instances as they incur unacceptable area and, more
importantly, power overhead. Error-detecting codes (EDC) [168] are typically associ-
ated with lower cost but are effective only against well-specified errors. For example,
the parity code applied to a circuit’s outputs cannot detect a single fault within the
circuit which propagated to an even number of outputs. The interest in effectiveness of
EDCs recently lead to the development of robust codes specifically optimized for mali-
cious fault injection (rather than random faults due to radiation and noise) [169, 170].
This chapter starts with the background on robust codes, which have been developed for
security applications. Then, the performance of these codes is investigated when applied
to protection of general purpose circuits. Since the performance of robust codes has been
evaluated based on information-theoretic measures, this chapter first introduces the cir-
cuit or fault-based measures that capture the input–fault–error relationship. Next, a
cross-level protection scheme is introduced which identifies faults that escape detection
and targets them by selective hardening. Finally, robust codes are applied to an ac-
tual cryptographic circuit and their performance is quantified in terms of introduced
fault-based metrics.
5.1 Robust codes
The general error detecting architecture is depicted in Fig. 5.1 [5, 168]. The k output
bits of the original device are denoted by y(x). The input vector x of the device is
concurrently applied to the inputs of a combinational predictor, which generates the r
redundant bits (RB) p(x). A further combinational block EDN (error-detection network)
evaluates the consistency of the original device’s outputs y(x) and the check bits p(x).
More formally, EDN checks whether the pair y(x).p(x) is a codeword c of a predefined
code C.
The design of error detecting codes against fault-based attacks is based on the assump-
tion [169] that injected faults manifest themselves as additive errors at the output, i.e.,
in a presence of a fault a fault-free output vector c becomes y = c ⊕ e, where e is an
error vector. There are three types of errors that are also illustrated in Fig. 5.2:
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Figure 5.1: Error detecting architecture
• Errors that are always detected: ∀ c ∈ C, c⊕ e /∈ C.
• Errors that are never detected: ∀ c ∈ C, c⊕ e ∈ C.
• Errors that may be detected or not detected depending on the codeword: ∃ ca, cb ∈
C such that ca ⊕ e /∈ C but cb ⊕ e ∈ C.
The set that contains all the errors that are not detected by any codeword is called the
kernel of the code, and is denoted by Kd. The error-masking probability Q(e) is defined
as the ratio between the number of codewords that are masked in the presence of the
error e, and the total number of codewords:
Q(e) =
| {c | c ∈ C and c⊕ e ∈ C} |
| C | (5.1)
This definition implicitly assumes that the output of a circuit is uniformly distributed.
The maximal error masking probability of a code is defined as
Qmc = max
e/∈Kd
Q(e) (5.2)
Robust codes are EDC that detect all nonzero errors with some nonzero probability.
More formally, they satisfy the condition
Q(e) < 1 for all e 6= 0 (5.3)
(This definition is equivalent to Kd = {0}.) For a given k and r, the maximal error
masking probability is lower bounded by Qmc ≥ {2−k+1, 2−r} [171]. A code that meets
this bound is called an optimal code.
The rate of a code is denoted by R = kk+r . Most robust codes are of relatively small
rate [172–174]. There are two codes with rate greater than 0.5, the quadratic sum (QS)
code [175] and the punctured cubic (PC) code [176]. Before describing these codes, some
notations are introduced.
Figure 5.2: Possible detection status of errors at the input of the EDN in Fig. 5.1
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Figure 5.3: General architecture for EDN of the QS code
A binary vector can be referred to as an element in a finite field. For example, a k-bit
vector can be regarded as a vector in k-dimensional space Fk2 with (F2 = GF (2)), but
can also be referred to as an element of the finite field F2k = GF (2
k). The following
constructions use both representations. For example, the expression x3P where P is a
binary k× r matrix, should be read as: refer to x as an element in F2k and compute x3,
then refer to the result as a vector in Fk2 and multiply it by the matrix P modulo 2; the
outcome of this operation is an element in Fr2. Note that addition of two elements of F
k
2
means coordinate-wise addition modulo 2 (XOR).
5.1.1 Quadratic sum code
The quadratic sum code [175] is defined by C = {(x,w) : x = (x1, . . . x2s) ∈ F2k , xi ∈
F2r , w ∈ F2r , w = x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 ⊕ · · · ⊕ · · ·x2s−1x2s}. It can be shown that for k = 2sr
and s > 0, the maximal error-masking probability of the QS code is Qmc = 2
−r. As
a result, the QS code is an optimal robust code for k = 2sr and s > 0. The minimal
distance of the QS code is 1, therefore, this code has no error correction capabilities.
Let 0 6= l ≤ 2r. A code of dimension k = 2sr − l is called a shortened QS (SQS)
code. A SQS code is constructed by appending l zeros to the information word (These
extra zeros are only used for calculating redundant bits and are not explicitly included
into the word). A code designer can choose where to place the l additional zeros. This
choice determines the value of Qmc. If xi and xi+1 (where i is odd) are both appended
with zeros, then the resulted code is not optimal. If an entire xi is appended with
zeros, the resulted code is not robust. The error masking probability of a SQS code is
Qmc ≥ max(2d l2s e2−r, 2−b k2 c) [177]. As a result, there are pairs of k and r for which no
optimal SQS code can be constructed.
The architecture of the EDN for the QS code has two parts. The first part consists
of s finite filed multipliers in GF(2r) [178] (in the simplest case of GF(2), these are
AND2 gates), and the second part is a XOR network that XORs of the results of the
multipliers. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.3.
5.1.2 Punctured cubic code
The construction of the punctured cubic code [176] is based on a binary k × r matrix
P of rank r ≤ k. The code is then defined by C = {(x,w) : x ∈ F2k , w = x3P ∈ F2r}.
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Figure 5.4: General architecture for EDN of the PC code
The maximal error masking probability of the PC code is Qmc ≤ 2−r+1 [179]. If k is
even and r is small enough, then it is possible to find matrix P such that the resulting
PC code has Qmc = 2
−r and the resulted code is optimal. In other cases, if r is large
enough it is possible to construct PC code with minimal distance d ≥ 2 [177].
For example, for k = 10, r = 4 the SQS code is not optimal but there is an optimal PC
codes for these parameters. On the other hand, for k = 10, r = 5 the QS code is optimal
but there is no optimal PC code for these parameters.
The architecture of the EDN of the PC code consists of two modules. The first module
computes z = x2, and the second computes (x ∗ z)P . The easiest way to implement
the PC code is by choosing P = [I|0]T . In this case, a multiplication by P is done by
simply disregarding some of the outputs of (x ∗ z). As a result, in order to calculate
(x ∗ z)P , it is sufficient to implement only part of the multiplier. Such a multiplier is
called a punctured multiplier. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.4. In this work, the PC code
is implemented for k = 64. A simple implementation is chosen using P = [0|I], for
r = 1, 2, 3, 4. For example, for r = 1, the redundancy is the LSB of x3.
5.2 Evaluation methodology
A key difficulty in transferring theoretical properties of codes to faults in actual circuits
is the difference between additive errors on the information-theoretical level (discussed
above) and faults in actual circuit structures. This requires specific metrics [46] which
are explained next.
5.2.1 Fault-based metrics
When a fault occurs in a circuit equipped by an error-detecting architecture, four distinct
outcomes are possible:
• Masked fault: A fault in the device does not affect y(x) and Err = 0. For example,
the fault-affected logic gate may drive a gate with a controlling value on its side
input.
• Detected fault: A fault affects y(x) and Err = 1. This happens when y(x) becomes
inconsistent with p(x) due to the fault and the EDN identifies that y(x).p(x) is a
non-codeword.
• Silent data corruption (SDC) [180]: A fault affects y(x) and is not detected: Err =
0. This may happen if the fault-induced changes to y(x) and/or p(x) still result
in y(x).p(x) being a codeword, or when a fault affects the EDN itself.
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• False alarm: A fault does not affect y(x) but error detection is reported: Err = 1.
This scenario is possible for errors in the EDN and for faults in the predictor which
influence p(x).
Obviously, the faults which could critically influence the circuit operation are of concern.
This is not the case for masked faults or false alarms, even though the latter might
trigger unnecessary recovery. Moreover, detected faults are considered uncritical as the
system is aware of the fault and can initiate corrective measures. In contrast, SDC is
considered critical. The definition of SDC does not distinguish between root causes of
a fault. The faults could be induced by random noise phenomena or introduced by a
malicious adversary who is interested in the fault-based attack being undetected.
It is to distinguish between the notions of a fault and an error. A fault f affects internal
logic gates and lines of the circuit. Single and multiple stuck-at faults on logic gate
outputs within the architecture (device, predictor and EDN) are considered. In contrast,
error e(f) is the effect of the fault on the device’s output y. If the fault-free response of
the device to input x is y(x) and the response of the device affected by fault f is yf (x),
then the error e(f(x)) is defined as e(f(x)) := y(x) ⊕ yf (x). It is important that the
error depends not only on the fault but also on the input vector applied. The same fault
could be masked, detected or undetected depending on the input vector. Therefore, the
efficiency of error detecting code in the context of fault detection cannot be calculated
analytically but rather has to be evaluated by simulations of the actual circuit.
Let the set of possible input vectors be I. Let the set of input vectors for which a fault
f is detected be IDET(f), and let the set of input vectors for which it results in an SDC
be ISDC(f). Let the sizes of the sets (the number of the respective input vectors) be |I|,
|IDET(f)| and |ISDC(f)|, respectively. In context of random transient faults, the silent
data corruption scenario is considered critical, and detected faults as well as faults with
no effect can be excluded from further consideration [181]. Therefore, an appropriate
metric with respect to reliability aspects is the SDC rate:
SDC(f) =
|ISDC(f)|
|I| (5.4)
SDC(f) = 0 means that fault f never goes undetected. A higher value of SDC(f)
means a higher chance that a silent data corruption takes place. Note that this definition
implicitly assumes uniformly distributed inputs I.
From the perspective of a malicious attacker, the undetected faults are of interest. If a
fault is masked, the attacker can simply repeat the attack. However, if a fault is detected,
countermeasures could be invoked. For instance, the device may be deactivated or the
secret key exchanged, making the attack useless. Therefore, an attacker is interested
in faults that will not be detected assuming they have manifested themselves. This
conditional probability is expressed by the attack success rate(ASR):
ASR(f) =
|ISDC(f)|
|ISDC(f)|+ |IDET(f)| (5.5)
An ASR(f) of 0 means that the attacker has no chance to inject the fault f without
being detected. An ASR(f) of 1 identifies particularly critical faults which are never
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detected. ASR(f) is related to the classical definitions of fault-secure and self-testing
circuits [182] as follows. If the circuit is fault-secure with respect to fault f , then SDC(f)
is empty and ASR(f) = 0. If the circuit is self-testing with respect to f , then at least
one input vector detects f and ASR(f) < 1.
ASR(f) obviously depends both on the fault f and on the employed EDC. Previous
work [169, 170] analyzed the detection properties of various codes based on the additive-
error model defined on the outputs of the original device and the predictor (Fig. 5.5).
An additive error e would transform the combined output y(x).p(x) into the erroneous
output ye(x).pe(x) = y(x).p(x)⊕ e. Note that the additive error e is independent from
the input vector x. For linear codes C, there are additive errors e 6= 0 which are never
detected, as for any possible output c = y(x).p(x) with c ∈ C, the erroneous output has
the property c ⊕ e ∈ C and is a codeword. For a given code C and an additive error
e 6= 0, the error-masking probability Qe (Eq. 5.1) can be viewed as the probability that
error e leads to an SDC, assuming that all the codewords (output vectors) occur with
uniform probability.
There are important differences between structural faults considered along with ASR(f)
and the additive errors from the previous works which are the foundation for Q(e). For
a fault f (e. g., a stuck-at fault), the induced error ef on the outputs changes the value
for different input vectors, and may even disappear (ef = 0) for a considerable number
of input vectors. Moreover, fault detection cannot be guaranteed even if robust codes
are employed. It follows from the definition of Q(e) that, for e 6= 0, there is at least one
c′ ∈ C with c′+e /∈ C. The implicit assumption is that such c′ has a non-zero probability
of occurrence and therefore the error can be detected. When considering actual circuits,
some codewords may never show up on the circuit’s outputs, and codewords that can be
produced on the outputs may fail to detect error e. More generally, uniform distribution
of input vectors does not always result in a uniform distribution of output vectors.
Therefore, bounds on Q(e) (Eq. 5.2) obtained assuming that all codewords are equally
likely, may not be accurate.
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For instance, consider the two-input, two-output circuit in Fig. 5.6. Assume it is pro-
tected by the QS code C with one redundant bit p = y1y2 (i.e., C = {000, 010, 100, 111}).
This code is robust, as for each e 6= 0 there is a c ∈ C such that c+ e /∈ C (every additive
error is detected by at least one codeword). However, injecting the single-stuck-at-0 fault
at line g in the circuit results in a change of its Boolean function (see table in Fig. 5.6),
while it is not detected by comparison of redundant bit p for any of the inputs (in fact, p
is always 0). Therefore, the fault is never detected. Note that the additive error induced
by the g-stuck-at-0 is not constant for different inputs: it is 010 for x1x2 = 01 and 000
for all other inputs.
In summary, theoretical results on robust codes cannot be directly applied to analyz-
ing effects of faults in the circuit’s structure. Note that this observation holds only
when considering faults within a circuit. It does not hold for faults in memories or
communication channels for which the additive-error model is accurate.
5.2.2 Fault injection platform
The faults are simulated by fault injection. The fault injection platform is implemented
on an Altera Cyclone IV FPGA. The overview of the framework is depicted in Fig. 5.7.
It allows injecting stuck-at faults of arbitrary multiplicity to any logic gate of the device,
the predictor and the EDN. In order to use the platform, HDL design files are automat-
ically modified to include the redundant multiplexers required for fault injection. Fault
injection takes place at a location if the control input fault act of the multiplexer at
that location is high. The value of injected fault (stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1) is carried by
the multiplexer input fault val. The inputs to the device under injection are either fed
by a pseudo-random source (an LFSR) or provided by the injection software, which runs
on the NIOS II processor. The control information (fault locations and stuck-at values)
are shifted in through scan chains.
The NIOS II controls the execution of the injection campaign. It computes the number
of cycles the scan chain needs to be shifted, such that the fault arrives to the gate to
be injected. It then passes the computed number of cycles to the scan chain controller.
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Figure 5.7: Fault injection framework
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The framework also includes a “clean” copy of the original device without fault-injection
logic, in order to identify faults which altered the device’s output but did not lead to
a detected error. This allows to exclude the event of a false alarm. The output of the
fault-affected device, the clean device and the error status calculated by the EDN are fed
back to the processor for further analysis. Basic preprocessing of the results is done on
the on-chip processor, and the intermediate results are transmitted to the workstation,
where desired numbers such as ASR(f) for each fault are calculated.
Note that the fault injection framework is independent of the particular EDC used.
Moreover, it does not require any low-level information. If some of the gates have been
selected for hardening (introduced in next section), then the multiplexers performing
fault injection at these gates are simply deactivated.
5.3 Cross-level protection
The objective of proposed cross-level protection is to achieve a required level of protection
of a given circuit by combining error-detecting capabilities of the architecture from
Fig. 5.1 with low-level hardening of insufficiently protected logic gates by eliminating
the possibility of faults f with large values of ASR(f). To do so, ASR(f) is first
computed for all modeled faults using large-scale fault-injection campaigns and order
the fault list by these values. Then a number of logic gates involved in faults with large
ASR(f) is selected for hardening. Hardening is implemented by resizing the gate such
that it becomes immune to physical disturbances such as particle strikes (in case of soft
errors) or charge generation by a laser (in case of malicious attacks).
It is possible to use two alternative approaches to select the gates to be hardened:
1. Identify faults whose attack success rate exceeds some threshold and harden gates
involved in these faults.
2. Allocate a budget for gates (e.g., 10%) which can be hardened and select the gates
involved in faults with the largest ASR(f).
For each selected gate, the resizing factor needed to render it tolerant against noise is
determined.
The resulting circuit is synthesized assuming a mix of hardened and unhardened gates
and its area and power overhead is estimated. The fault characterization is re-run
excluding fault effects on the hardened gates: faults affecting hardened gates are masked,
and multiple faults on a mixture of hardened and unhardened gates are transformed to
faults of lower multiplicity on unhardened gates only.
Note that the aim is the minimization of ASR(f). It could have been equally possible
to minimize the probability of undetected fault occurrence
( |ISDC(f)|
|I|
)
or to maximize
the fault detection probability
( |IDET(f)|
|I|
)
instead . Using a different objective would
result in a selection of a different subset of gates for hardening.
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Figure 5.8: Implementation of error detecting architecture
5.3.1 Implementation of code-based protection
Here, four codes are investigated: linear parity code and robust QS codes over Galois
fields GF (2), GF (4) and GF (16).
For a circuit with 8 outputs y1, . . . , y8, the linear parity code has one redundant bit
p = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ y8
The QS code over GF (2) has one redundant bit
p = y1y2 ⊕ y3y4 ⊕ y5y6 ⊕ y7y8
The nonlinear parity code over GF (4) has two redundant bits
p1 = y1y3 ⊕ y2y4 ⊕ y5y7 ⊕ y6y8
p2 = y1y4 ⊕ y2y4 ⊕ y2y3 ⊕ y5y8 ⊕ y6y7 ⊕ y6y8
The nonlinear parity code over GF (16) has four redundant bits
p1 = y0y4 ⊕ y1y7 ⊕ y2y6 ⊕ y3y5
p2 = y0y5 ⊕ y1y4 ⊕ y1y7 ⊕ y2y6 ⊕ y2y7 ⊕ y3y5 ⊕ y3y6
p3 = y0y6 ⊕ y1y5 ⊕ y2y4 ⊕ y2y7 ⊕ y3y6 ⊕ y3y7
p4 = y0y7 ⊕ y1y6 ⊕ y2y5 ⊕ y3y4 ⊕ y3y7
To generate predictor and EDN from Fig. 5.1, the generic procedure outlined in Fig. 5.8
is used. The predictor is composed of a copy of the original device and the code generator
(e.g., an XOR gate for the linear parity code). Similar, the EDN is created from another
copy of the code generator and a bit-wise comparator. The original device, the predictor
and the EDN are then, in isolation, synthesized by Synopsys Design Compiler, in order
to avoid optimizations which compromise the protection. All three blocks are mapped
to a sub-set of the Nangate Open Cell Library [183] which consists of INV, and 2- and
3-input NOR, and NAND gates.
It is important that the three blocks are synthesized in isolation, as synthesizing them
together would result in identification and elimination of many common sub-expressions,
which, in turn, would impair the protection. For instance, if the synthesis tool would
process the original device and the predictor, which includes one copy of the original
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device, it would simply delete this copy from the predictor and wire the output of the
original device into the predictor. While such an architecture would be much more
compact, it provides little protection against errors.
No special effort has been put to further optimize the predictor and the EDN beyond
the simplifications done by the synthesis tool. This is because the objective is to study
errors in the original device and their interaction with errors in the predictor and the
EDN. An arbitrary implementation of the predictor and the EDN which is functional
but not necessarily optimal is sufficient for these purposes.
5.3.2 Selective hardening of individual gates
Once the gates to be hardened have been specified, appropriate electrical parameters
(transistor sizes) are identified for each of the gates such that charge deposition due
to particle strike or laser pulse does not lead to a faulty signal (bitflip) at this gate’s
output.
Note that transistor resizing is not effective against upsets of very large energy. However,
resizing can facilitate detection of such excessive-energy upsets. Since the size of the
transistors is always increased, there is no delay overhead but power overhead.
The upsets only at gate outputs are considered because disturbances of gate-internal
nodes must propagate through one or multiple transistors before having any visible effect
on the gate outputs. In general, the possibility of a bit flip depends on the following
factors [184]:
1. Total charge deposited at the node at which the particle strike occurs.
2. The drive strength of gate that drives the node.
3. Total capacitance of the node which includes the fanin and the fanout gates from
the node
Transistor resizing employed here increases the critical charge Qcrit of a selected gate
by improving its drive strength and capacitance. (Qcrit is the minimal charge that must
be generated in order to upset the node [185].) The resizing is performed such that
Qcrit matches realistic charges. Hence, the charge deposition is modeled as a double
exponential current pulse [186]:
I(t) =
Qdep
Tα − Tβ
(
e−t/Tα − e−t/Tβ
)
(5.6)
where Qdep denotes the charge deposited, Tα is collection time constant of the junction
and Tβ is the ion-track establishment time constant. According to [187], Tα is set to 10
ps and Tβ is set to 5 ps. The worst-case charge that could be deposited is taken to be
130 fc.
The worst case condition for particle strike occurs, when the site of particle strike is at
the output of the gate, since the particle strike could effectively contribute logic changes
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Table 5.1: Gate counts of individual protection schemes
EDC Braun (150 gates) b20 (14159)
Predictor EDN Total Predictor EDN Total
Linear 165 35 350 16025 3139 33323
QS GF (2) 127 18 295 14659 1460 30278
QS GF (4) 165 45 360 17035 3721 34915
QS GF (16) 228 88 466 20896 7658 42713
at the fanout gates. A gate selected for hardening is simulated, along with its fanout,
assuming that the above-mentioned worst-case charge has been deposited at its output.
The size of the gate is increased until the peak transient at its output falls below 0.5
Vdd.
5.3.3 Synthesis and evaluation of circuit with hardened gates
As mentioned above, the circuits used for experiments were synthesized and mapped
to a library consisting of INV, 2-input NOR, 2-input NAND, 3-input NOR and 3-input
NAND gates. Spice libraries for 45nm technology were obtained from Predictive Tech-
nology Models [24]1.
After selective hardening, the area of the circuit is derived from the cell library. For
computing the power consumption, a large number of random input test cases is gener-
ated in the test bench of the design to create switching activity file using Synopsys VCS
which is then used by Synopsys Power Compiler to estimate dynamic power.1
5.3.4 Experimental results
The combinational 4 × 4 Braun array multiplier circuit [188] (synthesized using opti-
mizations from [189]) and the ITC-99 benchmark circuit b20 is considered in the ex-
periments. These circuits are representative, as the multiplier is a small and highly
structured arithmetic block and b20 is an instance of a larger random-logic circuit. The
exhaustive simulation of all 256 possible input vectors was employed for the Braun mul-
tiplier and 1, 000 random vectors for b20. Four EDC-based protection architectures were
synthesized for these circuits using linear parity and QS codes over GF (2), GF (4) and
GF (16). These codes employ 1, 1, 2 and 4 redundant bits, respectively. The composi-
tion of the architectures is shown in Table 5.1 (recall that it is not an objective of this
work to optimize the predictor and the EDN).
For each of the architectures, an exhaustive fault-injection campaign for all single-stuck-
at faults is performed. For each fault f (single-stuck-at-0 and single-stuck-at-1), the sets
|IDET(f)| of input vectors that detect the fault and |ISDC(f)| of faults which are not
detected (silent data corruptions) are obtained. From the cardinalities of these sets, the
attack success rate ASR(f) is obtained.
1This study has been conducted by research partner Sudarshan Srinivasan
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Table 5.2: ASR classes (no hardening) for Braun multiplier, single faults
EDC ASR class
0 (0, 0.1) [0.1, 0.2) [0.2, 0.3) [0.3, 0.4) [0.4, 0.5) [0.5, 0.6) [0.6, 0.7) [0.7, 0.8) [0.8, 0.9) [0.9, 1) 1
Linear 66 39 65 57 41 18 6 6 1 1 0 0
QS GF (2) 5 0 0 1 5 12 112 88 36 20 7 14
QS GF (4) 18 4 16 29 40 52 48 59 28 3 0 3
QS GF (16) 54 22 64 123 34 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5.3: ASR classes (no hardening) for b20, single faults
EDC ASR class
0 (0, 0.1) [0.1, 0.2) [0.2, 0.3) [0.3, 0.4) [0.4, 0.5) [0.5, 0.6) [0.6, 0.7) [0.7, 0.8) [0.8, 0.9) [0.9, 1) 1
Linear 7237 572 714 1010 795 572 529 185 61 22 8 148
QS GF (2) 651 3 86 434 934 3997 4941 1120 381 157 3 641
QS GF (4) 1385 208 1376 5993 1534 464 476 169 21 6 0 220
QS GF (16) 3258 5044 968 257 92 9 62 7 0 0 0 47
Each fault is assigned into an ASR class, as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Class 0
includes faults f with ASR(f) = 0, i. e., faults which are always detected. Class (0,
0.1) includes faults f with 0 < ASR(f) < 0.1; class [0.1, 0.2) includes faults f with
0, 1 ≤ ASR(f) < 0.2; and so forth. Note that a square bracket indicates that the value
is included into the class while a round bracket denotes that the value is excluded. Faults
from a class with larger boundaries are more critical than faults from a class with smaller
boundaries, as the malicious attacker has a higher probability that the advertent fault
injection is undetected; his chances to escape detection are perfect for faults from class
1. Note that faults that are always masked (redundant) have no valid ASR value are
not included in the table.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 allow some interesting insights. As expected, QS codes using 2 and
4 redundant bits perform better than the QS code over GF (2) with only one redundant
bit. However, predictions made using the additive error model at the outputs are not
confirmed. It has been shown in [169] that Q(e) ≤ Qmc where Qmc = 1/2 if the QS code
over GF (2) is employed; for its counterparts over GF (4) and GF (16), the value of Qmc
equals 1/4 and 1/16, respectively. When considering the distribution of codes to ASR
classes for these codes, ASR(f) is by no means bounded by these values. Moreover,
some of the faults are never detected, creating a large vulnerability. As pointed out
above, the mismatch between Q(e) and ASR(f) is due to two modeling deviations.
Q(e) is defined for an additive error e on the circuit’s outputs, while ASR(f) assumes
stuck-at faults within the circuit’s combinational logic. Furthermore, Q(e) assumes that
the circuit’s output values are distributed uniformly and therefore all codewords have a
nonzero probability of showing up. In contrast, ASR(f) is based on the presumption
that the circuit’s input vectors are uniformly distributed, meaning that some of the
output vectors may never be produced.
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 depict the exact histograms of ASR classes for both Braun multiplier
and b20 circuits. These histograms visualize the data of Tables 5.2 and 5.3
Since ASR(f) is a random variable itself, its mean can be obtained by averaging over
all possible faults
ASR =
1
|F |
∑
f∈F
ASR(f) =
1
|F |
∑
f∈F
|ISDC(f)|
|ISDC(f)|+ |IDET(f)| (5.7)
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Table 5.4: Different hardening scenarios, single faults
Braun multiplier b20
Scenario Gates hardened Area [µm2] Power [µW ] ASR SDC Gates hardened Area [µm2] Power [µW ] ASR SDC
Linear code
None – 217.9 24.84 0.188 0.028 – 21243 2.4631 0.129 0.0021
ASR0.9 No hardening necessary 56 21265 2.6049 0.126 0.0020
ASR0.5 9 225.9 30.58 0.165 0.025 648 21488 2.7493 0.006 0.0001
10% 15 227.5 31.79 0.155 0.023 1415 21775 2.9399 0.075 0.0008
50% 75 245.6 42.16 0.066 0.006 7080 24893 4.6543 0.004 0.0001
QS GF (2)
None – 217.9 24.84 0.627 0.129 – 21243 2.4631 0.5 0.0152
ASR0.9 18 223.2 28.74 0.601 0.109 90 21283 2.6170 0.500 0.0153
ASR0.5 148 262.6 54.45 0.470 0.001 7200 24331 4.5108 0.500 0.2158
10% 15 223.2 28.74 0.606 0.113 1415 21838 2.8712 0.500 0.2157
50% 75 242.4 40.91 0.549 0.058 7080 24278 4.4807 0.501 0.2157
QS GF (4)
None – 217.9 24.84 0.457 0.088 – 21243 2.4631 0.256 0.0058
ASR0.9 3 217.9 25.16 0.451 0.086 66 21273 2.6102 0.254 0.0054
ASR0.5 103 253.5 48.52 0.291 0.016 153 21311 2.6345 0.250 0.0054
10% 15 226.4 31.51 0.434 0.076 1415 21847 2.9743 0.252 0.0941
50% 75 244.5 41.11 0.339 0.032 7080 24289 4.4795 0.250 0.0467
QS GF (16)
None – 217.9 24.84 0.172 0.028 – 21243 2.4631 0.063 0.0019
10% 15 225.4 31.03 0.161 0.024 1415 21656 2.8552 0.062 0.0011
50% 75 240.8 41.62 0.129 0.011 7080 24660 4.8600 0.062 0.0003
when the attacker can accurately control the location of fault injection while SDC is a
measure of the attacker’s chances of success in absence of such capability.
It can be seen that relatively few gates are associated with ASR(f) > 0.9, and therefore
scenario ASR0.9 has rather low additional cost. Scenario ASR0.5 requires the hard-
ening of a large number of gates (almost all gates in some cases) Even in such cases the
area increase is limited. This is because the hardened cells with resized transistors are
often not much larger than their unhardened counterparts (the sizes are sometimes even
identical). In contrast, power consumption grows almost linearly with the number of
the hardened gates and is largely independent from the actual selection of gates. It can
be concluded that the main cost of selective hardening is power overhead, which tends
to scale with the number of selected gates.
The mean ASR reported for the larger circuit b20 for nonlinear codes matches well with
theoretical predictions from [190] (Q(e) is bounded by 0.5, 0.25 and 0.00625 for the
nonlinear code over GF (2), GF (4) and GF (16), respectively). The deviations of the
measured mean ASR from these values are much larger for the Braun multiplier. This is
probably due to the fact that a uniform distribution of vectors at the multiplier’s inputs
results in a very non-uniform distribution of output vectors. Hardening improves mean
ASR for the linear code and for the Braun multiplier but has almost no effect for the
nonlinear code in b20. This is because almost all faults have very similar ASR(f) and
eliminating some of them by hardening does not improve the mean ASR. However, mean
SDC is significantly improved by hardening, even though the selection of the gates was
driven by a different metric (ASR).
Figure 5.11 depicts the effect of hardening for various scenarios for Braun multiplier
protected by QS over GF(4).
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Table 5.5: Faults of different multiplicity, Braun multiplier
Scenario Power overh.[%] Single faults Double faults Multiple faults
ASR SDC ASR SDC ASR SDC
Linear code
None – 0.1878 0.0280 0.3674 0.0275 0.4720 0.0257
ASR0.5 23.1 0.1654 0.0246 0.3556 0.0169 0.4703 0.0247
10% 28.0 0.1553 0.0229 0.3492 0.0163 0.4682 0.0241
50% 69.7 0.0661 0.0058 0.2773 0.0241 0.4466 0.0150
QS GF (2)
None – 0.6269 0.1290 0.6015 0.0508 0.5632 0.0343
ASR0.9 15.7 0.6006 0.1093 0.5879 0.0443 0.5588 0.0311
ASR0.5 119.2 0.4702 0.0005 0.4778 0.0003 0.5103 0.0003
10% 15.7 0.6061 0.1132 0.5912 0.0458 0.5598 0.0317
50% 64.7 0.5492 0.0575 0.5555 0.1245 0.5449 0.0203
QS GF (4)
None – 0.4574 0.0875 0.4304 0.0221 0.3639 0.0202
ASR0.9 1.3 0.4507 0.0859 0.4273 0.0217 0.3631 0.0199
ASR0.5 95.3 0.2907 0.0158 0.3017 0.0047 0.2980 0.0059
10% 26.9 0.4341 0.0757 0.4150 0.00195 0.3571 0.0185
50% 65.5 0.3389 0.0318 0.3226 0.0102 0.3236 0.0102
QS GF (16)
None – 0.1718 0.0283 0.1653 0.0043 0.1257 0.0060
10% 24.9 0.1609 0.0242 0.1579 0.00035 0.1223 0.0054
50% 67.6 0.1289 0.0110 0.1138 0.00012 0.1138 0.0031
mean SDC). Therefore, if the attacker is capable to target specific gates, hardening some
of them is not likely to prevent an undetected attack. The protection must be based on
a sufficient performance of the code employed.
One basic assumption on the hardening scheme is that the gate resizing is sufficient
to protect against all possible errors and consequently no error effects on the hardened
gates are possible. The good values of SDC achieved by most codes provide support
for an additional level of protection if the attacker employs laser pulses with energy
larger than the maximal values used during transistor resizing. In this case, excessive
charge carriers may flip the output of the hardened gate. However, they are highly likely
to simultaneously flip the outputs of neighboring gates, resulting in (random) multiple
errors, which are relatively easy to detect as suggested by low values of SDC. Moreover,
excessive charge carriers will take time to dissipate, likely imposing (single or multiple)
errors in subsequent clock cycle. It has been reported in [190] that such multi-cycle faults
have a much higher probability of detection by robust codes than single-cycle faults.
The QS code over GF (2) has the lowest hardware overhead of all protection schemes
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Table 5.6: Faults of different multiplicity, b20
Scenario Power overh.[%] Single faults Double faults Multiple faults
ASR SDC ASR SDC ASR SDC
Linear code
None – 0.1289 0.0021 0.1350 0.0031 0.3565 0.0072
ASR0.5 5.8 0.1257 0.0020 0.1324 0.0031 0.3478 0.0069
10% 11.6 0.0056 0.0001 0.1205 0.0025 0.3399 0.0063
50% 19.4 0.0752 0.0008 0.0975 0.0020 0.3168 0.0055
QS GF (2)
None – 0.4997 0.0152 0.4996 0.0118 0.4991 0.0120
ASR0.9 6.2 0.4999 0.0153 0.4997 0.0116 0.4994 0.0120
ASR0.5 83.1 0.5000 0.2158 0.4999 0.0464 0.5003 0.0500
10% 16.6 0.4998 0.2157 0.4996 0.0477 0.5003 0.0500
50% 81.9 0.5008 0.2157 0.5001 0.0477 0.5007 0.0500
QS GF (4)
None – 0.2555 0.0058 0.2549 0.0059 0.2557 0.0052
ASR0.9 5.9 0.2542 0.0054 0.2542 0.0054 0.2552 0.0052
ASR0.5 6.9 0.2501 0.0054 0.2537 0.0054 0.2511 0.0052
10% 20.8 0.2521 0.0941 0.2520 0.0233 0.2511 0.0251
50% 81.9 0.2501 0.0467 0.2502 0.0232 0.2503 0.0250
QS GF (16)
None – 0.0629 0.0019 0.0621 0.000622 0.0634 0.0013
10% 15.9 0.0615 0.0011 0.0621 0.0006 0.0631 0.0013
50% 86.1 0.0615 0.0003 0.0620 0.0006 0.0626 0.0012
considered. It turns out to have the worst detection capabilities of single faults for
most scenarios, in terms of both ASR and SDC. This is unexpected, as QS codes are
robust and should outperform linear codes in terms of ASR. The two-redundant bit QS
code over GF (4) and the linear parity code are, by and large, comparable. The four-
redundant bit QS code over GF (16) has much better detection properties but requires
around 30% additional gates than other codes.
Selective hardening appears to be a useful alternative to exclude large vulnerabilities
(faults which can be injected with no or little chance of detection), as evidenced by
relatively small number of gates to be hardened in scenarioASR0.9. On the other hand,
ASR-guided selection of gates is not suitable to compensate for systematic deficiencies
of the basic protection scheme used. If the code misses faults with a high probability,
the hardening technique is only effective if almost all gates in the circuit are hardened.
It is a legitimate question whether using a better code with a higher area overhead or
employing a weaker code in combination with hardening selected gates is a better design
alternative. When comparing the unhardened design using the QS code over GF (16)
and the hardened versions based on other codes, there is no clear conclusion.
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5.4 Application to cryptographic circuits
In previous section robust codes have been applied to protection of general purpose
circuits. This section addresses application of robust codes to protection of the com-
binational circuit implementation of the lightweight block cipher PRINCE [191]. The
PRINCE algorithm is organized in 10 rounds, and each round is composed of four opera-
tions. The own circuit implementation was designed which is fully unrolled and performs
all 10 rounds of encryption in one cycle. It is purely combinational and consists of 8,320
gates (the reference combinational implementation from [191] requires 8,260 gates).
In order to investigate the granularity of protection, the flow introduced in Sec. 5.2 is
applied to the complete 10-round circuit; the portion of the unrolled circuit correspond-
ing to one round; and one SBox, which is the only nonlinear operation of the cipher.
The complete circuit and one round have 64 inputs and 64 outputs, whereas the SBox
has four inputs and four outputs.
Following linear codes are employed, along with the single parity code from previous
section: interlaced parity code with two through four parity bits responsible for non-
overlapping groups of information bits. The extended (8, 4) Hamming code is employed
solely for protection of the SBox of PRINCE.
Along with QS codes from previous section, QS code over GF (8) is employed. This code
has three redundant bits (RB) and its maximal error masking probability isQmc = 0.125.
Additionally, PC codes with same number of RBs and same Qmc as the QS codes are
employed. It is to note that the robust codes with multiple RBs are not applied to the
SBox of PRINCE due to the fact that the latter has only four outputs.
Three different fault-injection campaigns for each considered code and circuits were per-
formed: one assuming single stuck-at-1 and stuck-at-0 faults of one clock cycle duration
at all lines of the circuit, the predictor and the EDN, one assuming 10,000 randomly
selected double faults, and one assuming 10,000 faults of higher multiplicity. All cam-
paigns were run using random input sequences of 10,000 vectors.
5.4.1 Results
The mean ASR and SDC results are shown in Table 5.7. It can be seen that the linear
parity codes outperform the robust codes for single faults in SBox and one round of
PRINCE and a low number of redundant bits. This observation holds for both ASR
and SDC.
The good performance of linear codes might indicate that many single faults within
the circuit structure tend to manifest themselves as single errors at the circuit outputs.
This is plausible for cryptographic hardware composed of mostly reversible (bijective)
modules. Since linear codes have a minimal Hamming distance of 2, they are effective
in detecting such faults. For example, the 4-bit parity code x1⊕x2⊕x3⊕x4 will always
detect a single bit-flip at the first output in x1. On the other hand, the QS code over
GF (2) x1x2 ⊕ x3x4 will only detect the same bit-flip if x2 = 1.
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Table 5.7: Mean ASR and SDC, PRINCE circuit
Code RB Single faults Double faults Multiple faults
ASR SDC ASR SDC ASR SDC
S
B
ox
Parity 1 0.0677 0.0434 0.2754 0.1145 0.4210 0.2788
QS GF (2) 1 0.4422 0.2598 0.5063 0.2255 0.5140 0.3452
Punctured Cubic 1 0.4453 0.2254 0.5134 0.2565 0.5230 0.3012
QS GF (4) 2 0.2565 0.0155 0.2476 0.0456 0.2402 0.0174
Parity interlaced 2 0.0348 0.0184 0.1238 0.0502 0.1962 0.0119
Punctured Cubic 2 0.2587 0.0245 0.2357 0.0395 0.2335 0.0234
QS GF (8) 3 0.1245 0.0245 0.1235 0.0424 0.1221 0.0301
Punctured Cubic 3 0.1256 0.0245 0.1251 0.0234 0.1254 0.0326
Hamming 4 0 0 0.0137 0.0039 0.0283 0.0014
QS GF (16) 4 0.0634 0.0155 0.0627 0.0532 0.0633 0.0134
Punctured Cubic 4 0.0678 0.0201 0.0626 0.0133 0.0625 0.0223
O
n
e
ro
u
n
d
Parity 1 0.0980 0.0467 0.3424 0.0232 0.4727 0.0568
QS GF (2) 1 0.4970 0.1708 0.5007 0.0321 0.5007 0.0568
Punctured Cubic 1 0.4988 0.0264 0.5004 0.0267 0.5001 0.0588
Parity interlaced 2 0.0667 0.0057 0.1979 0.0025 0.2500 0.0068
QS GF (4) 2 0.2481 0.0743 0.2506 0.0140 0.2509 0.0256
Punctured Cubic 2 0.2503 0.0102 0.2501 0.0022 0.2502 0.0047
QS GF (8) 3 0.1344 0.0408 0.1330 0.0370 0.1291 0.0659
Punctured Cubic 3 0.1239 0.0047 0.1257 0.0011 0.1257 0.0024
Parity interlaced 4 0.0439 0.0042 0.1051 0.0015 0.1121 0.0031
QS GF (16) 4 0.0623 0.0025 0.0626 0.0005 0.0630 0.0011
Punctured Cubic 4 0.0624 0.0023 0.0625 0.0013 0.0623 0.0030
F
u
ll
ci
rc
u
it
Parity 1 0.4614 0.2219 0.4755 0.1829 0.4912 0.3223
QS GF (2) 1 0.5008 0.1157 0.5001 0.0639 0.5003 0.1094
Punctured Cubic 1 0.4996 0.1311 0.4999 0.1352 0.4999 0.2487
Parity interlaced 2 0.2305 0.0908 0.2392 0.0308 0.2435 0.0012
QS GF (4) 2 0.2501 0.0505 0.2502 0.0319 0.2501 0.0546
Punctured cubic 2 0.2503 0.0587 0.2507 0.0676 0.2501 0.0123
QS GF (8) 3 0.1325 0.0501 0.1298 0.0056 0.1267 0.0035
Punctured cubic 3 0.1250 0.0014 0.1251 0.0111 0.1248 0.0004
Parity interlaced 4 0.0568 0.0150 0.0600 0.0061 0.0609 0.0003
QS GF (16) 4 0.0624 0.0103 0.0625 0.0080 0.0626 0.0101
Punctured cubic 4 0.0628 0.0014 0.0630 0.0056 0.0625 0.0002
The situation changes when faults of higher multiplicity, more elaborate codes or larger
circuits are considered. The performance of the QS code over GF (2) is quite close to
the parity code for the SBox and is practically indistinguishable from the parity code
for the larger circuits. Robust codes with four RBs tend to outperform their linear
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Table 5.8: Mean ASR and SDC, faults in original device only
Code RB Single faults Double faults Multiple faults
ASR SDC ASR SDC ASR SDC
F
u
ll
ci
rc
u
it
Parity 1 0.4611 0.0182 0.4694 0.0059 0.4859 0.0085
QS GF (2) 1 0.4998 0.0194 0.5002 0.0063 0.5002 0.0087
Punctured Cubic 1 0.4999 0.0131 0.5002 0.0063 0.4999 0.0087
Parity interlaced 2 0.2312 0.0091 0.2361 0.0029 0.2426 0.0042
QS GF (4) 2 0.2494 0.0096 0.2502 0.0031 0.2501 0.0043
Punctured cubic 2 0.2502 0.0059 0.2500 0.0031 0.2499 0.0043
QS GF (8) 3 0.1321 0.0034 0.1245 0.0056 0.1239 0.0028
Punctured cubic 3 0.1253 0.0026 0.1251 0.0015 0.1248 0.0021
Parity interlaced 4 0.0571 0.0022 0.0588 0.0007 0.0607 0.0010
QS GF (16) 4 0.0626 0.0023 0.0625 0.0008 0.0625 0.0010
Punctured cubic 4 0.0624 0.0014 0.0625 0.0008 0.0624 0.0010
Table 5.9: Mean ASR and SDC, exploitable fault locations
Code RB Single faults Double faults Triple faults
ASR SDC ASR SDC ASR SDC
P
R
IN
C
E
ro
u
n
d
8/
9
Parity 1 0.5001 0.2501 0.5001 0.5633 0.4996 0.4371
QS GF (2) 1 0.5412 0.2707 0.5065 0.5729 0.5042 0.4424
Parity interlaced 2 0.3119 0.1560 0.2603 0.2969 0.2564 0.2262
QS GF (4) 2 0.2505 0.1253 0.2501 0.2817 0.2501 0.2188
Punctured cubic 3 0.1981 0.0990 0.1375 0.1590 0.1329 0.1184
Parity interlaced 4 0.1404 0.0702 0.0756 0.0901 0.0708 0.0644
QS GF (16) 4 0.0622 0.0311 0.0624 0.0703 0.0625 0.0547
Punctured cubic 4 0.1407 0.0703 0.0756 0.0898 0.0708 0.0643
counterparts. It is interesting that ASR almost perfectly matches Qmc for all fault
multiplicities. This is different compared with the significant deviations reported in
Sec. 5.3 for Braun multiplier design.
The reason is the high degree of reversibility of cryptographic circuits: the output code-
words are uniformly distributed, whereas a multiplier produces only a small subset of
output bit combinations. Comparing both classes of robust codes with each other, the
SDC of the punctured cubic codes tends to track with SDC of linear codes, while their
ASR closely matches the ASR of quadratic sum codes. They appear to combine the
best of the worlds, even though their construction is more complex.
Table 5.8 shows the results for faults injected only in the original device, whereas predic-
tor and EDN are fault-free. The numbers do not deviate from the results when all parts
of the architecture were considered during fault injection, indicating the high stability
of the predictions.
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Table 5.10: Distribution of ASR values over individual faults, one round of PRINCE
Code RB Number of faults with ASR in indicated range
0.0 0.0–0.1 0.1–0.2 0.2–0.3 0.3–0.4 0.4–0.5 0.5–0.6 0.6–0.7 0.7–0.8 0.8–0.9 0.9–1.0 1.0
si
n
gl
e
fa
u
lt
s
Parity 1 855 0 23 33 11 7 9 14 3 1 0 64
QS GF (2) 1 0 0 0 1 5 526 483 5 0 0 0 0
Punctured Cubic 1 0 0 0 0 5 514 496 5 0 0 0 0
Parity interlaced 2 58 0 4 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
QS GF (4) 2 0 0 46 941 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Punctured Cubic 2 0 0 33 945 41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
QS GF (8) 3 0 91 883 33 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 4
Punctured Cubic 3 0 102 916 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parity interlaced 4 174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
QS GF (16) 4 0 182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Punctured Cubic 4 0 1012 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d
ou
b
le
fa
u
lt
s
Parity 1 164 936 2858 3128 2081 2842 2844 248 235 140 32 43
QS GF (2) 1 16 0 4 9 54 7130 7348 80 20 5 2 26
Punctured Cubic 1 0 0 0 0 8 1413 1486 11 0 0 0 1
Parity interlaced 2 1341 288 539 411 222 340 396 15 19 39 6 9
QS GF (4) 2 17 4 390 12409 392 16 10 6 1 0 0 9
Punctured Cubic 2 0 0 74 2256 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
QS GF (8) 3 4 969 11653 306 58 51 24 12 5 5 3 13
Punctured Cubic 3 0 207 2209 6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Parity interlaced 4 2361 469 319 92 87 190 189 25 19 37 5 18
QS GF (16) 4 0 2322 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Punctured Cubic 4 2 2394 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
m
u
lt
ip
le
fa
u
lt
s
Parity 1 0 9 105 520 1600 9564 7116 82 13 5 1 1
QS GF (2) 1 0 0 4 10 50 9014 9510 79 11 3 0 0
Punctured Cubic 1 0 0 0 1 12 2882 3012 22 1 0 0 0
Parity interlaced 2 424 466 1030 3634 868 663 249 10 5 1 1 1
QS GF (4) 2 3 3 276 17206 357 16 11 5 1 2 1 0
Punctured Cubic 2 0 0 120 4701 136 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
QS GF (8) 3 3 860 16765 238 30 20 5 1 2 1 0 0
Punctured Cubic 3 0 354 4579 17 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Parity interlaced 4 1602 2582 1814 940 258 177 49 11 7 0 0 0
QS GF (16) 4 0 4859 17 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Punctured Cubic 4 2 4977 61 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In order to study the behavior of the codes in an actual attack scenario, faults were in-
jected according to the requirements of the multi-stage algebraic attack on the PRINCE
cipher [39]. The 64-bit state of PRINCE is organized into 4-bit nibbles, and the attacker
must flip an arbitrary number of bits in a single nibble without affecting other bits for
successful cryptanalysis. The attack is mounted in two stages: in the first stage the
fault is injected in a nibble in the state during round 9 (out of 10), and in the second
stage the injection is done into a state nibble in round 8. Three locations from the same
state nibble in round 9 were selected and a fault-injection campaign on all single, double
and triple faults on these locations was performed. This models an attacker who targets
these three locations by a probabilistic injection technique (such as laser illumination)
in order to obtain some modification of the nibble with a high probability. The same
procedure is repeated for other three suitable locations in round 8. The results are
shown in Table 5.9. They are quite similar to the result for larger fault lists from Table
5.7, and the match with the theoretical Qmc is even closer.
Table 5.10 shows the distribution of ASR values over individual faults for one round of
PRINCE. The findings discussed above are supported: linear codes are quite effective
for single and, to some extent, also double faults, but are inferior for multiple faults.
Robust codes always exhibit a clear profile: the vast majority of faults is collected in
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Figure 5.12: ASR classes for different codes with four RB (percentages)
the class(es) which contains Qmc of the code. For example, the quadratic sum code over
GF (4) has two redundant bits and Qmc = 0.25, which belongs to class 0.2–0.3. This
class contains by far most faults.
An important observation about robust codes is that the number of faults with high
ASR(f) (1.0 or somewhat below) is much lower compared with linear codes with the
same number of RBs. In particular, robust codes with four RBs have no high-ASR faults.
This is important in security context, where an attacker is free to pick any desired fault.
A fault with a high ASR(f) is likely (and a fault with an ASR(f) of 1 is certain) to
escape detection, thus allowing the adversary to complete the attack. This finding is
consistent with the purpose of the robust codes: to avoid the worst-case scenario which
the attacker could make use of. Figure 5.12 visualizes the ASR(f) distributions for
different codes with four RB.
5.5 Summary
A cross-level protection solution for digital circuits which combines information redun-
dancy (error-detecting codes) and low-level hardening was introduced. The results show
that spots vulnerable to undetected faults exist in the circuit for any code considered.
This is also true if advanced robust QS codes specifically designed for eliminating un-
detected faults or bounding their probability are employed. From a malicious attacker’s
point of view, such spots provide an opportunity to manipulate circuit operation without
being noticed. This capability of the attacker is modeled by the new formalism of attack
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success rate, and the relation between ASR and the value Qmc previously used in formal
analysis of robust codes is investigated. It is demonstrated that pinpointedly hardening
vulnerable spots is feasible and associated with limited area and power overhead. On the
other hand, ASR-guided selection of gates is not suitable to compensate for systematic
deficiencies of the basic protection scheme used. If the code misses faults with a high
probability, the hardening technique is only effective if almost all gates in the circuit are
hardened. An efficient solution for a given circuit must combine an effective code with
a good selection strategy for gate hardening.
The application of robust codes to protection of a cryptographic block against malicious
attacks was also investigated. The error-detection capabilities of quadratic-sum and
punctured cubic codes were determined and compared with the respective numbers
for linear codes. Robust codes were demonstrated to provide better security against
rare worst-case scenarios and also exhibited a good match to theoretical information-
level predictions. Punctured cubic codes showed detection properties comparable to
quadratic-sum codes with respect to malicious attacks and outperformed them when
random transient faults were considered.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Current CMOS technology is affected by process variations and is susceptible to physical
disturbances such as ionizing radiation. This thesis aimed at improving fault tolerance
of MIMO detection algorithms and underlying hardware. The trend in wireless com-
munications is the usage of large scale antenna arrays which leads to integration of
very large memories. This work addressed UW-OFDM in its interpretation as a vir-
tual massive MIMO system. Consequently, detection algorithms initially introduced
for generic large scale MIMO have been adopted to MIMO UW-OFDM. In particu-
lar, the modification of likelihood ascent search, which uses the soft information of the
LMMSE initial solution, denoted MAP LAS was proposed. In coded scenario, the pro-
posed MAP LAS algorithm outperforms the standard LAS algorithm. As far as the ML
detection is concerned, MIMO UW-OFDM with LAS detection is able to outperform
MIMO CP-OFDM with sphere decoding in uncoded scenario. However, associated com-
putational complexity is overwhelming and not suited for real-time implementation. In
coded scenario MIMO CP-OFDM with sphere decoding still performs better. It is to
conclude that MIMO UW-OFDM represents performance/complexity tradeoff between
MIMO CP-OFDM with LMMSE and MIMO CP-OFDM with sphere decoding (compa-
rable to successive interference cancellation). The large sizes of required memories (as
in MIMO UW-OFDM) renders their protection by standard means like error detecting
codes costly. The errors in the receive buffer memory are therefore treated as additional
non-Gaussian noise. This work proposed detection algorithms, derived from nonlinear
MMSE estimator, that take memory errors into account when deciding on the detected
symbols. The proposed log-NMMSE algorithm is able to significantly lower the BER
floor introduced by the memory errors even for very high bit-flip probability of 10−3.
When LAS is applied on top of the proposed algorithm, the BER performance is shown
to be very close to the memory error free case. With bit-flip probability of 10−4, the
effect of memory errors is canceled out. It has been shown, that allowing memory errors
with bit-flip probability of 10−4 by reducing the supply voltage of the memory circuit
would reduce the power consumption by 40%. Therefore, the proposed algorithm with
LAS run on top would allow significant power savings, without sacrificing the perfor-
mance. Future work could address other quasi-ML algorithms implemented recently
(reactive tabu search, belief propagation on factor graphs, Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods). Another interesting direction is the hardware implementation/optimization
of proposed memory error resilient algorithms.
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Actual hardware implementation of a MIMO receiver contains not only the detection
algorithm but also some preprocessing (QR decomposition) or post-processing (channel
decoding) blocks. Faults in different components of the receiver have different impact
on the detection quality. QR decomposition represents the critical point for the cor-
rect operation of the whole reception chain. In order to quantify this impact, the QRD
based on MMSE sorted Givens rotation was implemented fulfilling the stringent real-
time requirements of the LTE standard. The implementation was then targeted by fault
injection. The transient faults were injected into diverse computational components of
the implementation. The novelty of this experiment is stressed out by the fact that
previous works considered faults in internal buffering memories only. The implemented
QRD was integrated into the precise bit-accurate system-level simulation that allowed
to quantify the effect of faults injected into distinct computational sub-components on
the system performance in terms of FER. The results indicated that the affected com-
putation of the new diagonal element has the major impact on FER. Future research
should therefore consider fault tolerant implementation of the boundary cell, specifically
addressing the protection of the new diagonal element computation. As the errors in
the latter rotations are less critical, it can be considered to provide varying amount of
protection to first and subsequent iterations of the boundary cell.
Inherent vulnerability of contemporary hardware to physical disturbances makes it ac-
cessible to fault-based attacks. These attacks have been proven to be effective against
cryptographic components, present in by far most current systems (communications sys-
tems for example). This work addressed countermeasures against fault based attacks.
Here, robust codes were applied to actual circuits. In order to perform analysis of these
codes, new fault-based metrics have been introduced opposed to standard error-centric
metrics used previously. The introduced formalisms of attacks success rate and silent
data corruption allowed to identify critical location of stuck-at-faults within the circuits
which could escape detection. In order to remove these options for the possible attacker,
hardening of these locations has been proposed. The proposed combined solution can
be considered as a cross-level protection scheme that combines information and hard-
ware redundancy. Also, the classes of circuits where the robust codes are not able to
guarantee their properties have been identified. Finally, robust codes have been applied
to protection of actual low-power PRINCE cipher implementation. The performance of
robust codes and linear codes has been compared in terms of the introduced metrics.
It has been shown that robust codes are indeed superior over linear codes in terms of
ASR. Future work could concentrate on construction of codes that cover both malicious
attacks and random transient faults and empirical investigation of their properties.
Appendix A
Convolutional codes
Convolutional codes are linear codes. The difference from the block linear codes lies in
the encoding procedure. The encoding of K information bits to N code is performed in
one time step. The redundant bit depends on the current value of the information bit
and on the values of the information bits fed into the encoder at past time steps. The
encoding operation is not memoryless [56]. Usually, K and N are small numbers (1,2,3),
whereas for block codes K and N are large (N = 2048 for Reed-Solomon code). Due to
the memory of the encoder, convolutional codes are able to perform well for small K and
N . The memoryless encoder of a block code would produce poor codes for small K, N .
Convolutional codes and block codes are closely related. In fact, a convolutional code
can be regarded as a block code, with the generator matrix having special structure,
such that the encoding operation is expressed as convolution [55].
For an information bit sequence b, partitioned into blocks of length K:
b = (b0,b1, . . . ) (A.1)
bi = (b
(1)
i , b
(2)
i , . . . , b
(K)
i )
the encoder outputs the encoded bit sequence c, partitioned into blocks of length N
c = (c0, c1, . . . ) (A.2)
ci = (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , . . . , c
(N)
i )
The index i denotes the time step or the time index. In general, N > K code bits are
generated at each time step from K information bits, yielding the code rate:
R =
K
N
(A.3)
Consider an example rate 1/2 encoder depicted in Fig. A.1 The encoder contains a mem-
ory element and an exclusive-or element. Since the first code bit equals the information
bit - c
(1)
i = bi, it is a systematic encoder. In a non-systematic encoder, it is not possible
to separate the information bits and the code bits within the codeword. The second
code bit is obtained as c
(2)
i = bi+ bi−1. Initially, the memory element is set to zero. The
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Figure A.1: Rate 1/2 convolutional encoder
delay, until the code values are produced is defined by the number of time steps (cycles)
required to feed all memory elements of the encoder.
Looking at the example encoding circuit it is easy to identify the parameters of a con-
volutional code [54, 55]:
• maximal delay M is the number of time steps until valid code bits are produced
by the encoder circuit. For the example encoder in Fig. A.1 the maximal delay is
M = 1.
• code memory is the minimal number of registers required to construct the encoder
circuit. It is at most M ×K.
• constraint length lc is the overall number of information bits affecting code bits
generated at time step i, including the information bits fed into the encoder up to
M time steps back in time.
lc =MK +K = (M + 1)K (A.4)
A convolutional code is called systematic if the N code bits generated at time step i
contain K information bits. For the example code it is the case and it is obviously
systematic.
The codes with larger constraint length tend to provide better error correcting perfor-
mance, hence one of the main design goals of the convolutional codes is to obtain a code
with the maximum constraint length, while trying to keep the delay (number of required
memory elements) and thus the complexity of the encoder as low as possible [56].
Convolutional codes are linear codes, therefore the encoding can be described by multi-
plication with a generator matrix G [55]
c = GbT (A.5)
where
G =


G0 G1 G2 · · · GM
G0 G1 G2 · · · GM
G0 G1 G2 · · · GM
. . .
. . .
. . .

 (A.6)
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The K ×N sub-matrices Gm, m = 0, 1, . . . ,M , with elements from GF (2) specify how
an information bit block bi−m, delayed m steps in time, affects the code bit block xi:
xi =
M∑
m=0
Gmb
T
i−m, ∀i (A.7)
For the code in Fig. A.1 two sub-matrices of size 1× 2 have to be specified:
The sub-matrix G0 defines how ui affects the generation of code bits x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i . Hence
this matrix is G0 =
[
1 1
]
. The sub-matrix G1 identifies the code bits affected by the
ui−1, obviously, it equals G1 =
[
0 1
]
.
Alternatively, a convolutional code is defined by K × N polynomial generator matrix
[56], [54]
G(D) =


g
(1)
1 (D) g
(2)
1 (D) · · · g(N)1 (D)
g
(1)
2 (D) g
(2)
2 (D) · · · g(N)2 (D)
...
...
...
g
(1)
K (D) g
(2)
K (D) · · · g(N)K (D)

 (A.8)
where the matrix elements are polynomials over GF (2)
g
(j)
i (D) = g
(j)
i,0 + g
(j)
i,0D + g
(j)
i,2D
2 + · · ·+ g(j)i,MDM (A.9)
The j-th row of G(D) specifies how the j-th entry uji of each information bit block ui
affects the code bit block x.
The information bit sequence and code bit sequence can be described by vectors of
polynomials
b = (b(1)(D), b(2)(D), · · · b(K)(D)) (A.10)
where b(j)(D) = b
(j)
0 + b
(j)
1 D + · · ·+ b(j)i Di + · · · , j = 1, 2, · · · ,K,
c = (c(1)(D), c(2)(D), · · · c(N)(D)) (A.11)
where c(j)(D) = c
(j)
0 + c
(j)
1 D + · · ·+ c(j)i Di + · · · , j = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
The encoding equation for the polynomial representation is therefore
c(D) = G(D)bT (D) (A.12)
The polynomial matrix G(D) is obtained from G as follows:
g
(j)
i,m = gm(i, j) (A.13)
i = 1, · · ·K, j = 1, · · · , N , m = 0, · · · ,M , where gm(i, j) is the (i, j)-th entry of Gm.
The code parameter M defines the largest degree of all polynomials g
(j)
i (D).
For the example code in Fig. A.1, two generator polynomials g
(1)
1 (D) and g
(2)
1 (D) need
to be constructed to specify G(D) =
[
g
(1)
1 (D) g
(2)
1 (D)
]
. The first polynomial specifies
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Figure A.2: Rate 1/2 (171, 133) recursive systematic encoder
how the information bit, shifted in time up toM time steps, affects the first code bit. As
the first code bit is simply bi and does not depend on bi−1, the first generator polynomial
is given as g
(1)
1 (D) = 1 + 0 ·D = 1.
The second code bit is affected by both the current information bit bi and the information
bit, residing in the memory element, namely bi−1. Therefore the generator polynomial
is g
(2)
1 (D) = 1 + 1 ·D = 1 +D. The generator polynomial matrix is commonly given in
octal notation. In that format the polynomial generator matrix for the example code is
G(d) =
[
1 1 +D
]
=
[
1002 1102
]
=
[
48 68
]
(A.14)
The octal notation is practical as it specifies the information about the generator polyno-
mial of the code and consequently the corresponding encoding circuit in compact form.
For example, the industry standard rate 1/2 convolutional code is defined in octal nota-
tion as (171, 133) [54]. Disregarding the leading zeros in the octal notation the generator
polynomials are read as:
g
(1)
1 (D) = 171 = (00)1111001 = 1 +D +D
2 +D3 +D6 (A.15)
g
(2)
1 (D) = 133 = (00)1011011 = 1 +D
2 +D3 +D5 +D6
The resulting code is not systematic, as the first code bit is not just the current infor-
mation bit itself. In order to obtain a systematic code, the non-systematic generator
matrix has to be divided by the the first generator polynomial.
The resulting systematic polynomial generator matrix is
Gsys =
[
1 1+D
2+D3+D5+D6
1+D+D2+D3+D6
]
(A.16)
The first code bit is just the current information bit itself, rendering the code systematic.
The second polynomial is now a fraction of the two initial polynomials. The polyno-
mial in the nominator specifies the feed-forward connections and the polynomial in the
denominator specifies the feedback connection in the encoding circuit. Such systematic
convolutional codes are denoted as recursive systematic.
The resulting recursive systematic circuit of the rate 1/2 (171, 133) convolutional code
is depicted in Fig. A.2.
The decoding of convolutional codes is based on their trellis representation [55]. A
trellis is a directed graph, whose nodes are labeled with the variables s
(j)
i ∈ GF (2),
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j = 0, 1, . . . ,MK−1. The vector si =
[
s
(0)
i s
(1)
i · · · s(MK−1)i
]
combining all memory
element contents at time step i is called the state of the encoder at time step i. Therefore,
at each time step i there are S = 2MK nodes in a trellis. Each state node has 2K incoming
and outgoing branches. The branch labels contain the values of the information bit input
to the encoder at time step i and the resulting code bit values.
In order to obtain the trellis of a given convolutional code it is first necessary to find
out how state at each time step i depends on the information bit bi−m and possibly on
the state si−m,m > 0. In the example code depicted in Fig. A.1 the state is defined
as si = bi−1. Secondly, it must be defined how the code bits are generated from the
information bits and the state values. In the example code (Fig. A.1), the first code bit
is given by the information bit itself and does not depend on the state - c
(1)
i = bi. The
second code bit is computed from the current information bit and the value si stored in
the memory element - c
(2)
i = bi + si = bi + bi−1. Based on these two relationships the
trellis section of the example code is depicted in Fig. A.1.
At the receiver the encoded data possibly containing errors is denoted r. The convolu-
tional codes are decoded by the Viterbi algorithm [56]. At each time step i corresponding
to a section of the trellis the node and the branch metrics are computed. The branch
metric is given as
λi =
N∑
j=1
λji (A.17)
where the bit metric λji is the Hamming distance between the receive and the code bit
λji =

0 when c
(j)
i = r
(j)
i
1 when c
(i)
j 6= r(j)i
(A.18)
For each node the metrics for all 2K incoming branches Λi are computed as follows:
Λi =

λi , i = 0
Λi−1 + λi , i > 0
(A.19)
Out of 2K branches merging into a node, choose the one with the smallest metric Λi.
The other branches are discarded. The path through the trellis obtained so far is referred
to as the survivor path. If some metrics are equal, the survivor path is chosen by some
Figure A.3: Trellis section
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1
Figure A.4: Hard-decision decoding, one error
11
11 1
Figure A.5: Hard-decision decoding, two errors
arbitrary rule. For example, the upper/lower branch can be preferred or the branch can
be picked randomly.
After the algorithm processed l trellis sections or more, the node with the smallest overall
metric is chosen. The path which lead to this node through the trellis identifies the code
bit sequence which has the minimum Hamming distance to the receive bit sequence r.
The branches of the final survivor path identify the output information bit sequence.
The parameter l is the decision delay of the algorithm and specifies how many received
symbols have to be processed until the first block of decoded bits is available. As a rule
of thumb, the decision delay is often set to 5M .
Consider an example code sequence c =
[
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
]
output from
the example 1/2 rate convolutional encoder in Fig. A.1. Assume that during the trans-
mission an error has occurred as indicated in red in Fig. A.4 and the received code bit
sequence is r =
[
00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00
]
. The branches are labeled with the
branch metrics λi and the nodes are labeled with the Λi metric of the survivor path.
The discarding of paths is shown by crossing. The algorithm moves through the trellis,
and finally, there are two survivor paths with Λ7 = +1 and Λ7 = +3. The path with
the smallest metric is picked as the final survivor and is traced back to the beginning of
the trellis. The corresponding error corrected code sequence is obtained.
In case of multiple errors in the same transmitted code sequence, the received code
sequence is r =
[
00 11 00 00 00 00 00 00
]
as illustrated in Fig. A.5. It can
be observed that again the final survivor path is the one with Λ7 = +1, however, the
errors caused three decoding errors due to the changes in the path. Finally, there is one
information bit error.
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In order to improve the performance, soft-decision decoding is employed [55]. The soft
decision decoding uses the confidence information expressed as log-likelihood ratio (LLR)
[192]. The LLR of a coded bit ci is expressed as the ratio of probabilities of ci being
zero and one, respectively:
L(ci) =
P (ci = 0)
P (ci = 1)
(A.20)
Assume the following mapping of binary bit values to real values: 0 → +1, 1 → −1.
Using Bayes rule, the probability to guess the transmitted code bit ci, given the received
code bit ri is expressed as:
P (ci|ri) = p(ci, ri)/p(ri) = p(ri|ci)P (ci)/p(ri) (A.21)
Therefore, the LLR of the transmitted code bit, given the received code bit is
L(ci|ri) = log P (ci = +1|ri)
P (ci = −1|ri)
= log
p(ri|ci = +1)P (ci = +1)/p(ri)
p(ri|ci = −1)P (ci = −1)/p(ri)
= log
p(ri|ci = +1)P (ci = +1)
p(ri|ci = −1)P (ci = −1)
(A.22)
Assuming equal probability of transmitted code bits being +1 or −1, the LLR is further
simplified
L(ci|ri) = log p(ri|ci = +1)
p(ri|ci = −1) (A.23)
In case of binary input additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, the receive code
bit is given as [192]
ri = ci + ni (A.24)
where ni is the AWGN noise sample, with zero mean and variance σ
2
n. The conditional
probabilities in Eq. A.23 are therefore Gaussian
p(ri|ci = 1) = 1√
2πσ2n
exp
(
−(ri − 1)
2
2σ2n
)
(A.25)
p(ri|ci = −1) = 1√
2πσ2n
exp
(
(ri + 1)
2
2σ2n
)
(A.26)
The closed-form expression for LLR is then obtained as
L(ci|ri) = log
1√
2piσ2n
exp
(
− (ri−1)2
2σ2
)
1√
2piσ2n
exp
(
− (ri+1)2
2σ2n
)
= log exp
(
−(ri − 1)
2
2σ2n
+
(ri + 1)
2
2σ2n
)
=
1
2σ2n
(−(r2i − 2ri + 1) + (r2i + 2ri + 1))
=
2
σ2n
ri
(A.27)
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-0.5 -0.5
Figure A.6: Soft-decision decoding, two errors
The sign of the LLR gives the value of the of the transmitted code bit ci, and the
magnitude of LLR identifies the confidence in the taken decision. The positive sign of
LLR indicates p(ci = 0|ri) being larger than p(ci = 1|ri), resulting in decision for ci = 0.
The magnitude of LLR of +0.0043 would give less confidence in the decision compared
to the LLR of +2.5, as it indicates that the p(ci = 0|ri) is just slightly larger than
p(ci = 1|ri). As Eq. A.27 indicates that LLR magnitude depends on the AWGN noise
variance, in case of bad channel condition (large σ2n), the decision will be less certain
that in case of good channel condition (small σ2n).
Consider the same transmitted code sequence mapped to real values
c =
[
+1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1 +1 + 1
]
.
Assume that the errors happened due to bad channel conditions and the LLR val-
ues of the erroneous bits are −0.5. The correct bits are received while the channel
was reliable and their LLR values equal +2. The receive code sequence is therefore
r =
[
+2 + 2 −0.5− 0.5 +2 + 2 +2 + 2 +2 + 2 +2 + 2 +2 + 2 +2 + 2
]
. The
branch metric is now computed as Euclidean distance between the LLR of the received
bit and the code bit.
λji = (L(ri)− ci)2 (A.28)
The soft decision decoding is illustrated in Fig. A.6. It can be observed that, with
Euclidean distance metric computation, the correct path is taken through the trellis and
the errors are corrected.
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